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Similar to the question of Do experiences need to be “real” to be worthwhile or desireable?Do experiences need to be “real” to be worthwhile or desireable?

Robert Nozick has argued against pure hedonism as a means to happiness based on the fact that a person wouldn't want to plug themselves into a machine that makes him experience constant pleasure/happiness without requiring the natural physical stimuli for such emotions. Personally, I have never really understood the argument (and it has generated a good deal of literature), but let's say that it's true that a person would refuse the pleasure machine. However, once he is actually in the pleasure machine, he would certainly rather stay there forever and would experience his life as much better than if he wouldn't be in such a machine. Thus, would it be unethical for me to force him into such a machine, knowing that he'd be happier in there, despite his present refusal?

Before you answer 'no, that's horrible', imagine the opposite case: my friend has a psychiatric disorder or an unhealthily intense feeling of guilt that causes him to feel the need to constantly cause himself pain, but I know of a psychiatric treatment that would be able to help him get over those feelings and live a genuinely happy life. Right now, of course, he insists that undergoing such a therapy would be horrible, and he refuses to do so - but he's suffering from a psychiatric disorder. Can I help him anyway, against his wishes?

Is there a fundamental difference between these two cases, merely because in one case I'd cause someone to stop experiencing 'reality'? Does my own opinion matter (meaning, let's say I'm in the same position as the man in the first case myself, but I wouldn't refuse the opportunity to plug in to the experience machine)

Similar to the question of Do experiences need to be “real” to be worthwhile or desireable?

Robert Nozick has argued against pure hedonism as a means to happiness based on the fact that a person wouldn't want to plug themselves into a machine that makes him experience constant pleasure/happiness without requiring the natural physical stimuli for such emotions. Personally, I have never really understood the argument (and it has generated a good deal of literature), but let's say that it's true that a person would refuse the pleasure machine. However, once he is actually in the pleasure machine, he would certainly rather stay there forever and would experience his life as much better than if he wouldn't be in such a machine. Thus, would it be unethical for me to force him into such a machine, knowing that he'd be happier in there, despite his present refusal?

Before you answer 'no, that's horrible', imagine the opposite case: my friend has a psychiatric disorder or an unhealthily intense feeling of guilt that causes him to feel the need to constantly cause himself pain, but I know of a psychiatric treatment that would be able to help him get over those feelings and live a genuinely happy life. Right now, of course, he insists that undergoing such a therapy would be horrible, and he refuses to do so - but he's suffering from a psychiatric disorder. Can I help him anyway, against his wishes?

Is there a fundamental difference between these two cases, merely because in one case I'd cause someone to stop experiencing 'reality'? Does my own opinion matter (meaning, let's say I'm in the same position as the man in the first case myself, but I wouldn't refuse the opportunity to plug in to the experience machine)

Similar to the question of Do experiences need to be “real” to be worthwhile or desireable?

Robert Nozick has argued against pure hedonism as a means to happiness based on the fact that a person wouldn't want to plug themselves into a machine that makes him experience constant pleasure/happiness without requiring the natural physical stimuli for such emotions. Personally, I have never really understood the argument (and it has generated a good deal of literature), but let's say that it's true that a person would refuse the pleasure machine. However, once he is actually in the pleasure machine, he would certainly rather stay there forever and would experience his life as much better than if he wouldn't be in such a machine. Thus, would it be unethical for me to force him into such a machine, knowing that he'd be happier in there, despite his present refusal?

Before you answer 'no, that's horrible', imagine the opposite case: my friend has a psychiatric disorder or an unhealthily intense feeling of guilt that causes him to feel the need to constantly cause himself pain, but I know of a psychiatric treatment that would be able to help him get over those feelings and live a genuinely happy life. Right now, of course, he insists that undergoing such a therapy would be horrible, and he refuses to do so - but he's suffering from a psychiatric disorder. Can I help him anyway, against his wishes?

Is there a fundamental difference between these two cases, merely because in one case I'd cause someone to stop experiencing 'reality'? Does my own opinion matter (meaning, let's say I'm in the same position as the man in the first case myself, but I wouldn't refuse the opportunity to plug in to the experience machine)

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Ethics of Using an Experience Machine/Going Against Someone's Wishes for Their Own Good

Similar to the question of Do experiences need to be “real” to be worthwhile or desireable?

Robert Nozick has argued against pure hedonism as a means to happiness based on the fact that a person wouldn't want to plug themselves into a machine that makes him experience constant pleasure/happiness without requiring the natural physical stimuli for such emotions. Personally, I have never really understood the argument (and it has generated a good deal of literature), but let's say that it's true that a person would refuse the pleasure machine. However, once he is actually in the pleasure machine, he would certainly rather stay there forever and would experience his life as much better than if he wouldn't be in such a machine. Thus, would it be unethical for me to force him into such a machine, knowing that he'd be happier in there, despite his present refusal?

Before you answer 'no, that's horrible', imagine the opposite case: my friend has a psychiatric disorder or an unhealthily intense feeling of guilt that causes him to feel the need to constantly cause himself pain, but I know of a psychiatric treatment that would be able to help him get over those feelings and live a genuinely happy life. Right now, of course, he insists that undergoing such a therapy would be horrible, and he refuses to do so - but he's suffering from a psychiatric disorder. Can I help him anyway, against his wishes?

Is there a fundamental difference between these two cases, merely because in one case I'd cause someone to stop experiencing 'reality'? Does my own opinion matter (meaning, let's say I'm in the same position as the man in the first case myself, but I wouldn't refuse the opportunity to plug in to the experience machine)