Timeline for Does the famous Descartes quote "dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum" suggests secure knowledge of ones existence?
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Apr 13, 2017 at 12:42 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
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Oct 28, 2015 at 11:47 | comment | added | draks ... | Sorry, it was me being wrong. You answered all of them. I summarize: Starting from "Cogito, ergo sum", a dualist could say that this also proves that there is an interface. | |
Oct 27, 2015 at 15:32 | comment | added | Jo Wehler | Please tell me, what is lacking? Apparently I missed one of your points. What is it? | |
Oct 27, 2015 at 14:58 | comment | added | draks ... | @Jo I know about Eccles. But you didn't answer my questions! Facing a problem, is not a problem, fearing it is... | |
Oct 27, 2015 at 11:13 | comment | added | Jo Wehler | Accoding to Descartes this material interface is the pineal gland. A similar material interface exists in the dualistic approach of Eccles. - I for myself do not subscribe to such dualistic theories which always face the interface-problem. | |
Oct 27, 2015 at 7:11 | comment | added | draks ... | since you agreed, you also agreed that there is an interface from the mind to something outside the mind, right? How else would the putative evil genuis be able to draw a red herring across our track? | |
Oct 26, 2015 at 14:16 | comment | added | Jo Wehler | @draks: Yes :-) | |
Oct 26, 2015 at 12:37 | comment | added | draks ... | and the long way is necessary, since we can't be sure if there is a demon sitting in front of the mind, making us believe that we sense things and (re-)act on an outer world. Like that? | |
Oct 26, 2015 at 12:30 | comment | added | Jo Wehler | @draks According to Descartes there is a gap between body and mind. The methodoligal doubt affirmes only the existence of the mind. The conclusion from the existence of the mind to the existence of the body is achieved by a long argumentation in the Meditations. | |
Oct 26, 2015 at 11:58 | comment | added | draks ... | Why is it not possible to say something like "there exist impressions that fed my mind such that I can doubt their existence due to putative evil demons" or "there exist senses that fed my mind with data be it right or wrong"? | |
Oct 25, 2015 at 14:57 | vote | accept | John Am | ||
Oct 25, 2015 at 10:05 | comment | added | John Am | Yes my interest is on the affirmation of secure knowledge be it about the mind or the mind/body it does not really matter in this context. | |
Oct 25, 2015 at 10:02 | comment | added | Jo Wehler | The "further expanded cogito" as stated above in the quote from wikipedia "dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum — res cogitans" makes the important restriction "res cogitans". Hence it affirms only the existence of my mind as res cogitans, not of my body as res extensa. - The "expanded cogito" leaves it open what the author means by "ego sum": the mind, the body, mind and body? In my opinion, his short version only affirms the existence of the mind. - To affirm the long version with the existence of the body, Descartes needs the whole Meditations. | |
Oct 25, 2015 at 9:48 | comment | added | John Am | Of course, but is it generally accepted that the "expanded cogito" compacts the argumentation presented by Descartes in the Meditations on First Philosophy or not? | |
Oct 25, 2015 at 9:22 | comment | added | Jo Wehler | Yes, it is secure knowledge - according to Descartes. Namely clear and distinct insight. But the fact, that clear and distinct insight affirmes the thruth of the insight, does not follow as a direct consequence from the mental activity of doubting. It follows by the whole argumentation expanded in the Meditations - according to Descartes. | |
Oct 25, 2015 at 9:17 | comment | added | John Am | But affirms the existence as a person with mind/soul at least. It is a secure knowledge of it or not? | |
Oct 25, 2015 at 9:02 | history | answered | Jo Wehler | CC BY-SA 3.0 |