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Consider a world equipped with a god; and this god from time to time at his convenience and no other, acts in the world; and then too, that those beings who live in the world see these acts as something they name a miracle.

Can science as an empirical and theoretical discipline be possible in such a world?

On the face of it, one might say - no, it cannot; for no law can be discovered which could not be overturned or disrupted at this godsgod's whim were such whims possible in this world.

Still, one notes that in this world that, when one considers the genealogy of scientific theories, we see that they consider only a limited set of phenomena - for no theory can deal with everything all at once - and then that they idealise; thus, there is here a double exclusion:

The first exclusion excludes those phenomena which is not relevant to the picture that thought thinks on; for example a physicist will not be thinking of the history of the battle of Hastings, whilst reflecting on the meaning of gravity (unless his mind is drifting in a Joycean manner or interrupted by a scatalogical or sexual thought or even a scatological-sexual thought; or series thereof).

The second exclusion smooths out the rough; turns the unshapely to shapely; consider for example before friction can be considered one thinks on the frictionless; or the reduction of an unshapely stone to a perfectly spherical atom of stone.

Thus one might say that in that world where a god acts at exceptional moments, and then exceptionally; that one, when constructing scientific theories in the laborious task of constructing a theory of everything in so far as this is possible, must ignore the exceptions and the exceptional ...

Consider a world equipped with a god; and this god from time to time at his convenience and no other, acts in the world; and then too, that those beings who live in the world see these acts as something they name a miracle.

Can science as an empirical and theoretical discipline be possible in such a world?

On the face of it, one might say - no, it cannot; for no law can be discovered which could not be overturned or disrupted at this gods whim were whims possible in this world.

Still, one notes that in this world that when one considers the genealogy of scientific theories we see that they consider only a limited set of phenomena - for no theory can deal with everything all at once - and then that they idealise; thus, there is here a double exclusion:

The first exclusion excludes those phenomena which is not relevant to the picture that thought thinks on; for example a physicist will not be thinking of the history of the battle of Hastings, whilst reflecting on the meaning of gravity (unless his mind is drifting in a Joycean manner or interrupted by a scatalogical or sexual thought or even a scatological-sexual thought; or series thereof).

The second exclusion smooths out the rough; turns the unshapely to shapely; consider for example before friction can be considered one thinks on the frictionless; or the reduction of an unshapely stone to a perfectly spherical atom of stone.

Thus one might say that in that world where a god acts at exceptional moments, and then exceptionally; that one, when constructing scientific theories in the laborious task of constructing a theory of everything in so far as this is possible, must ignore the exceptions and the exceptional ...

Consider a world equipped with a god; and this god from time to time at his convenience and no other, acts in the world; and then too, that those beings who live in the world see these acts as something they name a miracle.

Can science as an empirical and theoretical discipline be possible in such a world?

On the face of it, one might say - no, it cannot; for no law can be discovered which could not be overturned or disrupted at this god's whim were such whims possible in this world.

Still, one notes that in this world that, when one considers the genealogy of scientific theories, we see that they consider only a limited set of phenomena - for no theory can deal with everything all at once - and then that they idealise; thus, there is here a double exclusion:

The first exclusion excludes those phenomena which is not relevant to the picture that thought thinks on; for example a physicist will not be thinking of the history of the battle of Hastings, whilst reflecting on the meaning of gravity (unless his mind is drifting in a Joycean manner or interrupted by a scatalogical or sexual thought or even a scatological-sexual thought; or series thereof).

The second exclusion smooths out the rough; turns the unshapely to shapely; consider for example before friction can be considered one thinks on the frictionless; or the reduction of an unshapely stone to a perfectly spherical atom of stone.

Thus one might say that in that world where a god acts at exceptional moments, and then exceptionally; that one, when constructing scientific theories in the laborious task of constructing a theory of everything in so far as this is possible, must ignore the exceptions and the exceptional ...

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Consider a world equipped with a god; and this god from time to time at his convenience and no other, acts in the world; and then too, that those beings who live in the world see these acts as something they name a miracle.

Can science as an empirical and theoretical discipline be possible in such a world?

On the face of it, one might say - no, it cannot; for no law can be discovered which could not be overturned or disrupted at this gods whim were whims possible in this world.

Still, one notes that in this world that when one considers the genealogy of scientific theories we see that they consider only a limited set of phenomena - for no theory can deal with everything all at once - and then that they idealise; thus, there is here a double exclusion:

The first exclusion excludes those phenomena which is not relevant to the picture that thought thinks on; for example a physicist will not be thinking of the history of the battle of Hastings, whilst reflecting on the meaning of gravity (unless his mind is drifting in a Joycean manner or interrupted by a scatalogical or sexual thought or even a scatological-sexual thought; or series thereof).

The second exclusion smooths out the rough; turns the unshapely to shapely; consider for example before friction can be considered one thinks on the frictionless; or the reduction of an unshapely stone to a perfectly spherical atom of stone.

Thus one might say that in that world where a god acts at exceptional moments, and then exceptionally; that one, when constructing scientific theories in the laborious task of constructing a theory of everything in so far as this is possible, must ignore the exceptions and the exceptional ...

Consider a world equipped with a god; and this god from time to time at his convenience and no other, acts in the world; and then too, that those beings who live in the world see these acts as something they name a miracle.

Can science as an empirical and theoretical discipline be possible in such a world?

On the face of it, one might say - no, it cannot; for no law can be discovered which could not be overturned or disrupted.

Still, one notes that in this world that when one considers the genealogy of scientific theories we see that they consider only a limited set of phenomena - for no theory can deal with everything all at once - and then that they idealise; thus, there is here a double exclusion:

The first exclusion excludes those phenomena which is not relevant to the picture that thought thinks on; for example a physicist will not be thinking of the history of the battle of Hastings, whilst reflecting on the meaning of gravity (unless his mind is drifting in a Joycean manner).

The second exclusion smooths out the rough; turns the unshapely to shapely; consider for example before friction can be considered one thinks on the frictionless; or the reduction of an unshapely stone to a perfectly spherical atom of stone.

Thus one might say that in that world where a god acts at exceptional moments, and then exceptionally; that one, when constructing scientific theories in the laborious task of constructing a theory of everything in so far as this is possible, must ignore the exceptions and the exceptional ...

Consider a world equipped with a god; and this god from time to time at his convenience and no other, acts in the world; and then too, that those beings who live in the world see these acts as something they name a miracle.

Can science as an empirical and theoretical discipline be possible in such a world?

On the face of it, one might say - no, it cannot; for no law can be discovered which could not be overturned or disrupted at this gods whim were whims possible in this world.

Still, one notes that in this world that when one considers the genealogy of scientific theories we see that they consider only a limited set of phenomena - for no theory can deal with everything all at once - and then that they idealise; thus, there is here a double exclusion:

The first exclusion excludes those phenomena which is not relevant to the picture that thought thinks on; for example a physicist will not be thinking of the history of the battle of Hastings, whilst reflecting on the meaning of gravity (unless his mind is drifting in a Joycean manner or interrupted by a scatalogical or sexual thought or even a scatological-sexual thought; or series thereof).

The second exclusion smooths out the rough; turns the unshapely to shapely; consider for example before friction can be considered one thinks on the frictionless; or the reduction of an unshapely stone to a perfectly spherical atom of stone.

Thus one might say that in that world where a god acts at exceptional moments, and then exceptionally; that one, when constructing scientific theories in the laborious task of constructing a theory of everything in so far as this is possible, must ignore the exceptions and the exceptional ...

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Is science possible in a world where a god acts?

Consider a world equipped with a god; and this god from time to time at his convenience and no other, acts in the world; and then too, that those beings who live in the world see these acts as something they name a miracle.

Can science as an empirical and theoretical discipline be possible in such a world?

On the face of it, one might say - no, it cannot; for no law can be discovered which could not be overturned or disrupted.

Still, one notes that in this world that when one considers the genealogy of scientific theories we see that they consider only a limited set of phenomena - for no theory can deal with everything all at once - and then that they idealise; thus, there is here a double exclusion:

The first exclusion excludes those phenomena which is not relevant to the picture that thought thinks on; for example a physicist will not be thinking of the history of the battle of Hastings, whilst reflecting on the meaning of gravity (unless his mind is drifting in a Joycean manner).

The second exclusion smooths out the rough; turns the unshapely to shapely; consider for example before friction can be considered one thinks on the frictionless; or the reduction of an unshapely stone to a perfectly spherical atom of stone.

Thus one might say that in that world where a god acts at exceptional moments, and then exceptionally; that one, when constructing scientific theories in the laborious task of constructing a theory of everything in so far as this is possible, must ignore the exceptions and the exceptional ...