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I think NietzscheNietzsche uses Socrates as a strawman for all kinds of ideas he wishes to counter.

For instance, in The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music he laments the passing of an archaic time when both Dionysian and Appolonian influences determined art (and life) and he criticizes Euripidean drama, in which he sees the influence of Socrates:

Thus, the Euripidean drama is simultaneously a cool and fiery thing, equally capable of freezing or burning. It is impossible for it to attain the Apollonian effect of the epic, while, on the other hand, it has divorced itself as much as possible from the Dionysian elements, and now, in order to work at all, it needs new ways to arouse people, methods which can no longer lie within either of the two individual artistic drives of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. These methods of arousing people are detached paradoxical ideas—substituted for Apollonian objects of contemplation—and fiery emotions—substituted for Dionysian enchantment. The fiery effects are, to be sure, imitated with the highest degree of realism, but the ideas and emotional effects are not in the slightest imbued with the spirit of art.

Hence, if we have recognized this much, that Euripides was not at all successful in basing his drama solely on Apollonian principles, that, by contrast, his un-Dionysian tendencies led him astray into an inartistic naturalism, we will now able to move closer to the essential quality of Socratic aesthetics, whose most important law runs something like this: “Everything must be understandable in order to be beautiful,” a corollary to the Socratic saying, “Only the knowledgeable person is virtuous.”

I think what Nietzsche has against the strawman is that he (as well as Nietzsche) investigates a domain besides the simply known, the rational (starting from "I know that I know nothing"), but instead of respecting it is as raw and un-knowable (i.e. Dionysian) he wishes to analyze and penetrate it. So as far as I can see, Nietzsche blames Socrates (or "Socrates") for raising a veil.

Of course and as always there are multiple threads in Nietzsche's argument, and some of them contradict each other: it is perhaps the author's way of supporting Dionysian principles against the strawman (who does not like logical contradictions and wants to get rid of them).

I think Nietzsche uses Socrates as a strawman for all kinds of ideas he wishes to counter.

For instance, in The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music he laments the passing of an archaic time when both Dionysian and Appolonian influences determined art (and life) and he criticizes Euripidean drama, in which he sees the influence of Socrates:

Thus, the Euripidean drama is simultaneously a cool and fiery thing, equally capable of freezing or burning. It is impossible for it to attain the Apollonian effect of the epic, while, on the other hand, it has divorced itself as much as possible from the Dionysian elements, and now, in order to work at all, it needs new ways to arouse people, methods which can no longer lie within either of the two individual artistic drives of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. These methods of arousing people are detached paradoxical ideas—substituted for Apollonian objects of contemplation—and fiery emotions—substituted for Dionysian enchantment. The fiery effects are, to be sure, imitated with the highest degree of realism, but the ideas and emotional effects are not in the slightest imbued with the spirit of art.

Hence, if we have recognized this much, that Euripides was not at all successful in basing his drama solely on Apollonian principles, that, by contrast, his un-Dionysian tendencies led him astray into an inartistic naturalism, we will now able to move closer to the essential quality of Socratic aesthetics, whose most important law runs something like this: “Everything must be understandable in order to be beautiful,” a corollary to the Socratic saying, “Only the knowledgeable person is virtuous.”

I think what Nietzsche has against the strawman is that he (as well as Nietzsche) investigates a domain besides the simply known, the rational (starting from "I know that I know nothing"), but instead of respecting it is as raw and un-knowable (i.e. Dionysian) he wishes to analyze and penetrate it. So as far as I can see, Nietzsche blames Socrates (or "Socrates") for raising a veil.

Of course and as always there are multiple threads in Nietzsche's argument, and some of them contradict each other: it is perhaps the author's way of supporting Dionysian principles against the strawman (who does not like logical contradictions and wants to get rid of them).

I think Nietzsche uses Socrates as a strawman for all kinds of ideas he wishes to counter.

For instance, in The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music he laments the passing of an archaic time when both Dionysian and Appolonian influences determined art (and life) and he criticizes Euripidean drama, in which he sees the influence of Socrates:

Thus, the Euripidean drama is simultaneously a cool and fiery thing, equally capable of freezing or burning. It is impossible for it to attain the Apollonian effect of the epic, while, on the other hand, it has divorced itself as much as possible from the Dionysian elements, and now, in order to work at all, it needs new ways to arouse people, methods which can no longer lie within either of the two individual artistic drives of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. These methods of arousing people are detached paradoxical ideas—substituted for Apollonian objects of contemplation—and fiery emotions—substituted for Dionysian enchantment. The fiery effects are, to be sure, imitated with the highest degree of realism, but the ideas and emotional effects are not in the slightest imbued with the spirit of art.

Hence, if we have recognized this much, that Euripides was not at all successful in basing his drama solely on Apollonian principles, that, by contrast, his un-Dionysian tendencies led him astray into an inartistic naturalism, we will now able to move closer to the essential quality of Socratic aesthetics, whose most important law runs something like this: “Everything must be understandable in order to be beautiful,” a corollary to the Socratic saying, “Only the knowledgeable person is virtuous.”

I think what Nietzsche has against the strawman is that he (as well as Nietzsche) investigates a domain besides the simply known, the rational (starting from "I know that I know nothing"), but instead of respecting it is as raw and un-knowable (i.e. Dionysian) he wishes to analyze and penetrate it. So as far as I can see, Nietzsche blames Socrates (or "Socrates") for raising a veil.

Of course and as always there are multiple threads in Nietzsche's argument, and some of them contradict each other: it is perhaps the author's way of supporting Dionysian principles against the strawman (who does not like logical contradictions and wants to get rid of them).

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I think Nietzsche uses Socrates as a strawman for all kinds of ideas he wishes to counter.

For instance, in The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music he laments the passing of an archaic time when both Dionysian and Appolonian influences determined art (and life) and he criticizes contemporary Euripidean drama, in which he sees the influence of Socrates:

Thus, the Euripidean drama is simultaneously a cool and fiery thing, equally capable of freezing or burning. It is impossible for it to attain the Apollonian effect of the epic, while, on the other hand, it has divorced itself as much as possible from the Dionysian elements, and now, in order to work at all, it needs new ways to arouse people, methods which can no longer lie within either of the two individual artistic drives of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. These methods of arousing people are detached paradoxical ideas—substituted for Apollonian objects of contemplation—and fiery emotions—substituted for Dionysian enchantment. The fiery effects are, to be sure, imitated with the highest degree of realism, but the ideas and emotional effects are not in the slightest imbued with the spirit of art.

Hence, if we have recognized this much, that Euripides was not at all successful in basing his drama solely on Apollonian principles, that, by contrast, his un-Dionysian tendencies led him astray into an inartistic naturalism, we will now able to move closer to the essential quality of Socratic aesthetics, whose most important law runs something like this: “Everything must be understandable in order to be beautiful,” a corollary to the Socratic saying, “Only the knowledgeable person is virtuous.”

I think what Nietzsche has against the strawman is that he (as well as Nietzsche) investigates a domain besides the simply known, the rational (starting from "I know that I know nothing"), but instead of respecting it is as raw and un-knowable (i.e. Dionysian) he wishes to analyze and penetrate it. So as far as I can see, Nietzsche blames Socrates (or "Socrates") for raising a veil.

Of course and as always there are multiple threads in Nietzsche's argument, and some of them contradict each other: it is perhaps the author's way of supporting Dionysian principles against the strawman (who does not like lociallogical contradictions and wants to get rid of them).

I think Nietzsche uses Socrates as a strawman for all kinds of ideas he wishes to counter.

For instance, in The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music he laments the passing of an archaic time when both Dionysian and Appolonian influences determined art (and life) and he criticizes contemporary Euripidean drama, in which he sees the influence of Socrates:

Thus, the Euripidean drama is simultaneously a cool and fiery thing, equally capable of freezing or burning. It is impossible for it to attain the Apollonian effect of the epic, while, on the other hand, it has divorced itself as much as possible from the Dionysian elements, and now, in order to work at all, it needs new ways to arouse people, methods which can no longer lie within either of the two individual artistic drives of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. These methods of arousing people are detached paradoxical ideas—substituted for Apollonian objects of contemplation—and fiery emotions—substituted for Dionysian enchantment. The fiery effects are, to be sure, imitated with the highest degree of realism, but the ideas and emotional effects are not in the slightest imbued with the spirit of art.

Hence, if we have recognized this much, that Euripides was not at all successful in basing his drama solely on Apollonian principles, that, by contrast, his un-Dionysian tendencies led him astray into an inartistic naturalism, we will now able to move closer to the essential quality of Socratic aesthetics, whose most important law runs something like this: “Everything must be understandable in order to be beautiful,” a corollary to the Socratic saying, “Only the knowledgeable person is virtuous.”

I think what Nietzsche has against the strawman is that he (as well as Nietzsche) investigates a domain besides the simply known, the rational (starting from "I know that I know nothing"), but instead of respecting it is as raw and un-knowable (i.e. Dionysian) he wishes to analyze and penetrate it. So as far as I can see, Nietzsche blames Socrates (or "Socrates") for raising a veil.

Of course and as always there are multiple threads in Nietzsche's argument, and some of them contradict each other: it is perhaps the author's way of supporting Dionysian principles against the strawman (who does not like locial contradictions and wants to get rid of them).

I think Nietzsche uses Socrates as a strawman for all kinds of ideas he wishes to counter.

For instance, in The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music he laments the passing of an archaic time when both Dionysian and Appolonian influences determined art (and life) and he criticizes Euripidean drama, in which he sees the influence of Socrates:

Thus, the Euripidean drama is simultaneously a cool and fiery thing, equally capable of freezing or burning. It is impossible for it to attain the Apollonian effect of the epic, while, on the other hand, it has divorced itself as much as possible from the Dionysian elements, and now, in order to work at all, it needs new ways to arouse people, methods which can no longer lie within either of the two individual artistic drives of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. These methods of arousing people are detached paradoxical ideas—substituted for Apollonian objects of contemplation—and fiery emotions—substituted for Dionysian enchantment. The fiery effects are, to be sure, imitated with the highest degree of realism, but the ideas and emotional effects are not in the slightest imbued with the spirit of art.

Hence, if we have recognized this much, that Euripides was not at all successful in basing his drama solely on Apollonian principles, that, by contrast, his un-Dionysian tendencies led him astray into an inartistic naturalism, we will now able to move closer to the essential quality of Socratic aesthetics, whose most important law runs something like this: “Everything must be understandable in order to be beautiful,” a corollary to the Socratic saying, “Only the knowledgeable person is virtuous.”

I think what Nietzsche has against the strawman is that he (as well as Nietzsche) investigates a domain besides the simply known, the rational (starting from "I know that I know nothing"), but instead of respecting it is as raw and un-knowable (i.e. Dionysian) he wishes to analyze and penetrate it. So as far as I can see, Nietzsche blames Socrates (or "Socrates") for raising a veil.

Of course and as always there are multiple threads in Nietzsche's argument, and some of them contradict each other: it is perhaps the author's way of supporting Dionysian principles against the strawman (who does not like logical contradictions and wants to get rid of them).

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I think Nietzsche uses Socrates as a strawman for all kinds of ideas he wishes to counter.

For instance, in The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music he laments the passing of an archaic time when both Dionysian and Appolonian influences determined art (and life) and he criticizes contemporary Euripidean drama, in which he sees the influence of Socrates:

Thus, the Euripidean drama is simultaneously a cool and fiery thing, equally capable of freezing or burning. It is impossible for it to attain the Apollonian effect of the epic, while, on the other hand, it has divorced itself as much as possible from the Dionysian elements, and now, in order to work at all, it needs new ways to arouse people, methods which can no longer lie within either of the two individual artistic drives of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. These methods of arousing people are detached paradoxical ideas—substituted for Apollonian objects of contemplation—and fiery emotions—substituted for Dionysian enchantment. The fiery effects are, to be sure, imitated with the highest degree of realism, but the ideas and emotional effects are not in the slightest imbued with the spirit of art.

Hence, if we have recognized this much, that Euripides was not at all successful in basing his drama solely on Apollonian principles, that, by contrast, his un-Dionysian tendencies led him astray into an inartistic naturalism, we will now able to move closer to the essential quality of Socratic aesthetics, whose most important law runs something like this: “Everything must be understandable in order to be beautiful,” a corollary to the Socratic saying, “Only the knowledgeable person is virtuous.”

I think what Nietzsche has against the strawman is that he (as well as Nietzsche) investigates a domain besides the simply known, the rational (starting from "I know that I know nothing"), but instead of respecting it is as raw and un-knowable (i.e. Dionysian) he wishes to analyze and penetrate it. So as far as I can see, Nietzsche blames Socrates (or "Socrates") for raising a veil.

Of course and as always there are multiple threads in Nietzsche's argument, and some of them contradict each other: it is perhaps the author's way of supporting Dionysian principles against the strawman (who does not like locial contradictions and wants to get rid of them).