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The last question is metaphysically quite interesting. If you're a Lewisian modal realist there is a quick answer: There is something rather than nothing, because it's impossible that there is nothing. According to Lewis it's possible that there is nothing iff there is some possible world where nothing exists. Lewis analyses worlds in such a way that this is the case only if there is some (non-empty) mereological sum u of individuals having no parts. But u has at least one part. Contradiction. See David K. Lewis : On the Plurality of Worlds.

You get the same result, if you accept the biconditional and if you assume that worlds are (represented by) classical first-order models, which by definition have non-empty domains.

The last question is metaphysically quite interesting. If you're a Lewisian modal realist there is a quick answer: There is something rather than nothing, because it's impossible that there is nothing. According to Lewis it's possible that there is nothing iff there is some possible world where nothing exists. Lewis analyses worlds in such a way that this is the case only if there is some (non-empty) mereological sum u of individuals having no parts. But u has at least one part. Contradiction.

You get the same result, if you accept the biconditional and if you assume that worlds are (represented by) classical first-order models, which by definition have non-empty domains.

The last question is metaphysically quite interesting. If you're a Lewisian modal realist there is a quick answer: There is something rather than nothing, because it's impossible that there is nothing. According to Lewis it's possible that there is nothing iff there is some possible world where nothing exists. Lewis analyses worlds in such a way that this is the case only if there is some (non-empty) mereological sum u of individuals having no parts. But u has at least one part. Contradiction. See David K. Lewis : On the Plurality of Worlds.

You get the same result, if you accept the biconditional and if you assume that worlds are (represented by) classical first-order models, which by definition have non-empty domains.

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The last question is metaphysically quite interesting. If you're a Lewisian modal realist there is a quick answer: There is something rather than nothing, because it's impossible that there is nothing. According to Lewis it's possible that there is nothing iff there is some possible world where nothing exists. Lewis analyses worlds in such a way that this is the case only if there is some (non-empty) mereological sum u of individuals having no parts. But u has at least one part. Contradiction.

You get the same result, if you accept the biconditional and if you assume that worlds are (represented by) classical first-order models, which by definition have non-empty domains.