Return to Question

I hope to receive well thought out answers. Danke.

On the other hand, I am curious about the other line of objections, namely 'antidotes'. The objection of 'antidotes' are best explained in the following example: Let's say someone is poisoned. The properties of poison which allow it to kill a person are in no way affected by an antidote, which is unlike the previous example of the electro-fink (which directly affects the wire's properties). Rather, the antidote affects the physiology of the body. So here we find an example of some causation in which the cause A (poison) does not result in the effect B (death), but in no way was the cause A affected so as to alter its properties (which is the condition of the Reformed Conditional Analysis. If the underlying criticism of Hume is in skepticism over what can truly be known of causality, this would in turn render the Humean analysis descriptively inadequate and contrary to what is truly observed.

If Hume's attempt is to demonstrate the inability of the mind to conceive, directly or indirectly, of causal powers, it seems that Hume doesn't have much of a backing granted these objections. However, how does the proponent of Humean analyses of causation answer to such objections?

(I've provided an extensive explanation of my understanding of Hume and more modern alternatives to his general theory of causation such as those named 'counterfactual') and in order to explain thoroughly the objections made, as I see them.)

I hope to receive well-thought out answers. Danke.

On the other hand, I am curious about the other line of objections, namely 'antidotes'. The objection of 'antidotes' are best explained in the following example: Let's say someone is poisoned. The properties of poison which allow it to kill a person are in no way affected by an antidote, which is unlike the previous example of the electro-fink (which directly affects the wire's properties). Rather, the antidote affects the physiology of the body. So here we find an example of some causation in which the cause A (poison) does not result in the effect B (death), but in no way was the cause A affected so as to alter its properties (which is the condition of the Reformed Conditional Analysis.) If the underlying criticism of Hume is in skepticism over what can truly be known of causality, this would in turn render the Humean analysis descriptively inadequate and contrary to what is truly observed.

If Hume's attempt is to demonstrate the inability of the mind to conceive, directly or indirectly, of causal powers, it seems that Hume doesn't have much of a backing granted these objections, which compel rather justified inference of belief in causal powers. However, how does the proponent of Humean analyses of causation answer to such objections?

(Forgive the length of this question. The intent involved was to provide an extensive explanation of my understanding of Hume and more modern alternatives to his general theory of causation such as those named 'counterfactual', and to explain thoroughly the objections made, as I see them.)

I hope to receive well thought out answers. Danke.

The Humean analysis of causation reads as follows: "We may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second."

1.) If A had not occurred, B would not have occurred.

2.) If A had occurred, B would have occurred.

3.) A and B both occurred.

P.S: I commend any of you who read the entire question. I have bolded the focus points so your eyes won't prematurely give out, or what is more likely, glaze over and miss out on the key points. Also, for any who are wondering, I made the question so long only in order to provide an extensive explanation of my understanding of Hume and more modern alternatives to his general theory of causation (such as those named 'counterfactual') and in order to explain thoroughly the objections made, as I see them. I hope to receive well-thought out answers. Danke.

The Humean analysis of causation reads as follows:

"We may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second." (Inquiry)

1. If A had not occurred, B would not have occurred.
2. If A had occurred, B would have occurred.
3. A and B both occurred.

(I've provided an extensive explanation of my understanding of Hume and more modern alternatives to his general theory of causation such as those named 'counterfactual') and in order to explain thoroughly the objections made, as I see them.)

I hope to receive well-thought out answers. Danke.