Wittgenstein says in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:
6.4 All propositions are of equal value.
6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value—and if there were, it would be of no value.
If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental. It must lie outside the world.
Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.
Ethics are transcendental.
(Ethics and æsthetics are one.)
7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
What this says is that all propositions are of equal value (6.4), ethics is transcendental (6.421) and that we cannot speak of it and thus should remain silent about ethics(7).
Ethics, he says, is something that can only be shown:
4.1212 What can be shown cannot be said.
While this seems very clear at first, it seems rather absurd to say that one can not speak about ethics altogether. This would be very problematic; how can we teach people about morality? Through our actions only? Also, some of the implications would include that we wouldn't be able to condone any wrongdoings: slavery, human rights violations, terrorism,... these can be talked about as propositions (i.e. as facts), but are all of equal value. This would obviously be problematic.
So my actual question is: should we, according to Wittgenstein, really remain totally silent about ethics altogether (i.e. not talk about it in any way)? And if this is the case, then how would he deal with the issues I raised? Would he resolve them all by showing value through actions? And how exactly would he do so?