Taking responsibility is distinguished from being morally responsible in that, if one takes responsibility for a particular outcome it does not follow that one is morally responsible for that outcome. One can take responsibility for many things, from the mundane to the vitally important. For example, one can take responsibility for teaching a course, organizing a conference, or throwing a birthday party. The responsibility taken, however, is profoundly different from the moral responsibility that would justify blame and punishment, praise and reward (Waller 2011: 105; Pereboom 2001: xxi).

While some philosophers may claim (or assume) that taking responsibility entails being morally responsible (e.g., Smilansky 2012), this seems to conflate a very important distinction. To take responsibility for, say, organizing a conference, is to agree to put forth the effort needed to achieve a certain set of goals or tasks—e.g., inviting speakers, putting out a CFP, reserving the space, etc. If the conference were to fail for reasons completely outside the control of the agent—say there was a major snowstorm that day and several of the speakers could not make it—it would remain a separate and open question whether the agent who took charge for organizing the conference was deserving of blame for the failure. For many, the intuition is rather strong that she is not, especially in cases where the reasons for failure are external to the agent (e.g., a snow storm, canceled flights, etc.). But skeptics would contend that the same remains true when the failure is due to the agent’s own flaws (e.g., their laziness) since in a naturalistic world devoid of miracles these too are the result of factors outside the control of the agent (e.g., determinism, chance, or luck).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/

It semes to be a very important aspect of moral obligation. If I cannot take charge for something then my obligation to do it is different.

Can we take responsibility without moral responsibility (I am somewhat unnconvinced that the example shows we can, rather than the two not being identical, because the agent is potentially blameworthy for something), and is taking responsibility threatened by determinism?

I'm also intersted in whether it interfaces with the answerability sense of responsibility, whether we need to be answerable to ourselves to take charge.

I know no convincing reason to think that the control involved in taking charge of something never suffices for the agent to be responsible for e.g. a succesful conference and the intrinsic goods associated with that, in which case we are morally responsible for some things. What have I missed (that I could understand)?

Taking responsibility is distinguished from being morally responsible in that, if one takes responsibility for a particular outcome it does not follow that one is morally responsible for that outcome. One can take responsibility for many things, from the mundane to the vitally important. For example, one can take responsibility for teaching a course, organizing a conference, or throwing a birthday party. The responsibility taken, however, is profoundly different from the moral responsibility that would justify blame and punishment, praise and reward (Waller 2011: 105; Pereboom 2001: xxi).

While some philosophers may claim (or assume) that taking responsibility entails being morally responsible (e.g., Smilansky 2012), this seems to conflate a very important distinction. To take responsibility for, say, organizing a conference, is to agree to put forth the effort needed to achieve a certain set of goals or tasks—e.g., inviting speakers, putting out a CFP, reserving the space, etc. If the conference were to fail for reasons completely outside the control of the agent—say there was a major snowstorm that day and several of the speakers could not make it—it would remain a separate and open question whether the agent who took charge for organizing the conference was deserving of blame for the failure. For many, the intuition is rather strong that she is not, especially in cases where the reasons for failure are external to the agent (e.g., a snow storm, canceled flights, etc.). But skeptics would contend that the same remains true when the failure is due to the agent’s own flaws (e.g., their laziness) since in a naturalistic world devoid of miracles these too are the result of factors outside the control of the agent (e.g., determinism, chance, or luck).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/

It semes to me an important aspect of moral obligation. If I cannot take charge of something - plan to attend the party - then my obligation to do it is different.

Can we take responsibility without moral responsibility (I am somewhat unnconvinced that the example shows we can, rather than the two not being identical, because the agent is potentially blameworthy for something), and is taking responsibility threatened by determinism?

I'm also intersted in whether it interfaces with the answerability sense of responsibility, whether we need to be answerable to ourselves to take charge.

I know no convincing reason to think that the control involved in taking charge of something never suffices for the agent to be responsible for e.g. a succesful conference and the intrinsic goods associated with that, in which case we are morally responsible for some things. What have I missed (that I could understand)?

Taking responsibility is distinguished from being morally responsible in that, if one takes responsibility for a particular outcome it does not follow that one is morally responsible for that outcome. One can take responsibility for many things, from the mundane to the vitally important. For example, one can take responsibility for teaching a course, organizing a conference, or throwing a birthday party. The responsibility taken, however, is profoundly different from the moral responsibility that would justify blame and punishment, praise and reward (Waller 2011: 105; Pereboom 2001: xxi).

While some philosophers may claim (or assume) that taking responsibility entails being morally responsible (e.g., Smilansky 2012), this seems to conflate a very important distinction. To take responsibility for, say, organizing a conference, is to agree to put forth the effort needed to achieve a certain set of goals or tasks—e.g., inviting speakers, putting out a CFP, reserving the space, etc. If the conference were to fail for reasons completely outside the control of the agent—say there was a major snowstorm that day and several of the speakers could not make it—it would remain a separate and open question whether the agent who took charge for organizing the conference was deserving of blame for the failure. For many, the intuition is rather strong that she is not, especially in cases where the reasons for failure are external to the agent (e.g., a snow storm, canceled flights, etc.). But skeptics would contend that the same remains true when the failure is due to the agent’s own flaws (e.g., their laziness) since in a naturalistic world devoid of miracles these too are the result of factors outside the control of the agent (e.g., determinism, chance, or luck).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/

It semes to be a very important aspect of moral obligation. If I cannot take charge for something then my obligation to do it is different.

Can we take responsibility without moral responsibility (I am somewhat unnconvinced that the example shows we can, rather than the two not being identical, because the agent is potentially blameworthy for something), and is taking responsibility threatened by determinism?

I'm also intersted in whether it interfaces with the answerability sense of responsibility, whether we need to be answerable to ourselves to take charge.

I know no convincing reason to think that the control involved in taking charge of something never suffices for the agent to be responsible for e.g. a succesful conference and the intrinsic goods associated with that, in which case we are morally responsible for some things. What have I missed?

Taking responsibility is distinguished from being morally responsible in that, if one takes responsibility for a particular outcome it does not follow that one is morally responsible for that outcome. One can take responsibility for many things, from the mundane to the vitally important. For example, one can take responsibility for teaching a course, organizing a conference, or throwing a birthday party. The responsibility taken, however, is profoundly different from the moral responsibility that would justify blame and punishment, praise and reward (Waller 2011: 105; Pereboom 2001: xxi).

While some philosophers may claim (or assume) that taking responsibility entails being morally responsible (e.g., Smilansky 2012), this seems to conflate a very important distinction. To take responsibility for, say, organizing a conference, is to agree to put forth the effort needed to achieve a certain set of goals or tasks—e.g., inviting speakers, putting out a CFP, reserving the space, etc. If the conference were to fail for reasons completely outside the control of the agent—say there was a major snowstorm that day and several of the speakers could not make it—it would remain a separate and open question whether the agent who took charge for organizing the conference was deserving of blame for the failure. For many, the intuition is rather strong that she is not, especially in cases where the reasons for failure are external to the agent (e.g., a snow storm, canceled flights, etc.). But skeptics would contend that the same remains true when the failure is due to the agent’s own flaws (e.g., their laziness) since in a naturalistic world devoid of miracles these too are the result of factors outside the control of the agent (e.g., determinism, chance, or luck).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/

It semes to be a very important aspect of moral obligation. If I cannot take charge for something then my obligation to do it is different.

Can we take responsibility without moral responsibility (I am somewhat unnconvinced that the example shows we can, rather than the two not being identical, because the agent is potentially blameworthy for something), and is taking responsibility threatened by determinism?

I'm also intersted in whether it interfaces with the answerability sense of responsibility, whether we need to be answerable to ourselves to take charge.

I know no convincing reason to think that the control involved in taking charge of something never suffices for the agent to be responsible for e.g. a succesful conference and the intrinsic goods associated with that, in which case we are morally responsible for some things. What have I missed (that I could understand)?

Taking responsibility is distinguished from being morally responsible in that, if one takes responsibility for a particular outcome it does not follow that one is morally responsible for that outcome. One can take responsibility for many things, from the mundane to the vitally important. For example, one can take responsibility for teaching a course, organizing a conference, or throwing a birthday party. The responsibility taken, however, is profoundly different from the moral responsibility that would justify blame and punishment, praise and reward (Waller 2011: 105; Pereboom 2001: xxi).

While some philosophers may claim (or assume) that taking responsibility entails being morally responsible (e.g., Smilansky 2012), this seems to conflate a very important distinction. To take responsibility for, say, organizing a conference, is to agree to put forth the effort needed to achieve a certain set of goals or tasks—e.g., inviting speakers, putting out a CFP, reserving the space, etc. If the conference were to fail for reasons completely outside the control of the agent—say there was a major snowstorm that day and several of the speakers could not make it—it would remain a separate and open question whether the agent who took charge for organizing the conference was deserving of blame for the failure. For many, the intuition is rather strong that she is not, especially in cases where the reasons for failure are external to the agent (e.g., a snow storm, canceled flights, etc.). But skeptics would contend that the same remains true when the failure is due to the agent’s own flaws (e.g., their laziness) since in a naturalistic world devoid of miracles these too are the result of factors outside the control of the agent (e.g., determinism, chance, or luck).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/

It semes to be a very important aspect of moral obligation. If I cannot take charge for something then my obligation to do it is different.

Can we take responsibility without moral responsibility (I am somewhat unnconvinced that the example shows we can, rather than the two not being identical, because the agent is potentially blameworthy for something), and is taking responsibility threatened by determinism?

I'm also intersted in whether it interfaces with the answerability sense of responsibility, whether we need to be answerable to ourselves to take charge.

I know no convincing reason to think that the control involved in taking charge of something never suffices for the agent to be responsible for e.g. a succesful conference and the intrinsic goods associated with that, in which case we are morally responsible for some things.

Taking responsibility is distinguished from being morally responsible in that, if one takes responsibility for a particular outcome it does not follow that one is morally responsible for that outcome. One can take responsibility for many things, from the mundane to the vitally important. For example, one can take responsibility for teaching a course, organizing a conference, or throwing a birthday party. The responsibility taken, however, is profoundly different from the moral responsibility that would justify blame and punishment, praise and reward (Waller 2011: 105; Pereboom 2001: xxi).

While some philosophers may claim (or assume) that taking responsibility entails being morally responsible (e.g., Smilansky 2012), this seems to conflate a very important distinction. To take responsibility for, say, organizing a conference, is to agree to put forth the effort needed to achieve a certain set of goals or tasks—e.g., inviting speakers, putting out a CFP, reserving the space, etc. If the conference were to fail for reasons completely outside the control of the agent—say there was a major snowstorm that day and several of the speakers could not make it—it would remain a separate and open question whether the agent who took charge for organizing the conference was deserving of blame for the failure. For many, the intuition is rather strong that she is not, especially in cases where the reasons for failure are external to the agent (e.g., a snow storm, canceled flights, etc.). But skeptics would contend that the same remains true when the failure is due to the agent’s own flaws (e.g., their laziness) since in a naturalistic world devoid of miracles these too are the result of factors outside the control of the agent (e.g., determinism, chance, or luck).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/

It semes to be a very important aspect of moral obligation. If I cannot take charge for something then my obligation to do it is different.

Can we take responsibility without moral responsibility (I am somewhat unnconvinced that the example shows we can, rather than the two not being identical, because the agent is potentially blameworthy for something), and is taking responsibility threatened by determinism?

I'm also intersted in whether it interfaces with the answerability sense of responsibility, whether we need to be answerable to ourselves to take charge.

I know no convincing reason to think that the control involved in taking charge of something never suffices for the agent to be responsible for e.g. a succesful conference and the intrinsic goods associated with that, in which case we are morally responsible for some things. What have I missed?