Return to Answer

###2. Does philosophy meet scientific rigor?

2. Does philosophy meet scientific rigor?

(As to your characterization of scientific theories, see the answer of Michael Dorfman's reply. There is a common problem when speaking about "what science is" or "what scientific theories are", as it is not clear if one means to give a (widely shared) definition or a factual description. Most of the time it is meant both as a definition and a description. Historical and sociological research showed that some widely shared definitions are simply false when used as factual descriptions of science - which still doesn't invalidate these claims qua definitions!)

(As to your characterization of scientific theories, see the answer of Michael Dorfman's reply. There is a common problem when speaking about "what science is" or "what scientific theories are", as it is not clear if one means to give a (widely shared) definition or a factual description. Most of the time it is meant both as a definition and a description. Historical and sociological research showed that some widely shared definitions are simply false when used as factual descriptions of science - which still doesn't invalidate these claims qua definitions!)

(To be sure, there were always battles within philosophy between rationalistic and empiristic inclined philosophers, and so Descartes would contribute to mathematics, while Newton would contribute to physics. But all these Descartes wanted to advance, in different ways, our actual knowledge of the world.)

One important symptom in the modern self-(re)imaging of philosophy as non-empirical was a debate occured in the 19th century about whether psychology, which was at the time a subdiscipline of philosophy, should use properly experimental methods in research. The faction supporting this view could succeed only at the cost of leaving (institutionally) philosophy in order to become an experimental discipline. The so called Psychologismus-Streit (psychologism debate) which followed sanctioned that logic and, most importantly, epistemology shouldn't have anything to do with psychology, thus consolidating the claim that philosophy shouldn't employ empirical methods and should deal with conceptual issues only. This is pretty much the status quo today.

(To be sure, there were always battles within philosophy between rationalistic and empiristic inclined philosophers, and so Descartes would contribute to mathematics, while Newton would contribute to physics. But all these philosophers wanted to advance, in different ways, our actual knowledge of the world.)

One important symptom in the modern self-(re)imaging of philosophy as non-empirical was a debate occured in the 19th century about whether psychology, which was at the time a subdiscipline of philosophy, should use properly experimental methods in research. The faction supporting this view could succeed only at the cost of leaving philosophy (institutionally) in order to become an experimental discipline. The so called Psychologismus-Streit (psychologism debate) which followed sanctioned that logic and, most importantly, epistemology shouldn't have anything to do with psychology, thus consolidating the claim that philosophy shouldn't employ empirical methods and should deal with conceptual issues only. This is pretty much the status quo today.