Are there any fallacies in arguments for design from DNA? [closed]

Question

DNA frequently comes up in discussions with theists about God and design (for context, I currently identify as agnostic). It is often compared to concepts from computer science, such as programming languages or information storage systems, which we know from experience to be designed. From this analogy, some argue that DNA must also be designed. While this is a simplification and may probably not represent the strongest version of Intelligent Design (ID) arguments based on DNA, I encourage you to explore primary sources that present steelman versions of this argument in more detail, such as:

• DNA by Design: An Inference to the Best Explanation for the Origin of Biological Information by Stephen C. Meyer: Link to article
• DNA and Design by Timothy G. Standish: Link to article

What are the major flaws or fallacies (if any) in these sorts of arguments?

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Summary of the first article

Title: "DNA by Design: An Inference to the Best Explanation for the Origin of Biological Information" by Stephen C. Meyer.

Sections:

• Introduction
• Chemical Evolution and the Problem of Life’s Origin
• The Miller-Urey Experiment
• Problems with the Oparin-Miller Hypothesis
  • Molecular Biology and the Origin of Information
  • Information Transfer: From DNA to Protein
• Naturalistic Explanations for the Origin of Information
  • Biological Information: Beyond the Reach of Chance
  • Prebiotic Natural Selection: A Contradiction in Terms
  • Self-Organizational Scenarios
  • Order vs. Information
  • The Message and the Medium
• The Return of the Design Hypothesis
• An Argument from Ignorance?
• Notes

Summary of the main argument from section The Return of the Design Hypothesis:

• Origin of Information: The properties of matter alone do not explain the origin of biological information, and blind chance becomes inadequate due to the immense improbability of specific arrangements, like in functional DNA or proteins.
• Scientific Laws and Self-Organization: Proposed naturalistic models like scientific laws or self-organization (e.g., Eigen's hypercycle, Kauffman’s self-organizational theory) fail to account for the origin of biological complexity, as they often presuppose the existence of information rather than explaining it.
• Intelligence as a Cause: High-information systems, such as DNA, show a pattern consistent with intelligent design. Experience in various fields (e.g., archaeology, SETI) suggests that information-intensive systems originate from intelligent agents.
• Inferences to Design: Historical and forensic methods allow for valid inferences about past causes based on present knowledge. The presence of high information content in a system, exceeding 500 bits (as calculated by Dembski), strongly implies intelligent design due to the inadequacy of chance or naturalistic explanations.

Inference to the Best Explanation:
Given that neither matter's properties nor chance provide a satisfactory explanation for the origin of biological information, and naturalistic models presuppose rather than explain the required complexity, the inference to the best explanation points toward an intelligent source. Just as in historical and forensic sciences where unique causes are inferred from known effects, the presence of high information content in DNA and cellular systems logically indicates the action of an intelligent mind. This conclusion follows from the insufficiency of natural laws and chance, combined with the observation that only intelligent agents are known to produce systems with high specified complexity.

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Summary of the second article

Title: "DNA and Design" by Timothy G. Standish

1. Sand and Paper as Information Storage: The article starts by comparing writing in sand, which is temporary and easily erased, to writing on paper, a more durable medium. It highlights how different materials are better suited for information storage based on their properties.

2. DNA as a Stable Information Storage Medium: DNA is presented as a remarkably stable material for genetic information. Its chemical stability allows it to last for thousands of years, enabling scientists to study extinct species' DNA.

3. DNA’s Information Efficiency: DNA stores an enormous amount of information in a very compact form. The human genome, though only a meter long in its DNA structure, contains enough information to fill around a million pages.

4. DNA’s Accurate Replication: The article explains the double helix structure of DNA and its role in ensuring that genetic information is accurately copied during cell division. This structure allows DNA to be replicated with precision, supporting life's complexity.

5. DNA’s Origin as the Genetic Material: Two views are presented for DNA's selection as the genetic material: either it was a product of unguided natural processes (Darwinism) or it was chosen by an intelligent Designer. The article points out the difficulty in imagining how DNA, as an ideal solution, could have evolved naturally without trial and error.

6. Challenges to Darwinian Evolution: The complexity involved in changing genetic material and the machinery to read it is seen as a problem for Darwinian evolution. The article argues that this level of coordination is unlikely to have occurred through slight, gradual changes.

7. Design Argument: The article compares DNA’s selection to how engineers choose materials for specific tasks, suggesting that DNA was chosen by a Designer who knew what they were doing, aligning with the belief in a Creator.

8. Misunderstood “Junk DNA”: Initially, many scientists considered non-coding DNA as "junk," but new research reveals that much of this DNA plays important roles, which challenges early evolutionary assumptions.

9. Genes’ Flexibility and Functionality: The article discusses how one gene can produce multiple proteins through processes like RNA splicing, further demonstrating the complexity and functionality of DNA beyond initial evolutionary models.

10. Conclusion: The article concludes by suggesting that the beauty, efficiency, and complexity of DNA support the idea of a Designer. It aligns the intricate nature of DNA with the Biblical view of God as the Creator, who chose DNA as the perfect medium for storing genetic information.

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BONUS: Pruss’ Analogical Design Argument (source)

1. DNA is like an intentionally designed computer program.
2. Intentionally designed computer programs have intelligent designers.
3. If DNA is like an intentionally designed computer program, it, too, probably has an intelligent designer.
4. So DNA probably has an intelligent designer.

Answer 1

BONUS: Pruss’ Analogical Design Argument

1. DNA is like an intentionally designed computer program.
2. Intentionally designed computer programs have intelligent designers.
3. If DNA is like an intentionally designed computer program, it too probably has an intelligent designer.
4. So DNA probably has an intelligent designer.

This is based on the weak/false analogy fallacy. I can give an absurd example using the same fallacy:

1. A cloud is like cotton candy.
2. Cotton candy is composed of sugar.
3. If a cloud is like cotton candy, then it too is composed of sugar.
4. So clouds are composed of sugar.

Edit: The weak/false analogy fallacy may not be the correct fallacy but it's close. My objection is the creation of an analogy to describe the function of DNA and then applying all the attributes of the analogy to DNA. It's a fallacy that involves analogies. An analogy is not an equivalence.

See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_analogy#Counterarguments:

Arguments from analogy may be attacked by using disanalogy, using counteranalogy, and by pointing out unintended consequences of an analogy. To understand how one might analyse an argument from analogy, consider the teleological argument and its criticisms put forward by the philosopher David Hume.

The logic behind the watchmaker argument states that you cannot assume that a complex and precise object like a watch was created through some random process. We can easily infer that such objects had an intelligent creator who planned its use. Therefore, we ought to draw the same conclusion for another complex and apparently designed object: the universe.

Hume argued that the universe and a watch have many relevant differences. For instance, the universe is often very disorderly and random but a watch is not. This form of argument is called "disanalogy". If the amount and variety of relevant similarities between two objects strengthens an analogical conclusion, then the amount and variety of relevant differences have to weaken it. Creating a "counteranalogy," Hume argued that some natural objects seem to have order and complexity — snowflakes for example — but are not the result of intelligent direction. But even if the snowflake's order and complexity might not have direction, their causes might. So this falsifies the statement but begs the question. Finally, Hume provides many possible "unintended consequences" of the argument. For instance, objects such as watches are often the result of the labour of groups of individuals. Thus, the reasoning used by the teleological argument would seem to agree with polytheism.

Answer 2

Such books are not written to convince anyone of a different opinion that they had before. They are written to help people keep their faith while facing growing amount of evidence and pressure for the opposite. So such books are meant to act as an anchor keeping the sheep in the pen.

Thus the authors do not in any way attempt to seek a fair survey of all available material and write a justified evaluation of it, rather they seek to create an impression of doing so while doing the opposite, selecting specific "weak" claims to attack completely discarding any stronger claims and evidence. This only works for publication because they do not seek "peer" feedback by experts on the matter (which are not really peers in a way). Instead they are either not reviewed, or reviewed by people with the same agenda.

True enough, the author Stephen Meyer is a director in the Discovery Institute, an organization founded and sponsored by Christian Creationists seeking for US schools to teach religion in science class. This book is just yet another attack on science, made because Christian Creationists believe that teaching children sientific facts will turn them into drug users, prostitutes, homosexuals, or even worse, Democrats.

Because of all those structural flaws in the creation of such books, one should not analyze their arguments as if this was an honest debate. Rather such books are attempts at misguiding and selling cultist propaganda, and should be read as such.

Putting all that aside, the typical strategy of ID developed by Christian creationists in the "Discovery Institute" is to build a fallacious argument based on:

• Argument from incredulity
• Argument from ignorance
• Bad and unjustified math

So ID prepares materials targeted at those creationists who actually got a science education (a minority among creationists), and generally follows a script of explaining how awesome and complex biology is, and then urging that we cannot in our minds imagine how this could have evolved and emerges without a designer, and because our imagination is thusly limited, we should accept a simpler narrative that all this was done by a great designer.

In other words, the authors hope that the imagination of their audience is limited enough to succumb to the temptation of a dumbed down fairytale story. And it is obvious that in matters of daily life, we prefer narratives that we can understand, and deferr complexity to the authority of experts. But that approach does not work for nature and biology.

And since such materials are targeted at doubting Christians, that designer is implicitly assumed to be that god which preferred some bronze-age tribe of shepherds in the middle east over their neighboring tribes.

While the irreducible complexity argument would also work for any other religion, only the Christian Creationist movement uses it for its propaganda.

Answer 3

That is begging the question. The thing is by assuming that this is "information" or "storage" you assume that this is deliberate, hence by design. But that it is information in the first place is not really a fact, that's merely our interpretation.

Like if you look at a rough surface or into the clouds you can easily see faces, animals, machines or whatnot. Largely due to the fact that we are really good at pattern matching and apply those skills even to things that don't actually follow any patterns.

In other words, these things aren't information, we MAKE them be information.

You can even ask the question as to whether information can exist on it's own or whether information requires an interaction between data and an entity capable of processing it.

For example by using a keyboard you can encode your thoughts in words and texts, but a cat running over your keyboard could also produce strings of characters yet they would have no meaning and their creation wasn't even a deliberate act to begin with but just a byproduct of walking from A to B or using the "massage" function of that weird human gizmo.

So in other words the "information density" is almost entirely subjective. Like a physicist might look at a painting and analyze the material composition of it's constituents, a painter might look at it and marvel about the techniques, colors and contrasts being employed, an unskilled observer might be drawn into the scenery or narrative of what is portrayed, while an uninterested observer might just react with "nice" or "ugh" and move on. Now how much "information" is truly part of that image and how much is made up in the respective observer?

Like for the person who can make use of it, every smallest particle might hold enough information to write tomes and marvel about it for an entire life or might, for the uninterested observer, be void of anything interesting.

Similarly complexity, symmetry or simplicity somewhat lay in the eyes of the beholder. Like we often consider straight edges and sharp contrasts as "simple", but actually those are rather rare in nature (though not impossible either). While round objects are much harder for US to construct, though are quite frequent to occur naturally (simple)? The layman (me included) considers art were you just drip colors on a canvas randomly to be void of much skill and interesting qualities, but some nonetheless see meaning and complexity in it. While algorithmic structure that evolve into bigger constructs taking very interesting shapes, might appear complex but their conception is actually really simple.

So just because something appears beautifully simplistic or unfathomably complex doesn't mean it actually is either of those or that it needs to have been the result of deliberate action. We sometimes make the assumptions and are sometimes justified by experience to make that assumption but often enough it's nonetheless an assumption.

Answer 4

While some ID arguments may have fallacies, the main problem with ID arguments is that they are designed to PERSUADE. IE, they are not science.

To persuade, one cites supporting examples, and falsely claims they provide "confirmation". But in doing science, one wants to make predictions. How USEFUL is ID? What does it predict? And do ID advocates go looking for falsifying test cases, where predictions fail? Scientists do. For ID, it is really only the critics who do.

Lets compare the design vs abiogenesis theories about DNA's origins.

First, the design hypothesis. If one assumes and omni-designer, then DNA should be the perfect chemical encoding method for our temperatures and planetary resources. These papers talk about how good DNA is (stable, high information density), but not whether there is anything better that we didn't use. It is actually easy to check this. DNA uses only four "letters" in its alphabet. If instead DNA used 10, 20, or a hundred, then the information density of DNA could be orders of magnitude better. DNA may be "good" as is, but it is not optimal. And these failures to be optimal are actually common across all aspects of life.

The abiogenesis theory I will assume is Dyson's model of RNA then DNA taking over a dynamic equilibrium protein protocell. In this model, one would expect to have some precursors to DNA still bouncing around in the cell and doing some encrypting (RNA is right there, doing exactly that), and to have RNA precursors in the cell doing other things (Sure, ATP, and the coil structure of proteins). One should expect DNA to not be perfect, just very good at what it does (yes again).

The abiogenesis model looks like a much better fit to the actual properties of information storage in cells (NOT all DNA!), and the properties of DNA (good but not perfect).

We can also look at the information and complexity and perfection of DNA arguments in the papers, and look for test cases for them. The most obvious for me is the yearly evolution of influenza viruses. For viruses to change every year like they do, the "new information" barrier these papers treat as a major law of nature, clearly does not actually limit viruses. They make changes to DNA on a regular basis, CREATING information per the ID model. And that so many variants can and do exist, means that NONE of them are "perfect". In fact the advantage of pluralism suggests there IS no such thing as a "perfect" DNA, variability is a bonus. Also, the ease by which these changes occur shows that chemical evolution happens far more easily than the ID calculations of chemical probabilities would claim.

So -- two relatively simple test cases, that just some basic biology understanding allows one to do, show that the ID assumptions and claims are far from the "best explanation".

Answer 5

The key flaw (to my knowledge) is dialectical: ID theory involves a specific theory (or at least a family of such theories) of probability, and then a theory/family-of-theories about how probability intersects justifiability. From a mathematical-pluralist standpoint, one can't entirely gainsay someone's decision to adopt these or those random axioms of probability any more than one can gainsay someone's decision to adopt these or those random axioms of sets or whatever. But so as the SEP entry on interpretations of probability concludes:

It should be clear from the foregoing that there is still much work to be done regarding the interpretations of probability. Each interpretation that we have canvassed seems to capture some crucial insight into a concept of it, yet falls short of doing complete justice to this concept. Perhaps the full story about probability is something of a patchwork, with partially overlapping pieces and principles about how they ought to relate. In that sense, the above interpretations might be regarded as complementary, although to be sure each may need some further refinement. My bet, for what it is worth, is that we will retain the distinct notions of physical, logical/evidential, and subjective probability, with a rich tapestry of connections between them.

... We thus come back full circle to where we started. The classical and logical/evidential interpretations sought to capture an objective notion of probability that measures evidential support relations. Early proponents of the subjective interpretation gave us a highly permissive notion of rational credences, constrained only by the probability calculus. Less liberal subjectivists added further rationality constraints, with credences beholden to attitudes about physical probabilities, and to evidential probabilities—at an extreme, to the point of uniqueness. The three kinds of concepts of probability that we identified at the outset converge: epistemological, degrees of confidence, and physical. Future research will doubtless explore further the relationships between them—and how they provide guides to life.

So perhaps if one adopts a creationist theory of probability, one gets the intended conclusion. But what reason do I have to adopt a creationist theory of probability?

There's also a triviality danger: if there is a singular agent of divine simplicity with power over all other things, and this agent orders all of creation, then everything is designed anyway, and regardless of how the designing is done (God radiates energy from outside spacetime, into spacetime? that doesn't sound correct, per divine simplicity among other things). There's no differentiating an undesigned thing from a designed one, on that basis. As Kant summarizes the matter:

The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such contempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon it, with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For, if they reflect upon and examine their own arguments, they will find that, after following for some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering themselves no nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and pass into the region of pure possibility [emphasis added], where they hope to reach upon the wings of ideas what had eluded all their empirical investigations. Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this immense leap, they extend their determinate conception—into the possession of which they have come, they know not how—over the whole sphere of creation, and explain their ideal, which is entirely a product of pure reason, by illustrations drawn from experience—though in a degree miserably unworthy of the grandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge that they have arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from that of experience.

Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and this upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being; and as besides these three there is no other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof, on the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is the only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all.

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To illuminate a comment of mine:

The mathematical theory of measures encompasses and brings together concepts such as mass and probability. It is from within this theoretique that the notion of a measurable cardinal in part came (another basis was infinitary logic, where we got not so much the concept of a measurable cardinal as a proof of their relative immensity, though). So there is even the bizarre-sounding notion of quantum measurable cardinals.

Now per the theory of consistency strength, every large cardinal is large in terms of this strength. For a historical example, ZFC without Replacement has aleph-omega as a large cardinal, i.e. one it can't prove to be a set. But for ZFC proper, a worldly cardinal, which is not inaccessible, is the least satisfier of the solution type for the problem (of consistency strength). And so on and on. So patterns of consistency strength are able to be considered "unto themselves," and there is e.g. a double helix pattern in a certain sphere of large-cardinal "dynamics" (elementary embeddings, to be precise, of which measurable cardinals are a notoriously imposing example).

What is the point of that labyrinth of sets, here? Just that the theory of probability is itself embedded in not only an infinitely greater mathematical context, but one whose sheer order of greater infinity rises to the insane heights of things like measurable cardinals and upwards spirals of abstract logical power approaching something as drastic as the Kunen inconsistency. The most powerful way for us to gain knowledge in mathematics is by being able to understand a particular sample, e.g. a particular natural number, in terms of e.g. the whole set of natural numbers. To reflect the individual through its encompassing infinity of variation. So if there are, relative to us, unboundedly many possibilities, then there are infinitesimal variations in probability, infinitely many of them, even just in one universe governed by quantum physics to a sufficient extent (and which is also not only expanding but changing its rate of expansion as time expands).

How, in a world with such a nature, is it so difficult to understand that if a stable structure popped into being during whatever primordial flux, then by definition as a stable being, this would somehow endure to expand the presence of its structure to other beings? And so what deliberative foresight does this require? This is luck, but in the trivial sense that a sufficiently stable structure would pop into existence ever at all, so we need not be as superstitious as to ask about even impersonal fate, now. The physical creationist will be minded to claim that God "protected" DNA as it formed and developed, for what else would be called for if DNA is so powerful once secured in the first place? And if it was just that there happened to be the right environment for the initial homeostasis to emerge, well... Again, it does not seem self-evidently justifiable to infer a specific claim that this is somehow objectionably improbable. If God could have predestined DNA in general, It could have predestined it to emerge in the luckily suitable environment; or It could have generated protective energy fields around DNA in a more hostile environment. In the one case, we have a causality indistinguishable from no causality at all; in the other, we have a magical, superstitious picture of the matter.

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I have not been able to find much in the way of academic assessments of creationist probability theory. Mehta[08] is a book review of two texts at the intersection of theology and probability theory, which says (regarding Unwin's The Probability of God):

Before getting to the math, Unwin reaches out to those who may be skeptical of this entire process in the first place. He explains precisely the type of God he will be referring to and dismisses many of the “proofs” of God that are popular among Christians, including Intelligent Design and the Fine-Tuned Universe argument.

Schurz[07] argues against the improbability argument at hand. I found a sub-dialectic about references to some "Borel's law," something about things with an improbability of 10⁵⁰ or more being impossible, but from what I know of Borel vs. Kolmogorov, Borel's supposed law is refutable if taken literally.

I have also often heard that quantum physics is the most well-supported empirical theory in history. Quantum physics seems to be based on a nonstandard probability theory (see e.g. the SEP entry on the topic). But then it seems as if calculations of individual probabilities, in quantum physics, are the most well-supported as such, and these calculations do not clearly seem to lend themselves to the picture of intelligent selection. "It is probable that DNA was designed," does not seem to fall out of quantum probability theory in the same way that, "It is probable that this particle will decay as of time t," does.

Answer 6

Possibly bad statistics.

Evidence of X is data which shifts the probability of X a finite amount in the direction of 1.

The appearance of X is, in fact, evidence of X. If you take the emotionally loaded subject out of the picture, this is not controversial.

Evidence of X is not proof of X. Evidence of X is not proof that X is probable. Evidence of X is data which shifts the probability of X a finite amount in the direction of 1 and that's all it is.

How much, and from where, the appearance of X shifts the probability of X, we can't know without some measured priors.

The job of somebody promoting the X hypothesis is to demonstrate that X is more likely than not-X. This requires one of two things:

1. A measured prior probability or set of prior probabilities of X|appears-X. If we have this, we can just run some elementary probability calculus and find out how probable it is in some particular case. But trying to use appears-X to find out what that prior probability of X|appears-X is in the first place doesn't go anywhere.

2. A falsifiable model which predicts something different for X|appears-X than it predicts for !X|appears-X under some circumstances, which we can then go out and measure. In this case, if modern biology is taken to be an instance of !X, and the claim is that modern biology is missing something which the claim X represents, we want a model which can predict something that contradicts a prediction of modern biology. Or we want a model which which can make a prediction about something that modern biology can't predict with any precision. If we have this, we can go out and get some measured priors.

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re 1, note that using the probability for one sample set (i.e. this DNA and also a big box of computer code) and then swapping sample sets (to i.e. just DNA) is lying.

re 2, one might assert that one has already done the experiment and one's model already did predict something that modern biology failed to predict. This may be what some of the DNA arguments are doing. "Modern biology predicts less appearance of design in DNA than was found, while my model predicts the found appearance of design in DNA, therefore my model is more predictively useful under these circumstances" is sound. The premise may be false, but there's nothing wrong with the induction.

Answer 7

I see a few major problems with this kind of argument.

From a theological side, I think, some Christians and other theists would consider it a subtle and therefore devious form of blasphemy or idolatry, since this argument brings an infinite God down to the level of God's finite creation. It's like saying "Ah, now we have a found an unmistable trace of God, God's imprint on the world!" Science (or what science seems to reveal) here becomes an idol. From a Christian or theist perspective this argument diminishes God, in particular God's infinite grace and power. God is no longer the truly transcendent, totally Other. A Christian theologian like Karl Barth rejects this kind of natural theology out of hand since it implicitly denies that we only get to know God through faith and through Gods revelation in Christ. The prime directives of protestant theology are Sola Scriptura, Sola Fide ("only scripture, only faith") and any argument like this rattles the "sola".

From a pyschological side, I would tell those who defend this kind of reasoning to be very wary of what they wish for. When adolescents or others are really persuaded by this argument, it thereby also becomes a possible reason to lose their faith, when the argument later proves to be untenable and doesn't appear so convincing anymore.

Finally, from a scientific side, the argument essentially relies on a tendentious, hand-waving-like representation of evolutionary biology. The argument always involves a premisse similar to the quoted one

blind chance becomes inadequate due to the immense improbability of specific arrangements, like in functional DNA or proteins.

Note that (1) no specific probability measure is given, and (2) it's claimed that yet the current DNA arrangements have "immense" improbability, (3) it considers some unspecified current DNA strings, ignoring actual evolutionary processes.

As to (1), the OPs first article actually does mention several probability measures "to construct" a functioning protein. (See also comments below this answer.) These estimates seem to me rather like back-of-the-envelope guestimates. Moreover, they also completely ignore the recursive evolutionary process in which those proteins might have developed. (If we simply calculate the "probability" of "constructing" Shakespeare's collected plays by considering the space of all random alphabetic sequences (in a given length range), then that probability would also be "vanishingly" small, much smaller than 1 in 10⁶⁵. It's a miracle they could ever be created at all... In fact, even if we just consider the probability of constructing one of Shakespeare's sonnets in terms of a trigram language model build on words, instead of letters, a reasonable guestimate might be 10^-240. These kind of numbers, where "information" is just considered as some kind of "given" don't mean much. We have to ask: how did that "given" develop.)

As to (2) this implicitly appeals to laypeople's intuitions about what might be "probable". However, those intuitions don't have a good sense of the time-scale on which evolution occurs and don't have any sense of the speed at which evolution can occur ("can" in the sense of "provably can" and "empirically has"). One way to get a better intuition for this is to consider evolutionary algorithms. (Another way is to look at the speed of viral evolution, where the time-scale does make intuitive sense to us. The mechanisms there are essentially the same as in general evolution. Isn't it kind of suspicious that no one speaks of "design" working itself out on that level?)

As to (3), evolutionary processes are not simply driven by chance, but by chance and mutual adaptation. According to the theory of genetic algorithms, adaptation happens by gradually building up blocks in the genome, substring "schemata". John Holland's Schema Theorem then shows (with some caveats) that short schemata with above-average fitness receive exponentionally many more samples in each new generation.

Evolutionary and genetic algorithms are used as optimization algorithms and are a much simplified model of actual evolution, but as such they show that optimization (or adaptation) can happen with exponential speed. (Of course sometimes it can lock in on a kind of suboptimal "dead-end", as happens frequently in actual evolution as well.)

In short, any intuitive appeal the DNA argument of design has is based on people's lack of adequate intuitions about both the time-scale of evolutionary processes and about exponential increase. The argument either rests on empirically false premisses or on premisses that may not be completely known but are themselves very unlikely (like the presumed "immense improbability" of some DNA strings).

Answer 8

This question asks whether there are any fallacies, and so I'd like to provide an answer in the negative--not trying to prove a universal negative, but explaining why I think the most commonly cited fallacies that I've heard aren't really fallacies if we look at them:

1. "It's not science": (This isn't an allegation of a fallacy, but it's probably the most common objection given in any event.) I'll grant that ID isn't the same as operational chemistry or biology; but neither is the theory of undirected universal common descent, for that matter. Both are forensic in nature. I saw a sign in a museum once that said, "Evolution is a fact, like the law of gravity." If by "evolution" they meant "universal common descent," then I strongly disagree. I can test gravity with an apple and the kitchen table, but I certainly cannot test universal common descent in that way.
2. "Weak analogy": In every analogy, there are similarities and differences. If there were no differences, it would not be analogous but univocal. And so we must evaluate whether the bases of the analogy are more essential or accidental, for example, and how they relate to the conclusion. As I understand the arguments, I think the analogy from the design, and the "computer code" like function of DNA, are very good. Instructional code is part of how we understand intelligence to express itself in relation to function; and the appearance of design is a highly essential comparison with a designer, as well.
3. "Sub-optimal design":
   (A) Many times, we've guessed wrong on that. :) For example, we've pulled "junk DNA" back out of the trash can when we realized the value it has. I think we're in danger of being like a toddler trying to give his father advice on how to frame a house; maybe in his mind, his way seems better; but almost certainly, he's not thinking of something important. The ID argument is based on the brilliance of the design that we can understand, and not on the parts we may not yet understand.
   (B) If the DNA has suffered mutational degradation over millennia, then some of what's there was not in the original design. But a weathered statue evidences design all the same, notwithstanding the fading somewhat from the original.
   (C) A Creator may have different values than we do. Maybe He's not always going for 100% maximum functional efficiency. Maybe He wants to show His creativity sometimes, the way we humans might want to show off the neat designs of building ice castles out of only ice, for example. And if we accept creation, then the sum goal of life isn't all about survival anyway, but about a lot of other great things. Again, the ID argument is about the brilliance of design that we do understand, not a claim to fully understand all of the design decisions.
4. "Probability cloud": So as I understand it (and I'm open to correction if I'm misunderstanding the argument), this claims that a cloud of doubt hangs over probability theory, and thus over subsequent justifiability of belief. But I don't see how that undermines Meyer's argument specifically at all. Meyer's argument is really quite simple at the core, as I understand it; the probability of a functional protein relative to the proportion of non-functional ones, the handedness of amino acids, etc. It seems to me that I can safely assume that I will never flip a hundred heads in a row, on an honest coin, by chance, during my lifetime; no matter what it is that philosophers are trying to hash out about probability theory itself. Perhaps we could quibble about the specific numbers a little, or throw around the idea of literal chemical properties playing a miniscule role; but any small patch of clouds on probability theory itself seems quite insufficient to darken the entire landscape. I don't see its correlation to reality on anywhere near the magnitude of Meyer's argument.