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To quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Here Aristotle recognizes four types of things that can be given in answer to a why-question:

  • The material cause: “that out of which”, e.g., the bronze of a statue.
  • The formal cause: “the form”, “the account of what-it-is-to-be”, e.g., the shape of a statue.
  • The efficient cause: “the primary source of the change or rest”, e.g., the artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue, the man who gives advice, the father of the child.
  • The final cause: “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”, e.g., health is the end of walking, losing weight, purging, drugs, and surgical tools.

My assumption has always been that modern science concerns itself mostly with first three causes and that the final cause is considered out of bounds. Apparently Francis Bacon put both formal and final causes into the metaphysical realm:

For as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes and productions of effects, so that part which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdivide according to the received and sound division of causes. The one part, which is physic, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and the other, which is metaphysic, handleth the formal and final causes.

But I was surprised to read that biologists especially (including Darwin himself) have begun to tackle even Teleology, the Fourth Cause. Is this appropriate in Modern Science?

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Of course, I ask now because I want a chance at a free book‌​, but I've long wondered why teleology began to fall out of favor ironically around the same time Aristotle began to be rediscovered in the West. – Jon Ericson Dec 14 '11 at 21:27
I would disagree with the idea that biology has anything to do with causes. Evolution is not a directed process. I can program a "genetic algorithm" that will do a massive number of different random things, pick the best, and then modify that in a massive number of different ways, pick the best, and repeat. There is a progression towards the optimal solution. The random number generator has no grand plan and no goal. It doesn't want to make a perfect solution, it doesn't want to make a terrible solution. It simply spits out random numbers. What do you mean by the statement? – Keller Scholl Dec 15 '11 at 2:29
@Keller: If you read the Wikipedia entry I linked to or this one, you'll see that evolutionary biologist make statements that read as teleological. Any time an author uses the phrase "in order to" they are making a teleological statement whether they mean to or not. Presumably they don't mean to for reasons such as the one you suggest. (It's interesting that you used the phrase "progression towards the optimal solution", which strikes me as teleological too.) – Jon Ericson Dec 15 '11 at 17:02
I did read it. I agree that evolutionary biologists make those statements. I don't believe that they are addressing ultimate questions of intent. My action has a goal. The fourth cause of the computer spitting out random numbers is that I wanted it to produce something. The program is not the fourth cause of the data. I produce the program with the intent of having it spit out random numbers until it gets a set that is good enough. The data doesn't have a different fourth cause generated by the program. A dog doesn't have a cause generated by its DNA, though it approaches optimal DNA. – Keller Scholl Dec 16 '11 at 1:56
@Keller: Sorry. I must have misunderstood your earlier comment. At any rate, while genetic drift doesn't have a purpose, the process of natural selection is sometimes said to have a purpose of selecting mutations that best provide characteristics that facilitate reproduction. The anthropic principle verges in that direction sometimes too. I've asked a related question which might help you understand where this question comes from. – Jon Ericson Dec 16 '11 at 17:03
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3 Answers

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Teleology is, generally speaking, within the domain of theology; to speak of a final cause implies a subject who is intentionally causing the action in question, which in the global sense would apply to a god of some sort. (Naturally, teleology with regard to human actions is in the domain of psychology, but that's not what interests us here.)

The history of modern science, on the other hand, has been predicated (for the most part) on a growing assumption of a naturalistic hypothesis, where recourse to a deity is off-limits; the principle of parsimony implies Occam's Razor, so positing an additional entity to serve as the subject of a telos is frowned upon, as it is more parsimonious to just assume an unmotivated process. So, in general, the more modern a scientist is, the less likely they are to partake in teleological deliberation.

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This is false--- you can assume that natural phenomenon in biological evolution have a teleology without assuming that there is intervention of external supernatural entity. It might just be a law of nature that evolving computations become more complex and self-aware--- it is certainly true of life on Earth, and human social development up to this point. – Ron Maimon Apr 22 '12 at 18:31
You can assume that, but you have no particular reason to-- life on earth has gone through many waves of expansion and contraction; I'm sure the dinosaurs were certain that it might be a law of nature that creatures would keep getting bigger. – Michael Dorfman Apr 23 '12 at 6:59
I don't agree with either of you, but I agree that finality is not theological per se. After all, Aristotle's metaphysics certainly concerns itself with final causality, even going so far as to say that the organization of animals is impossible to explain without finality. But of course, he does not adhere to a mechanistic metaphysics, in which case teleology must be externalized just as the finality of an artifact is external to the artifact itself. In that case, even the often vague idea of physical law can't be teleological unless it rests in the mind of God. – danielm Nov 21 '12 at 12:13
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Modern science doesn't consider Aristotle's final cause to be a cause. The modern meaning of the word cause is simply different from the meaning of the word as used by Aristotle. However, modern science still considers describing "relevant ends" as providing valuable insight. This insight will typically be unrelated to the origin of the thing, but modern science is well aware that there may be more important questions than just the origin.

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This is also not true--- the "final cause" is fine when you are talking about intentional systems. Why are male peacock's tails longer today than 10,000,000 years ago? Because the females wanted future tails to be longer. This is a form of final cause, the female choice is intending a future outcome. Final causes are everywhere in evolution, and are not anathema to science if they are implemented by material causes. – Ron Maimon Apr 22 '12 at 18:33
@RonMaimon I answered this question back then, because I had already investigated that question before. If you look at the four causes, only the "efficient cause" resembles the way we use the word "cause" today. But the "final cause" seems to imply some sort of teleology, so people worry more about it than about the other "slightly off" causes. My answer just tried to clarify that even modern science sometimes investigates "relevant ends" (what Aristotle called "final cause") without subscribing to any sort of teleology. – Thomas Klimpel Apr 23 '12 at 8:47
I see, you're talking about the use of the word "cause". That's true, you're right--- usually we don't call teleological cause "cause", but "epiphenomenon". – Ron Maimon Apr 23 '12 at 16:30
Why does the female peacock respond to feathers of a certain kind? Certainly not because she "wanted" future tails to be longer. That's absurd. There isn't necessarily a particular "reason" she should respond to a particular peacock other than by virtue of her biological constitution (or why a male should respond only to females with all their feathers). That the effect may be survival of the species is also not a matter of intent (peacock feathers can attract predators just as well). As Gilson notes, while modern science doesn't concern itself with finality, its methods do not contradict it. – danielm Nov 21 '12 at 11:57
up vote 0 down vote

You ask at the end whether or not it is "appropriate" to address the subject in modern science.

Pro:

  • Psychology extensively addresses why humans do things. The normal list of goals is "Describe, explain, predict, and control." The second and third directly engage with what humans desire.

  • Behavioral Economics is another example of a field that is focused on why people desire specific things and how they desire them.

Anti:

  • Metaphysical theories are non falsifiable and as such don't fall under the category of science.
  • We don't yet know enough about psychology to attempt to truly engage with the fourth cause.
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