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I always assumed that Logical Positivism and reductionism went hand in hand, and that refutations of LP automatically made the case for reductionism weaker.

My reasoning was,: if only empirically verifiable statements are considered meaningful, then all meaningful statements can be reduced to physical measurements of some sort or another, and that somehow implied the reduction of all sciences to physics.

I realize that there are serious gaps in that reasoning.

So my questions:

  1. Can someone be both a logical positivist and anti-redictionist?
  2. What would be the implications for logical positivism of empirically verifiable, but non reducible statements/theories?

I always assumed that Logical Positivism and reductionism went hand in hand, and that refutations of LP automatically made the case for reductionism weaker.

My reasoning was, if only empirically verifiable statements are considered meaningful, then all meaningful statements can be reduced to physical measurements of some sort or another, and that somehow implied the reduction of all sciences to physics.

I realize that there are serious gaps in that reasoning.

So my questions:

  1. Can someone be both a logical positivist and anti-redictionist?
  2. What would be the implications for logical positivism of empirically verifiable, but non reducible statements/theories?

I always assumed that Logical Positivism and reductionism went hand in hand, and that refutations of LP automatically made the case for reductionism weaker.

My reasoning was: if only empirically verifiable statements are considered meaningful, then all meaningful statements can be reduced to physical measurements of some sort or another, and that somehow implied the reduction of all sciences to physics.

I realize that there are serious gaps in that reasoning.

So my questions:

  1. Can someone be both a logical positivist and anti-redictionist?
  2. What would be the implications for logical positivism of empirically verifiable, but non reducible statements/theories?
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Does logical positivism necessarily entail reductionism?

I always assumed that Logical Positivism and reductionism went hand in hand, and that refutations of LP automatically made the case for reductionism weaker.

My reasoning was, if only empirically verifiable statements are considered meaningful, then all meaningful statements can be reduced to physical measurements of some sort or another, and that somehow implied the reduction of all sciences to physics.

I realize that there are serious gaps in that reasoning.

So my questions:

  1. Can someone be both a logical positivist and anti-redictionist?
  2. What would be the implications for logical positivism of empirically verifiable, but non reducible statements/theories?