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(This may just be repetition of http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/18324/9166https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/18324/9166 in a more extreme form.)

(This may just be repetition of http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/18324/9166 in a more extreme form.)

(This may just be repetition of https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/18324/9166 in a more extreme form.)

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First of all our science makes it questionable whether it is possible to optimize pleasure. If Crooks andthe James-Lange or Cannon-Bard theories of emotion (especially as they come together in as they come together in Lisa Feldman Barret's model) (q.v. all on Wikipedia) are right, we assign the positive or negative valence of an emotion well after we experience it. So, if we would just reassign the valence, given different environmental factors, how is the experience itself absolutely good or bad? But at the same time, how are we supposed to work to increase something that can just be reassigned the exact opposite value due to mere accidents over which we have no control?

First of all our science makes it questionable whether it is possible to optimize pleasure. If Crooks and James are right, we assign the positive or negative valence of an emotion well after we experience it. So, if we would just reassign the valence, given different environmental factors, how is the experience itself absolutely good or bad? But at the same time, how are we supposed to work to increase something that can just be reassigned the exact opposite value due to mere accidents over which we have no control?

First of all our science makes it questionable whether it is possible to optimize pleasure. If the James-Lange or Cannon-Bard theories of emotion (especially as they come together in as they come together in Lisa Feldman Barret's model) (q.v. all on Wikipedia) are right, we assign the positive or negative valence of an emotion well after we experience it. So, if we would just reassign the valence, given different environmental factors, how is the experience itself absolutely good or bad? But at the same time, how are we supposed to work to increase something that can just be reassigned the exact opposite value due to mere accidents over which we have no control?

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Such reversals are easy because negation is tricky. Opposites often lie closer together than they lie far apart. So absolute values like pleasure are often undermined by their own inability to be properly set opposite to their nearest possible contrasts. From McLuhan'sa perspective elaborating McLuhan, the manipulation of choice, in modern society, and the psychological burden it can easily become, suggests that even the freedom that we imagine is the reason towe avoid domination can facilitate a variety of power, with its own set of leverage points.

So we can fall back on the psychotic directive: 'Choose your illusion'. Crowley's devotion to evil or Starhawk's "Dreaming the Dark" capture in religious terms a worldview that owes much to Nietzsche, and that values difficulty and contradiction and extends a greater value to pleasure if it is complete to the degree that it and contains its opposite. But at that point, one has assigned all value you are going to allocate to your primary goal, and are valuing its opposite. But the

But we are all moderns, at heart. Having seen science, we are unlikely to abandon its foundations. The ecstatic and revealed form that these post-modern criteria take seems open only to the fanatical and anti-realisticantirealistic.

To me, this exhausts the tradition of Epicurus and the search for a single motive upon which to base ethics. There is no proper way to just keep the focus and redefine the goal. We are forced to back down from a single point of reference to something more negotiated. Even

Even if those negotiations keep pulling us back to a point of consensus which promises to provide another single point of reference, it will always be as unstable as the original chosen point.

Such reversals are easy because negation is tricky. Opposites often lie closer together than they lie far apart. So absolute values like pleasure are often undermined by their own inability to be properly set opposite to their nearest possible contrasts. From McLuhan's perspective, the manipulation of choice, in modern society, and the burden it can easily become, suggests that even the freedom that we imagine is the reason to avoid domination can facilitate a variety of power, with its own set of leverage points.

So we can fall back on the psychotic directive: 'Choose your illusion'. Crowley's devotion to evil or Starhawk's "Dreaming the Dark" capture in religious terms a worldview that owes much to Nietzsche, and that values difficulty and contradiction and extends a greater value to pleasure if it is complete to the degree that it and contains its opposite. But at that point, one has assigned all value you are going to allocate to your primary goal, and are valuing its opposite. But the ecstatic and revealed form these criteria take seems open only to the fanatical and anti-realistic.

To me, this exhausts the tradition of Epicurus and the search for a single motive upon which to base ethics. There is no proper way to just keep the focus and redefine the goal. We are forced to back down from a single point of reference to something more negotiated. Even if those negotiations keep pulling us back to a point of consensus which promises to provide another single point of reference, it will always be as unstable as the original chosen point.

Such reversals are easy because negation is tricky. Opposites often lie closer together than they lie far apart. So absolute values like pleasure are often undermined by their own inability to be properly set opposite to their nearest possible contrasts. From a perspective elaborating McLuhan, the manipulation of choice in modern society, and the psychological burden it can easily become, suggests that even the freedom that we imagine is the reason we avoid domination can facilitate a variety of power, with its own set of leverage points.

So we can fall back on the psychotic directive: 'Choose your illusion'. Crowley's devotion to evil or Starhawk's "Dreaming the Dark" capture in religious terms a worldview that owes much to Nietzsche, and that values difficulty and contradiction and extends a greater value to pleasure if it is complete to the degree that it and contains its opposite. But at that point, one has assigned all value you are going to allocate to your primary goal, and are valuing its opposite.

But we are all moderns, at heart. Having seen science, we are unlikely to abandon its foundations. The ecstatic and revealed form that these post-modern criteria take seems open only to the fanatical and antirealistic.

To me, this exhausts the tradition of Epicurus and the search for a single motive upon which to base ethics. There is no proper way to just keep the focus and redefine the goal. We are forced to back down from a single point of reference to something more negotiated.

Even if those negotiations keep pulling us back to a point of consensus which promises to provide another single point of reference, it will always be as unstable as the original chosen point.

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