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Jun 17, 2020 at 8:34 history edited CommunityBot
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Sep 10, 2019 at 15:02 answer added Geoffrey Thomas timeline score: 1
Sep 10, 2019 at 13:58 comment added Ray Butterworth Kvanvig's 'weaker view that "to believe that P" implies "to believe that P is true"' means that "belief that P is true" doesn't necessarily imply "belief that P". Is there a real-world example of such a "P" that would serve a a count-example to William's view?
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Jan 24, 2016 at 15:46 comment added DBK @virmaior: I agree. I think I interpreted Kvanvigs claim to stringently. It may be as simple as requiring doxastic closure, as Johannes mentioned. I don't know.
Jan 24, 2016 at 15:42 comment added DBK @Johannes: Good reasoning! The recent paper Rationally held ‘P, but I fully believe ~P and I am not equivocating' by Frances in Philosophical Studies got me thinking and I'm trying to formulate what rubs me the wrong way about it. I've got a feeling that granting Kvanvig's view might render Frances' point moot. But it's just an intution for now :)
Jan 24, 2016 at 14:49 comment added virmaior I don't have an answer to this since it's well outside of my own specialization, but it seems like the rub is going to be about the sort of entailment meant by "implies" and whether one considers believes that P and believes that P is true to be distinct beliefs (which again mirrors whether one considers the implication intuitively automatic or true upon reflection).
Jan 24, 2016 at 12:51 comment added Johannes Assuming that "having the concept of truth" minimally requires accepting the T-sentences (or accepting the capture/release rules for truth), and assuming some form of doxastic closure (i.e. the agent believes what she has inferred from her beliefs), it's hard to see how you could argue against the weaker thesis. I have seen the P->T("P") direction of the T-equivalence questioned (I can't remember where), so that might be a way to argue against it. Also, if the belief is some sort of partial belief then maybe you could have a case against it.
Jan 24, 2016 at 4:49 comment added Jo Wehler Now that you have added the context of your question, quoting Wiliams and Kvanvig, one should first clarify: What do they mean by respectively, p and P? I agree with Cort Ammon that one has to discriminate between a proposition and a state of affairs. Do the two authors believe propositions or do they believe state of affairs? Can you derive the answer from their texts?
Jan 24, 2016 at 3:07 history edited DBK CC BY-SA 3.0
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Jan 24, 2016 at 2:22 history edited DBK CC BY-SA 3.0
enlarged my question with some research
Jan 24, 2016 at 2:12 history edited DBK CC BY-SA 3.0
enlarged my question with some research
Jan 23, 2016 at 7:00 history tweeted twitter.com/StackPhilosophy/status/690791281681940480
Jan 23, 2016 at 6:43 answer added Cort Ammon timeline score: 0
Jan 23, 2016 at 6:43 answer added Jo Wehler timeline score: 0
Jan 23, 2016 at 0:48 history asked DBK CC BY-SA 3.0