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Conceivability and possibility arguments became fashionable after Kripke made modal logic respectable by providing semantics for it in terms of possible worlds. However, to make it applicable to anything real one needs a way to decide what is possible. This gave rise to "imaginability" and "conceivability" as "guides" to possibility. The game is to argue that in some circumstances our sense of possibility is refined enough so that what we can imagine or conceive turns out to be possible. This usually concerns the traditional epistemic possibility. But in counterfactual reasoning we often "restrain" our imagination to what Kripke calls "metaphysical possibility" with closer ties to the actual world, so Nixon could possibly lose the 1968 election, but could not possibly be an alien.

As for your examples, generally speaking there is no difference, the move from conceivability to possibility is either accepted or not accepted, and depending on that all four will be valid or invalid. Swinburne does think that Kripke's mind-body dualism argument can succeed even if one generally rejects this move however, because imagination is usually mistaken about issues we have no direct acquaintance with, and our mind is an exception to that, see SEP.

But modal arguments that end with a mere possibility of something are toothlessnot very interesting. Under different physical laws faster than light travel is possible, so what?. Perhaps it is even "metaphysically" possible for a mind to be disembodied,. But so what? It is when possibility is used as a premise to draw conclusions about the actual that they show real bite, e.g. that mind and body are separate entities because they are possibly so because we can imagine them so. And as van Inwagen points out thereby lies the problem:

"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

Conceivability and possibility arguments became fashionable after Kripke made modal logic respectable by providing semantics for it in terms of possible worlds. However, to make it applicable to anything real one needs a way to decide what is possible. This gave rise to "imaginability" and "conceivability" as "guides" to possibility. The game is to argue that in some circumstances our sense of possibility is refined enough so that what we can imagine or conceive turns out to be possible. This usually concerns the traditional epistemic possibility. But in counterfactual reasoning we often "restrain" our imagination to what Kripke calls "metaphysical possibility" with closer ties to the actual world, so Nixon could possibly lose the 1968 election, but could not possibly be an alien.

As for your examples, generally speaking there is no difference, the move from conceivability to possibility is either accepted or not accepted, and depending on that all four will be valid or invalid. Swinburne does think that Kripke's mind-body dualism argument can succeed even if one generally rejects this move however, because imagination is usually mistaken about issues we have no direct acquaintance with, and our mind is an exception to that, see SEP.

But modal arguments that end with a mere possibility of something are toothless. Under different physical laws faster than light travel is possible, so what? Perhaps it is even "metaphysically" possible for a mind to be disembodied, so what? It is when possibility is used as a premise to draw conclusions about the actual that they show real bite, e.g. that mind and body are separate entities because they are possibly so because we can imagine them so. And as van Inwagen points out thereby lies the problem:

"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

Conceivability and possibility arguments became fashionable after Kripke made modal logic respectable by providing semantics for it in terms of possible worlds. However, to make it applicable to anything real one needs a way to decide what is possible. This gave rise to "imaginability" and "conceivability" as "guides" to possibility. The game is to argue that in some circumstances our sense of possibility is refined enough so that what we can imagine or conceive turns out to be possible. This usually concerns the traditional epistemic possibility. But in counterfactual reasoning we often "restrain" our imagination to what Kripke calls "metaphysical possibility" with closer ties to the actual world, so Nixon could possibly lose the 1968 election, but could not possibly be an alien.

As for your examples, generally speaking there is no difference, the move from conceivability to possibility is either accepted or not accepted, and depending on that all four will be valid or invalid. Swinburne does think that Kripke's mind-body dualism argument can succeed even if one generally rejects this move however, because imagination is usually mistaken about issues we have no direct acquaintance with, and our mind is an exception to that, see SEP.

But modal arguments that end with a mere possibility of something are not very interesting. Under different physical laws faster than light travel is possible. Perhaps it is even "metaphysically" possible for a mind to be disembodied. But so what? It is when possibility is used as a premise to draw conclusions about the actual that they show real bite, e.g. that mind and body are separate entities because they are possibly so because we can imagine them so. And as van Inwagen points out thereby lies the problem:

"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

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Conceivability and possibility arguments became fashionable after Kripke made modal logic respectable by providing semantics for it in terms of possible worlds. However, to make it applicable to anything real one needs a way to decide what is possible. This gave rise to "imaginability" and "conceivability" as "guides" to possibility. The game is to argue that in some circumstances our sense of possibility is refined enough so that what we can imagine or conceive turns out to be possible. This usually concerns the traditional epistemic possibility. But in counterfactual reasoning we often "restrain" our imagination to what Kripke calls "metaphysical possibility" with closer ties to the actual world, so Nixon could possibly lose the 1968 election, but could not possibly be an alien.

As for your examples, generally speaking there is no difference, the move from conceivability to possibility is either accepted or not accepted, and depending on that all four will be valid or invalid. Swinburne does think that Kripke's mind-body dualism argument can succeed even if one generally rejects this move however, because imagination is usually mistaken about issues we have no direct acquaintance with, and our mind is an exception to that, see SEP.

But modal arguments that end with a mere possibility of something are toothless. Under different physical laws faster than light travel is possible, so what? Perhaps it is even "metaphysically" possible for a mind to be disembodied, so what? It is when possibility is used as a premise to draw conclusions about the actual that they show real bite, e.g. that mind and body are separate entities because they are possibly so because we can imagine them so. And as van Inwagen points out thereby lies the problem:

"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

Conceivability and possibility arguments became fashionable after Kripke made modal logic respectable by providing semantics for it in terms of possible worlds. However, to make it applicable to anything real one needs a way to decide what is possible. This gave rise to "imaginability" and "conceivability" as "guides" to possibility. The game is to argue that in some circumstances our sense of possibility is refined enough so that what we can imagine or conceive turns out to be possible. This usually concerns the traditional epistemic possibility. But in counterfactual reasoning we often "restrain" our imagination to what Kripke calls "metaphysical possibility" with closer ties to the actual world, so Nixon could possibly lose the 1968 election, but could not possibly be an alien.

As for your examples generally speaking there is no difference, the move from conceivability to possibility is either accepted or not accepted, and depending on that all four will be valid or invalid. Swinburne does think that Kripke's mind-body dualism argument can succeed even if one generally rejects this move however, because imagination is usually mistaken about issues we have no direct acquaintance with, and our mind is an exception to that, see SEP.

But modal arguments that end with a mere possibility of something are toothless. Under different physical laws faster than light travel is possible, so what? Perhaps it is even "metaphysically" possible for a mind to be disembodied, so what? It is when possibility is used as a premise to draw conclusions about the actual that they show real bite, e.g. that mind and body are separate entities because they are possibly so because we can imagine them so. And as van Inwagen points out thereby lies the problem:

"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

Conceivability and possibility arguments became fashionable after Kripke made modal logic respectable by providing semantics for it in terms of possible worlds. However, to make it applicable to anything real one needs a way to decide what is possible. This gave rise to "imaginability" and "conceivability" as "guides" to possibility. The game is to argue that in some circumstances our sense of possibility is refined enough so that what we can imagine or conceive turns out to be possible. This usually concerns the traditional epistemic possibility. But in counterfactual reasoning we often "restrain" our imagination to what Kripke calls "metaphysical possibility" with closer ties to the actual world, so Nixon could possibly lose the 1968 election, but could not possibly be an alien.

As for your examples, generally speaking there is no difference, the move from conceivability to possibility is either accepted or not accepted, and depending on that all four will be valid or invalid. Swinburne does think that Kripke's mind-body dualism argument can succeed even if one generally rejects this move however, because imagination is usually mistaken about issues we have no direct acquaintance with, and our mind is an exception to that, see SEP.

But modal arguments that end with a mere possibility of something are toothless. Under different physical laws faster than light travel is possible, so what? Perhaps it is even "metaphysically" possible for a mind to be disembodied, so what? It is when possibility is used as a premise to draw conclusions about the actual that they show real bite, e.g. that mind and body are separate entities because they are possibly so because we can imagine them so. And as van Inwagen points out thereby lies the problem:

"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

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Conceivability and possibility arguments became fashionable after Kripke made modal logic respectable by providing semantics for it in terms of possible worlds. However, to make it applicable to anything real one needs a way to decide what is possible. This gave rise to "imaginability" and "conceivability" as "guides" to possibility. The game is to argue that in some circumstances our sense of possibility is refined enough so that what we can imagine or conceive turns out to be possible. This usually concerns the traditional epistemic possibility. But in counterfactual reasoning we often "restrain" our imagination to what Kripke calls "metaphysical possibility" with closer ties to the actual world, so Nixon could possibly lose the 1968 election, but could not possibly be an alien.

As for your examples generally speaking there is no difference, the move from conceivability to possibility is either accepted or not accepted, and depending on that all four will be valid or invalid. Swinburne does think that Kripke's mind-body dualism argument can succeed even if one generally rejects this move however, because imagination is usually mistaken about issues we have no direct acquaintance with, and our mind is an exception to that, see SEP.

But modal arguments that end with a mere possibility of something are toothless. Under different physical laws faster than light travel is possible, so what? Perhaps it is even "metaphysically" possible for a mind to be disembodied, so what? It is when possibility is used as a premise to draw conclusions about the actual that they show real bite, e.g. that mind and body are separate entities because they are possibly so because we can imagine them so. And as van Inwagen points out thereby lies the problem:"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

Conceivability and possibility arguments became fashionable after Kripke made modal logic respectable by providing semantics for it in terms of possible worlds. However, to make it applicable to anything real one needs a way to decide what is possible. This gave rise to "imaginability" and "conceivability" as "guides" to possibility. The game is to argue that in some circumstances our sense of possibility is refined enough so that what we can imagine or conceive turns out to be possible. This usually concerns the traditional epistemic possibility. But in counterfactual reasoning we often "restrain" our imagination to what Kripke calls "metaphysical possibility" with closer ties to the actual world, so Nixon could possibly lose the 1968 election, but could not possibly be an alien.

As for your examples generally speaking there is no difference, the move from conceivability to possibility is either accepted or not accepted, and depending on that all four will be valid or invalid. Swinburne does think that Kripke's mind-body dualism argument can succeed even if one generally rejects this move however, because imagination is usually mistaken about issues we have no direct acquaintance with, and our mind is an exception to that, see SEP.

But modal arguments that end with a mere possibility of something are toothless. Under different physical laws faster than light travel is possible, so what? Perhaps it is even "metaphysically" possible for a mind to be disembodied, so what? It is when possibility is used as a premise to draw conclusions about the actual that they show real bite, e.g. that mind and body are separate entities because they are possibly so because we can imagine them so. And as van Inwagen points out thereby lies the problem:"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

Conceivability and possibility arguments became fashionable after Kripke made modal logic respectable by providing semantics for it in terms of possible worlds. However, to make it applicable to anything real one needs a way to decide what is possible. This gave rise to "imaginability" and "conceivability" as "guides" to possibility. The game is to argue that in some circumstances our sense of possibility is refined enough so that what we can imagine or conceive turns out to be possible. This usually concerns the traditional epistemic possibility. But in counterfactual reasoning we often "restrain" our imagination to what Kripke calls "metaphysical possibility" with closer ties to the actual world, so Nixon could possibly lose the 1968 election, but could not possibly be an alien.

As for your examples generally speaking there is no difference, the move from conceivability to possibility is either accepted or not accepted, and depending on that all four will be valid or invalid. Swinburne does think that Kripke's mind-body dualism argument can succeed even if one generally rejects this move however, because imagination is usually mistaken about issues we have no direct acquaintance with, and our mind is an exception to that, see SEP.

But modal arguments that end with a mere possibility of something are toothless. Under different physical laws faster than light travel is possible, so what? Perhaps it is even "metaphysically" possible for a mind to be disembodied, so what? It is when possibility is used as a premise to draw conclusions about the actual that they show real bite, e.g. that mind and body are separate entities because they are possibly so because we can imagine them so. And as van Inwagen points out thereby lies the problem:

"I know of no case in which a possibility argument has changed any philosopher's mind about anything. No one (I think) would now dispute the logical validity... but a philosopher who rejects the conclusion of any of them will simply - I know of no exceptions to this generalization - reject (or at least refuse to accept) the crucial modal premise of the argument that has the unwelcome conclusion... it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise. The resulting argument will, of course, be valid if the original argument was valid, and those who reject the conclusion of the original argument will invariably claim to find the resulting "contrapositive" argument at least as plausible as the original argument".

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