I understand moral subjectivism to be the meta-ethical idea that all moral statements are merely expressions of the individual and thus that there are no moral statements that are implicitly (objectively) true or false.
This essay/lecture by Michael Tabor seems to summarize and lay out as much (in addition to differentiating between moral subjectivism and moral relativism which are often treated as the same): http://faculty.smcm.edu/mstaber/rel-subj.htm
I understand that given such, a good analogy to use to illustrate the position of the moral subjectivism on morality is the the illustration using "favorite flavors of ice-cream".
Just as people's favorite flavor of ice-cream is understood to be completely subjective (dependent on their own arbitrary personal preference) so also is the moral subjectivist's approach to different moral doctrines and moral statements. To the moral subjectivist each is understood to be solely derived from one's personal preferences for that particular "flavor" of morality.
Understanding that to be a correct analogy- I have been trying to create a logical syllogism to say as much.
Are any of the three logical syllogisms below valid syllogisms, and if not- how might they be made to be so?
- P1. One's preference for ice-cream is completely subjective.
- P2. Moral subjectivism understands one's preference for morality to be completely subjective.
- C. Therefore moral subjectivism understands one's preference for morality to be analogous to ones preference for ice-cream.
- P1. When something is completely based on one's personal preferences, one can only appeal to arguments that depend on one's personal preferences.
- P2. Moral subjectivism understands all moral preferences to be completely based on ones personal preferences.
- C. Therefore moral preferences under moral subjectivism can only be appealed to using arguments that depend on one's personal preferences.
- P1. One's preference for ice-cream is completely subjective.
- P2. One's preference for morality with respect to moral subjectivism is completely subjective.
- C. Therefore one's preference for morality with respect to moral subjectivism is just as subjective as One's preference for ice-cream.
To those who will moderate this question- I am more interested in the question of the validity of the integrity of the syllogisms presented more than anything, and I hope that understanding that as the centerpiece of this question lends it the core of objectivity that is needed to save it from the ash-heap of being too subjective.