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I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of the excluded middle. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise. They are redundancies or unwanted baggage that result from our methods of formalization. One might say they are artefacts. We begin with what we are given, and we then generate our propositions. We do not generate our laws of thought.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of the excluded middle. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise. They are redundancies or unwanted baggage that result from our methods of formalization. One might say they are artefacts. We begin with what we are given, and we then generate our propositions.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of the excluded middle. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise. They are redundancies or unwanted baggage that result from our methods of formalization. One might say they are artefacts. We begin with what we are given, and we then generate our propositions. We do not generate our laws of thought.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

4 deleted 79 characters in body
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I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of the excluded middle. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise.

Tautologies may indeed be considered as propositions in the context of propositional logic, although some (e.g., Wittgenstein) consider tautologies to be They are redundancies and therefore perhaps open to exclusion asor unwanted baggage that result from our methods of abstractionformalization. One might say they are artefacts. We begin with what we are given, and we then generate our propositions.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of the excluded middle. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise.

Tautologies may indeed be considered as propositions in the context of propositional logic, although some (e.g., Wittgenstein) consider tautologies to be redundancies and therefore perhaps open to exclusion as unwanted baggage that result from our methods of abstraction.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of the excluded middle. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise. They are redundancies or unwanted baggage that result from our methods of formalization. One might say they are artefacts. We begin with what we are given, and we then generate our propositions.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

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I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of non-contradictionthe excluded middle. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise.

Tautologies may indeed be considered as propositions in the context of propositional logic, although some (e.g., Wittgenstein considered) consider tautologies to be redundancies and therefore perhaps open to exclusion as unwanted baggage that result from our methods of abstraction.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of non-contradiction. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise.

Tautologies may indeed be considered as propositions in the context of propositional logic, although Wittgenstein considered tautologies to be redundancies and therefore perhaps open to exclusion as unwanted baggage that result from our methods of abstraction.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

I would say that the statement "It might be dark outside" is logically equivalent to the statement "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside".

This is a tautological statement, i.e., a fact in the sense that it cannot be false.

Facts are not propositions.

EDIT

Following virmaior's comments below, I will attempt to justify / correct my answer.

One might argue that the equivalent form "It is either dark outside or it is not dark outside" is an instantiation of the second law of thought - i.e., the law of the excluded middle. As such, it would not be considered a proposition. This is because our laws of thought are given, and therefore not subject to a change of status.

Some statements may fulfil the definition of tautology, but at the same time possess other attributes which override their status as a tautology. For example, an instance of a law of thought or an axiom in disguise.

Tautologies may indeed be considered as propositions in the context of propositional logic, although some (e.g., Wittgenstein) consider tautologies to be redundancies and therefore perhaps open to exclusion as unwanted baggage that result from our methods of abstraction.

The term proposition has a meaning in general philosophy beyond that of propositional logic, and the wiki entry for proposition states that according to general use of the term, facts are not propositions.

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