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I was contemplating Heideggers idea of Being whose Being is a problem. Self-consciousness to me, whilst directly speaks of consciousness that is aware of its own self as a consciousness, also carries an overtone of anxiety of that state of knowledge. Whereas consciousness seems to have only the connotation of being aware of qualia stimulated externally.

(As an aside, does Heidegger acknowledge the possibility of Being for which Being is not a problem? For if there is no such Being, why bring that distinction, is it only for distinction?)

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(On the aside, I think this would require an impossible degree of ontological stability; and it strikes me that Zizek perhaps makes the most interesting contemporary version of this argument, with his thesis that reality itself is fragmentary, or ontologically 'incomplete'...) –  Joseph Weissman Jan 3 '13 at 22:43
I remember the phrase "all consciousness is self-consciousness" in 'The Phenomenological Mind' - can't remember the argument particularly well - but the jist was that you generally do not have experience that is not obviously yours (even schizophrenics who receive others thoughts, which they discuss in some detail) - all experience has some kind of 'self content' (my term). –  Lucas Mar 9 at 19:05
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