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Also, this whole argument is founded on the underlying assumption that something cannot come from nothing. (And this is partly why I think the matter of infinite regress is relevant.) Well, it might seem natural, but how the heck could we possibly take the statement like that as sure or even probable? We just do not know. It is a bit like in the case of identity. How can we know there won't come a quantum superposition-like law that will explain existence ex nihilo? Or a proof for eternity of everything that exists, like ancient Greeks wanted it?

So, answering your final questions: I do not think we can ascribe such sophisticated modern logic to Aquinas. We could interpret him with their aid, but I would not ascribe beliefs in them to a medieval monk. I am not a specialist in scholasticism, but it seems to me that he treated the terms rather naturally. And I do not really see a way in which this argument could be held and defended.

So, answering your final questions: I do not think we can ascribe such sophisticated modern logic to Aquinas. We could interpret him with their aid, but I would not ascribe beliefs in them to a medieval monk. I am not a specialist in scholasticism, but it seems to me that he treated the terms rather naturally. And I do not really see a way in which this argument could be held and defended.

Also, this whole argument is founded on the underlying assumption that something cannot come from nothing. (And this is partly why I think the matter of infinite regress is relevant.) Well, it might seem natural, but how the heck could we possibly take the statement like that as sure or even probable? We just do not know. It is a bit like in the case of identity. How can we know there won't come a quantum superposition-like law that will explain existence ex nihilo? Or a proof for eternity of everything that exists, like ancient Greeks wanted it?

So, answering your final questions: I do not think we can ascribe such sophisticated modern logic to Aquinas. We could interpret him with their aid, but I would not ascribe beliefs in them to a medieval monk. I am not a specialist in scholasticism, but it seems to me that he treated the terms rather naturally. And I do not really see a way in which this argument could be held and defended.

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First of all, these are not proofs, but merely leads. It is a common misconception.

I would not say that alethic modality is standard in any way. We do not need this special, logical meaning of contingency to get rid of Aquinas's third way.

[Irrelevant according to the asker] { Basically, it is just the matter of infinite regress, and there is no reason to think that god should be immune to it. (Unless you define him as immune to infinite regress, but well...) (Dawkins has written quite well on the topic in his famous "God Delusion".) }

Now, the interesting part - Feser's understanding of necessity and possibility. It does not seem so different. This view can be easily translated into the possible-worlds model. In this case stating that god is necessary would mean that he exists in every possible world, whilst other things do not. It does not really make things better for the following reasons:

1) There are stronger or at least equally strong claims. The fact that god exists in every possible world comes from our definition of god which is not verifiable, nor could be applied to anything else. But, for instance, the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 or that ¬(p = ¬p) is true for all possible worlds as well and is far more corroborated, quite verifiable and applicable to infinite number of objects and situations. They are more sure, and thus godly, than god himself.

2) It does not solve the problem of infinite regress. Let's assume that god does exist in every possible world, etc. Alright, but how did he get there? Same thing about logic - how did it get here? Where from? [This part keeps its relevancy. The possible-worlds interpretation of necessity without an additional, topic-specific interpretation does not say a word about the source of facts and objects marked by it as necesary.]

As to the transition from ∀x∀t {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[∃x En(x, t)]}, for "Object(x)" standing for "x is an object", "Time(t)" standing for "t is a moment in time", and for "En(x, t)" standing for "x endures at t", to ∃t∀x {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[En(x, t)]} for predicates as before - it surely depends in which modal logic. Frankly, I am quite sceptic about that happening at all. A logic allowing non-negated general statements to be transformed into non-negated existential statements is somewhat fishy.

So, answering your final questions: I do not think we can ascribe such sophisticated modern logic to Aquinas. We could interpret him with their aid, but I would not ascribe beliefs in them to a medieval monk. I am not a specialist in scholasticism, but it seems to me that he treated the terms rather naturally. And I do not really see a way in which this argument could be held and defended.

If you would like to consider a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, try reading on Gödel's ontological argument which is a developed version of Anzelm's ontological argument.

And if you would like to stop seeking a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, read Wittgenstein's lectures on religious belief. :)

First of all, these are not proofs, but merely leads. It is a common misconception.

I would not say that alethic modality is standard in any way. We do not need this special, logical meaning of contingency to get rid of Aquinas's third way.

[Irrelevant according to the asker] { Basically, it is just the matter of infinite regress, and there is no reason to think that god should be immune to it. (Unless you define him as immune to infinite regress, but well...) (Dawkins has written quite well on the topic in his famous "God Delusion".) }

Now, the interesting part - Feser's understanding of necessity and possibility. It does not seem so different. This view can be easily translated into the possible-worlds model. In this case stating that god is necessary would mean that he exists in every possible world, whilst other things do not. It does not really make things better for the following reasons:

1) There are stronger or at least equally strong claims. The fact that god exists in every possible world comes from our definition of god which is not verifiable, nor could be applied to anything else. But, for instance, the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 or that ¬(p = ¬p) is true for all possible worlds as well and is far more corroborated, quite verifiable and applicable to infinite number of objects and situations. They are more sure, and thus godly, than god himself.

2) It does not solve the problem of infinite regress. Let's assume that god does exist in every possible world, etc. Alright, but how did he get there? Same thing about logic - how did it get here? Where from?

As to the transition from ∀x∀t {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[∃x En(x, t)]}, for "Object(x)" standing for "x is an object", "Time(t)" standing for "t is a moment in time", and for "En(x, t)" standing for "x endures at t", to ∃t∀x {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[En(x, t)]} for predicates as before - it surely depends in which modal logic. Frankly, I am quite sceptic about that happening at all. A logic allowing non-negated general statements to be transformed into non-negated existential statements is somewhat fishy.

So, answering your final questions: I do not think we can ascribe such sophisticated modern logic to Aquinas. We could interpret him with their aid, but I would not ascribe beliefs in them to a medieval monk. I am not a specialist in scholasticism, but it seems to me that he treated the terms rather naturally. And I do not really see a way in which this argument could be held and defended.

If you would like to consider a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, try reading on Gödel's ontological argument which is a developed version of Anzelm's ontological argument.

And if you would like to stop seeking a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, read Wittgenstein's lectures on religious belief. :)

First of all, these are not proofs, but merely leads. It is a common misconception.

I would not say that alethic modality is standard in any way. We do not need this special, logical meaning of contingency to get rid of Aquinas's third way.

[Irrelevant according to the asker] { Basically, it is just the matter of infinite regress, and there is no reason to think that god should be immune to it. (Unless you define him as immune to infinite regress, but well...) (Dawkins has written quite well on the topic in his famous "God Delusion".) }

Now, the interesting part - Feser's understanding of necessity and possibility. It does not seem so different. This view can be easily translated into the possible-worlds model. In this case stating that god is necessary would mean that he exists in every possible world, whilst other things do not. It does not really make things better for the following reasons:

1) There are stronger or at least equally strong claims. The fact that god exists in every possible world comes from our definition of god which is not verifiable, nor could be applied to anything else. But, for instance, the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 or that ¬(p = ¬p) is true for all possible worlds as well and is far more corroborated, quite verifiable and applicable to infinite number of objects and situations. They are more sure, and thus godly, than god himself.

2) It does not solve the problem of infinite regress. Let's assume that god does exist in every possible world, etc. Alright, but how did he get there? Same thing about logic - how did it get here? Where from? [This part keeps its relevancy. The possible-worlds interpretation of necessity without an additional, topic-specific interpretation does not say a word about the source of facts and objects marked by it as necesary.]

As to the transition from ∀x∀t {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[∃x En(x, t)]}, for "Object(x)" standing for "x is an object", "Time(t)" standing for "t is a moment in time", and for "En(x, t)" standing for "x endures at t", to ∃t∀x {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[En(x, t)]} for predicates as before - it surely depends in which modal logic. Frankly, I am quite sceptic about that happening at all. A logic allowing non-negated general statements to be transformed into non-negated existential statements is somewhat fishy.

So, answering your final questions: I do not think we can ascribe such sophisticated modern logic to Aquinas. We could interpret him with their aid, but I would not ascribe beliefs in them to a medieval monk. I am not a specialist in scholasticism, but it seems to me that he treated the terms rather naturally. And I do not really see a way in which this argument could be held and defended.

If you would like to consider a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, try reading on Gödel's ontological argument which is a developed version of Anzelm's ontological argument.

And if you would like to stop seeking a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, read Wittgenstein's lectures on religious belief. :)

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First of all, these are not proofs, but merely leads. It is a common misconception.

I would not say that alethic modality is standard in any way. We do not need this special, logical meaning of contingency to get rid of Aquinas's third way.

[Irrelevant according to the asker] { Basically, it is just the matter of infinite regress, and there is no reason to think that god should be immune to it. (Unless you define him as immune to infinite regress, but well...) (Dawkins has written quite well on the topic in his famous "God Delusion".) }

Now, the interesting part - Feser's understanding of necessity and possibility. It does not seem so different. This view can be easily translated into the possible-worlds model. In this case stating that god is necessary would mean that he exists in every possible world, whilst other things do not. It does not really make things better for the following reasons:

1) There are stronger or at least equally strong claims. The fact that god exists in every possible world comes from our definition of god which is not verifiable, nor could be applied to anything else. But, for instance, the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 or that ¬(p = ¬p) is true for all possible worlds as well and is far more corroborated, quite verifiable and applicable to infinite number of objects and situations. They are more sure, and thus godly, than god himself.

2) It does not solve the problem of infinite regress. Let's assume that god does exist in every possible world, etc. Alright, but how did he get there? Same thing about logic - how did it get here? Where from?

As to the transition from ∀x∀t {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[∃x En(x, t)]}, for "Object(x)" standing for "x is an object", "Time(t)" standing for "t is a moment in time", and for "En(x, t)" standing for "x endures at t", to ∃t∀x {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[En(x, t)]} for predicates as before - it surely depends in which modal logic. Frankly, I am quite sceptic about that happening at all. A logic allowing non-negated general statements to be transformed into non-negated existential statements is somewhat fishy.

So, answering your final questions: I do not think we can ascribe such sophisticated modern logic to Aquinas. We could interpret him with their aid, but I would not ascribe beliefs in them to a medieval monk. I am not a specialist in scholasticism, but it seems to me that he treated the terms rather naturally. And I do not really see a way in which this argument could be held and defended.

If you would like to consider a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, try reading on Gödel's ontological argument which is a developed version of Anzelm's ontological argument.

And if you would like to stop seeking a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, read Wittgenstein's lectures on religious belief. :)

First of all, these are not proofs, but merely leads. It is a common misconception.

I would not say that alethic modality is standard in any way. We do not need this special, logical meaning of contingency to get rid of Aquinas's third way. Basically, it is just the matter of infinite regress, and there is no reason to think that god should be immune to it. (Unless you define him as immune to infinite regress, but well...) (Dawkins has written quite well on the topic in his famous "God Delusion".)

Now, the interesting part - Feser's understanding of necessity and possibility. It does not seem so different. This view can be easily translated into the possible-worlds model. In this case stating that god is necessary would mean that he exists in every possible world, whilst other things do not. It does not really make things better for the following reasons:

1) There are stronger or at least equally strong claims. The fact that god exists in every possible world comes from our definition of god which is not verifiable, nor could be applied to anything else. But, for instance, the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 or that ¬(p = ¬p) is true for all possible worlds as well and is far more corroborated, quite verifiable and applicable to infinite number of objects and situations. They are more sure, and thus godly, than god himself.

2) It does not solve the problem of infinite regress. Let's assume that god does exist in every possible world, etc. Alright, but how did he get there? Same thing about logic - how did it get here? Where from?

As to the transition from ∀x∀t {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[∃x En(x, t)]}, for "Object(x)" standing for "x is an object", "Time(t)" standing for "t is a moment in time", and for "En(x, t)" standing for "x endures at t", to ∃t∀x {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[En(x, t)]} for predicates as before - it surely depends in which modal logic. Frankly, I am quite sceptic about that happening at all. A logic allowing non-negated general statements to be transformed into non-negated existential statements is somewhat fishy.

So, answering your final questions: I do not think we can ascribe such sophisticated modern logic to Aquinas. We could interpret him with their aid, but I would not ascribe beliefs in them to a medieval monk. I am not a specialist in scholasticism, but it seems to me that he treated the terms rather naturally. And I do not really see a way in which this argument could be held and defended.

If you would like to consider a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, try reading on Gödel's ontological argument which is a developed version of Anzelm's ontological argument.

And if you would like to stop seeking a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, read Wittgenstein's lectures on religious belief. :)

First of all, these are not proofs, but merely leads. It is a common misconception.

I would not say that alethic modality is standard in any way. We do not need this special, logical meaning of contingency to get rid of Aquinas's third way.

[Irrelevant according to the asker] { Basically, it is just the matter of infinite regress, and there is no reason to think that god should be immune to it. (Unless you define him as immune to infinite regress, but well...) (Dawkins has written quite well on the topic in his famous "God Delusion".) }

Now, the interesting part - Feser's understanding of necessity and possibility. It does not seem so different. This view can be easily translated into the possible-worlds model. In this case stating that god is necessary would mean that he exists in every possible world, whilst other things do not. It does not really make things better for the following reasons:

1) There are stronger or at least equally strong claims. The fact that god exists in every possible world comes from our definition of god which is not verifiable, nor could be applied to anything else. But, for instance, the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 or that ¬(p = ¬p) is true for all possible worlds as well and is far more corroborated, quite verifiable and applicable to infinite number of objects and situations. They are more sure, and thus godly, than god himself.

2) It does not solve the problem of infinite regress. Let's assume that god does exist in every possible world, etc. Alright, but how did he get there? Same thing about logic - how did it get here? Where from?

As to the transition from ∀x∀t {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[∃x En(x, t)]}, for "Object(x)" standing for "x is an object", "Time(t)" standing for "t is a moment in time", and for "En(x, t)" standing for "x endures at t", to ∃t∀x {Object(x) ∧ Time(t) ∧ ♢¬[En(x, t)]} for predicates as before - it surely depends in which modal logic. Frankly, I am quite sceptic about that happening at all. A logic allowing non-negated general statements to be transformed into non-negated existential statements is somewhat fishy.

So, answering your final questions: I do not think we can ascribe such sophisticated modern logic to Aquinas. We could interpret him with their aid, but I would not ascribe beliefs in them to a medieval monk. I am not a specialist in scholasticism, but it seems to me that he treated the terms rather naturally. And I do not really see a way in which this argument could be held and defended.

If you would like to consider a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, try reading on Gödel's ontological argument which is a developed version of Anzelm's ontological argument.

And if you would like to stop seeking a more convincing proposition for the necessity of existence of god, read Wittgenstein's lectures on religious belief. :)

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