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In the original version of the fallacy sensations, perceptions and thoughts were replaced by "the unity of thought", and Kant pointed out that this sort of reasoning cuts both ways:"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material". ThisHere is Kitcher's summary of Kant's argument in the Second Paralogism.:

"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material".

Here is another version of the same fallacy with immateriality replaced by intentionality, which is due to Searle:"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

As Kitcher points out, "In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking.":

"In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking."

In the original version of the fallacy sensations, perceptions and thoughts were replaced by "the unity of thought", and Kant pointed out that this sort of reasoning cuts both ways:"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material". This is Kitcher's summary of Kant's argument in the Second Paralogism.

Here is another version of the same fallacy with immateriality replaced by intentionality, which is due to Searle:"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

As Kitcher points out, "In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking."

In the original version of the fallacy sensations, perceptions and thoughts were replaced by "the unity of thought", and Kant pointed out that this sort of reasoning cuts both ways. Here is Kitcher's summary of Kant's argument in the Second Paralogism:

"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material".

Here is another version of the same fallacy with immateriality replaced by intentionality, which is due to Searle:

"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

As Kitcher points out:

"In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking."

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This argument is a variation on what Kitcher calls the "rational psychologist's fallacy" in Kant's Transcendental Psychology. It is a particular case of the argument from ignorance fallacy, and was addressed already by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. In the OP version of the argument the fallacious reasoning is rolled into using premise 3. Sensations, perceptions and thoughts are effects implemented by something, and one can not move from description of effects to conclusions about the nature of something that implements them, unless one actually knows how they can be implemented. So "not extended, have no shape nor definite locations" are no more relevant than the same statements about say heat or beauty.

In the original version of the fallacy sensations, perceptions and thoughts were replaced by "the unity of thought", and Kant pointed out that this sort of reasoning cuts both ways:"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material". This is Kitcher's summary of Kant's argument in the Second Paralogism.

Here is another version of the same fallacy with immateriality replaced by intentionality, which is due to Searle:"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

As Kitcher points out, "In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking."

This argument is a variation on what Kitcher calls the "rational psychologist's fallacy" in Kant's Transcendental Psychology. It is a particular case of the argument from ignorance fallacy, and was addressed already by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. In the OP version of the argument the fallacious reasoning is rolled into using premise 3. Sensations, perceptions and thoughts are effects implemented by something, and one can not move from description of effects to conclusions about the nature of something that implements them unless one actually knows how they can be implemented. So "not extended, have no shape nor definite locations" are no more relevant than the same statements about say heat or beauty.

In the original version of the fallacy sensations, perceptions and thoughts were replaced by "the unity of thought", and Kant pointed out that this sort of reasoning cuts both ways:"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material". This is Kitcher's summary of Kant's argument in the Second Paralogism.

Here is another version of the same fallacy with immateriality replaced by intentionality, which is due to Searle:"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

As Kitcher points out, "In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking."

This argument is a variation on what Kitcher calls the "rational psychologist's fallacy" in Kant's Transcendental Psychology. It is a particular case of the argument from ignorance fallacy, and was addressed already by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. In the OP version of the argument the fallacious reasoning is rolled into using premise 3. Sensations, perceptions and thoughts are effects implemented by something, and one can not move from description of effects to conclusions about the nature of something that implements them, unless one actually knows how they can be implemented. So "not extended, have no shape nor definite locations" are no more relevant than the same statements about say heat or beauty.

In the original version of the fallacy sensations, perceptions and thoughts were replaced by "the unity of thought", and Kant pointed out that this sort of reasoning cuts both ways:"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material". This is Kitcher's summary of Kant's argument in the Second Paralogism.

Here is another version of the same fallacy with immateriality replaced by intentionality, which is due to Searle:"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

As Kitcher points out, "In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking."

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source | link

This argument is a variation on what Kitcher calls the "rational psychologist's fallacy" in Kant's Transcendental Psychology. It is a particular case of the argument from ignorance fallacy, and was addressed already by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. In the OP version of the argument the fallacious reasoning is rolled into using premise 3. Sensations, perceptions and thoughts are effects implemented by something, and one can not move from description of effects to conclusions about the nature of something that implements them unless one actually knows how they arecan be implemented. So "not extended, have no shape nor definite locations" are no more relevant than the same statements about say heat or beauty.

In the original version of the fallacy sensations, perceptions and thoughts were replaced by "the unity of thought", and Kant pointed out that this sort of reasoning cuts both ways:"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material". This is Kitcher's summary of Kant's argument in the Second Paralogism.

Here is another version of the same fallacy with immateriality replaced by intentionality, which is due to Searle:"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

As Kitcher points out, "In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking."

This argument is a variation on what Kitcher calls the "rational psychologist's fallacy" in Kant's Transcendental Psychology. It is a particular case of the argument from ignorance fallacy, and was addressed already by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. In the OP version of the argument the fallacious reasoning is rolled into using premise 3. Sensations, perceptions and thoughts are effects implemented by something, and one can not move from description of effects to conclusions about the nature of something that implements them unless one actually knows how they are implemented. So "not extended, have no shape nor definite locations" are no more relevant than the same statements about say heat or beauty.

In the original version of the fallacy sensations, perceptions and thoughts were replaced by "the unity of thought", and Kant pointed out that this sort of reasoning cuts both ways:"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material". This is Kitcher's summary of Kant's argument in the Second Paralogism.

Here is another version of the same fallacy with immateriality replaced by intentionality, which is due to Searle:"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

As Kitcher points out, "In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking."

This argument is a variation on what Kitcher calls the "rational psychologist's fallacy" in Kant's Transcendental Psychology. It is a particular case of the argument from ignorance fallacy, and was addressed already by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. In the OP version of the argument the fallacious reasoning is rolled into using premise 3. Sensations, perceptions and thoughts are effects implemented by something, and one can not move from description of effects to conclusions about the nature of something that implements them unless one actually knows how they can be implemented. So "not extended, have no shape nor definite locations" are no more relevant than the same statements about say heat or beauty.

In the original version of the fallacy sensations, perceptions and thoughts were replaced by "the unity of thought", and Kant pointed out that this sort of reasoning cuts both ways:"If Rational Psychologists are permitted to argue for the simplicity and immateriality of the soul by claiming that they do not see how a material substance could realize the unity of thought, then materialists would be free to employ the same strategy to "establish" the opposite conclusion. Since the latter do not understand how an immaterial substance could realize the unity of thought, they may claim that the soul is material". This is Kitcher's summary of Kant's argument in the Second Paralogism.

Here is another version of the same fallacy with immateriality replaced by intentionality, which is due to Searle:"It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able to understand English and have other forms of intentionality... but as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e., chemical and physical) structure, and this structure under certain conditions is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, and other intentional phenomena".

As Kitcher points out, "In this passage Searle indulges in exactly the sort of argument from ignorance that Kant warns Rational Psychologists against... The problem with both arguments is that, although we have certain abstract descriptions of thoughts (they must be unified, they must be intentional), we do not have the slightest idea what kinds of things might be able to instantiate those properties. Proponents of such arguments disguise this fact, by announcing that souls possess the requisite unity or that brains possess the requisite intentionality. But these bold claims do not rest on an understanding of how anything could possess such properties; they are supported entirely by the antecedent conviction that it is brains or immaterial souls that do the thinking."

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