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This is the closest I've been able to find in St. Thomas, where he discusses whether truth is immutable (Summa Theologica I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3):

A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, insofar, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but is said to have truth in a special way, insofar as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, insofar as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, insofar as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

And from his Quæstiones Disputate De Veritate a. 6, on whether truth is immutable:

The truth of a thing is the cause of the truth of a proposition, for a statement is said to be true or false insofar as a thing exists or does not exist.

and

it is essential to a proposition that it signify that which it has been made to signify.

Thus, according to St. Thomas, the liar's paradox "propositions" are not real propositions at all because there is no corresponding thing for them that "exists or does not exist" and they do not "signify that which" they have "been made to signify."

This is the closest I've been able to find in St. Thomas, where he discusses whether truth is immutable (Summa Theologica I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3):

A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, insofar, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but is said to have truth in a special way, insofar as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, insofar as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, insofar as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

And from his Quæstiones Disputate De Veritate a. 6, on whether truth is immutable:

The truth of a thing is the cause of the truth of a proposition, for a statement is said to be true or false insofar as a thing exists or does not exist.

and

it is essential to a proposition that it signify that which it has been made to signify.

Thus, according to St. Thomas, the liar's paradox "propositions" are not real propositions at all because there is no corresponding thing for them that "exists or does not exist" and they do not "signify that which" they have "been made to signify."

This is the closest I've been able to find in St. Thomas, where he discusses whether truth is immutable (Summa Theologica I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3):

A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but is said to have truth in a special way, insofar as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, insofar as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, insofar as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

But what would "the design of the divine intellect concerning" the liar's paradox propositions be?

This is the closest I've been able to find in St. Thomas, where he discusses whether truth is immutable (Summa Theologica I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3):

A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, insofar, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but is said to have truth in a special way, insofar as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, insofar as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, insofar as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

And from his Quæstiones Disputate De Veritate a. 6, on whether truth is immutable:

The truth of a thing is the cause of the truth of a proposition, for a statement is said to be true or false insofar as a thing exists or does not exist.

and

it is essential to a proposition that it signify that which it has been made to signify.

Thus, according to St. Thomas, the liar's paradox "propositions" are not real propositions at all because there is no corresponding thing for them that "exists or does not exist" and they do not "signify that which" they have "been made to signify."

This is the closest I've been able to find in St. Thomas, where he discusses whether truth is immutable (Summa Theologica I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3):

A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

Thus, propositions are not of themselves true or false, as it is assumed in the liar's paradox; they are true or false depending on what they signify, which can change.

This is the closest I've been able to find in St. Thomas, where he discusses whether truth is immutable (Summa Theologica I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3):

A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but is said to have truth in a special way, insofar as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, insofar as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, insofar as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

But what would "the design of the divine intellect concerning" the liar's paradox propositions be?