2 fixed grammar and clarified that a definition was a guess
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Why not create a world with freedom of the will, but without suffering?

This seems to allow two possibilities:

  1. No wrong choices are allowed.
  2. Wrong choices do not cause suffering.

To assert 1. would threaten to deny freedom; one quick argument is that freedom to choose which ice cream flavor is not true freedom. I presume there are more advanced forms of this argument, but they would depend on you further articulating what you mean by the word 'freedom'. As a heads-up, it is important to understand that there are at least the categories of 'freedom-from' and 'freedom-to'; I have seen many people err by omitting one of those.

To assert 2. is to require an accounting for how wrongness would be indicated. One possibility is to say that pain ⇏ suffering, that there is a way to live such that pain is noticed as more of an information signal that can be shut off once the wrongness it indicates is taken care of. Indeed, people with high pain tolerances seem to well-simulate this phenomenon: they can use the information provided by pain [up to a certain level] but not care about it otherwise.

Note that insensitivity to pain can be very bad; see for example congenital insensitivity to pain. A more extreme version is CIPA. People with CIP[A] must be very careful, like people with leprosy (it can destroy the nerve architecture).

Now, what is suffering isbut merely prolonged pain, due to those signals being ignored? InIf that is the case, one must restrict freedom in order to guarantee zero suffering. But this leaves us questioning whether 2. is even a coherent option: for it to obtain, we appear to have to deny a certain kind of freedom, which destroys the very argument we are trying to make.

Therefore, it appears that there is no guaranteed method for obtaining freedom ∧ ¬suffering.

Why not create a world with freedom of the will, but without suffering?

This seems to allow two possibilities:

  1. No wrong choices are allowed.
  2. Wrong choices do not cause suffering.

To assert 1. would threaten to deny freedom; one quick argument is that freedom to choose which ice cream flavor is not true freedom. I presume there are more advanced forms of this argument, but they would depend on you further articulating what you mean by the word 'freedom'. As a heads-up, it is important to understand that there are at least the categories of 'freedom-from' and 'freedom-to'; I have seen many people err by omitting one of those.

To assert 2. is to require an accounting for how wrongness would be indicated. One possibility is to say that pain ⇏ suffering, that there is a way to live such that pain is noticed as more of an information signal that can be shut off once the wrongness it indicates is taken care of. Indeed, people with high pain tolerances seem to well-simulate this phenomenon: they can use the information provided by pain [up to a certain level] but not care about it otherwise.

Note that insensitivity to pain can be very bad; see for example congenital insensitivity to pain. A more extreme version is CIPA. People with CIP[A] must be very careful, like people with leprosy (it can destroy the nerve architecture).

Now, what is suffering is merely prolonged pain, due to those signals being ignored? In that case, one must restrict freedom in order to guarantee zero suffering. But this leaves us questioning whether 2. is even a coherent option: for it to obtain, we appear to have to deny a certain kind of freedom, which destroys the very argument we are trying to make.

Therefore, it appears that there is no guaranteed method for obtaining freedom ∧ ¬suffering.

Why not create a world with freedom of the will, but without suffering?

This seems to allow two possibilities:

  1. No wrong choices are allowed.
  2. Wrong choices do not cause suffering.

To assert 1. would threaten to deny freedom; one quick argument is that freedom to choose which ice cream flavor is not true freedom. I presume there are more advanced forms of this argument, but they would depend on you further articulating what you mean by the word 'freedom'. As a heads-up, it is important to understand that there are at least the categories of 'freedom-from' and 'freedom-to'; I have seen many people err by omitting one of those.

To assert 2. is to require an accounting for how wrongness would be indicated. One possibility is to say that pain ⇏ suffering, that there is a way to live such that pain is noticed as more of an information signal that can be shut off once the wrongness it indicates is taken care of. Indeed, people with high pain tolerances seem to well-simulate this phenomenon: they can use the information provided by pain [up to a certain level] but not care about it otherwise.

Note that insensitivity to pain can be very bad; see for example congenital insensitivity to pain. A more extreme version is CIPA. People with CIP[A] must be very careful, like people with leprosy (it can destroy the nerve architecture).

Now, what is suffering but merely prolonged pain, due to those signals being ignored? If that is the case, one must restrict freedom in order to guarantee zero suffering. But this leaves us questioning whether 2. is even a coherent option: for it to obtain, we appear to have to deny a certain kind of freedom, which destroys the very argument we are trying to make.

Therefore, it appears that there is no guaranteed method for obtaining freedom ∧ ¬suffering.

1
source | link

Why not create a world with freedom of the will, but without suffering?

This seems to allow two possibilities:

  1. No wrong choices are allowed.
  2. Wrong choices do not cause suffering.

To assert 1. would threaten to deny freedom; one quick argument is that freedom to choose which ice cream flavor is not true freedom. I presume there are more advanced forms of this argument, but they would depend on you further articulating what you mean by the word 'freedom'. As a heads-up, it is important to understand that there are at least the categories of 'freedom-from' and 'freedom-to'; I have seen many people err by omitting one of those.

To assert 2. is to require an accounting for how wrongness would be indicated. One possibility is to say that pain ⇏ suffering, that there is a way to live such that pain is noticed as more of an information signal that can be shut off once the wrongness it indicates is taken care of. Indeed, people with high pain tolerances seem to well-simulate this phenomenon: they can use the information provided by pain [up to a certain level] but not care about it otherwise.

Note that insensitivity to pain can be very bad; see for example congenital insensitivity to pain. A more extreme version is CIPA. People with CIP[A] must be very careful, like people with leprosy (it can destroy the nerve architecture).

Now, what is suffering is merely prolonged pain, due to those signals being ignored? In that case, one must restrict freedom in order to guarantee zero suffering. But this leaves us questioning whether 2. is even a coherent option: for it to obtain, we appear to have to deny a certain kind of freedom, which destroys the very argument we are trying to make.

Therefore, it appears that there is no guaranteed method for obtaining freedom ∧ ¬suffering.