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Nelson Goodman is well known for what he calls the "The New Riddle of Induction." I believe the following does a good job of summarizing his conclusion:

"We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

I believe his conclusion is correct because in the final analysis it merely exemplifies the fact that we assume that things will behave in a regular manner. That assumption usually serves us very well, but it is still only an assumption for which there is no means to prove.

Your question seems to suggest and all-or-nothing attitude toward epistemology, i.e. if we can't have certainty, we are doomed to scepticism. However, in practice, such an extreme position is unnecessary as Goodman points out:

"If our definition works for such hypotheses as are normally employed, isn't that all we need? In a sense, yes; but only in the sense that we need no definition, no theory of induction, and no philosophy of knowledge at all. We get along well enough without them in daily life and in scientific research." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

Of course, Goodman didn't give up at that point. He went on to try to clarify the problem to provide a firmer foundation for the confirmation of hypotheses. He maintained hope that seeking solutions to the problem is a worthwhile endeavor. However, he never lost sight of the inescapable fact that we live by faithhave to put our trust in certain assumptions:

"We have no guarantees. The criterion for the legitimacy of projections cannot be truth that is as yet undetermined." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

We may continue with our science and our philosophy, but it's best to remember that we operate within the constraints of some presuppositions we can never empirically justify.

Nelson Goodman is well known for what he calls the "The New Riddle of Induction." I believe the following does a good job of summarizing his conclusion:

"We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

I believe his conclusion is correct because in the final analysis it merely exemplifies the fact that we assume that things will behave in a regular manner. That assumption usually serves us very well, but it is still only an assumption for which there is no means to prove.

Your question seems to suggest and all-or-nothing attitude toward epistemology, i.e. if we can't have certainty, we are doomed to scepticism. However, in practice, such an extreme position is unnecessary as Goodman points out:

"If our definition works for such hypotheses as are normally employed, isn't that all we need? In a sense, yes; but only in the sense that we need no definition, no theory of induction, and no philosophy of knowledge at all. We get along well enough without them in daily life and in scientific research." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

Of course, Goodman didn't give up at that point. He went on to try to clarify the problem to provide a firmer foundation for the confirmation of hypotheses. He maintained hope that seeking solutions to the problem is a worthwhile endeavor. However, he never lost sight of the inescapable fact that we live by faith in certain assumptions:

"We have no guarantees. The criterion for the legitimacy of projections cannot be truth that is as yet undetermined." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

We may continue with our science and our philosophy, but it's best to remember that we operate within the constraints of some presuppositions we can never empirically justify.

Nelson Goodman is well known for what he calls the "The New Riddle of Induction." I believe the following does a good job of summarizing his conclusion:

"We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

I believe his conclusion is correct because in the final analysis it merely exemplifies the fact that we assume that things will behave in a regular manner. That assumption usually serves us very well, but it is still only an assumption for which there is no means to prove.

Your question seems to suggest and all-or-nothing attitude toward epistemology, i.e. if we can't have certainty, we are doomed to scepticism. However, in practice, such an extreme position is unnecessary as Goodman points out:

"If our definition works for such hypotheses as are normally employed, isn't that all we need? In a sense, yes; but only in the sense that we need no definition, no theory of induction, and no philosophy of knowledge at all. We get along well enough without them in daily life and in scientific research." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

Of course, Goodman didn't give up at that point. He went on to try to clarify the problem to provide a firmer foundation for the confirmation of hypotheses. He maintained hope that seeking solutions to the problem is a worthwhile endeavor. However, he never lost sight of the inescapable fact that we have to put our trust in certain assumptions:

"We have no guarantees. The criterion for the legitimacy of projections cannot be truth that is as yet undetermined." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

We may continue with our science and our philosophy, but it's best to remember that we operate within the constraints of some presuppositions we can never empirically justify.

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Nelson Goodman is well known for what he calls the "The New Riddle of Induction." I believe the following does a good job of summarizing his conclusion:

"We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

I believe his conclusion is correct because in the final analysis it merely exemplifies the fact that we assume that things will behave in a regular manner. That assumption usually serves us very well, but it is still only an assumption for which there is no means to prove.

Your question seems to suggest and all-or-nothing attitude toward epistemology, i.e. if we can't have certainty, we are doomed to scepticism. However, in practice, such an extreme position is unnecessary as Goodman points out:

"If our definition works for such hypotheses as are normally employed, isn't that all we need? In a sense, yes; but only in the sense that we need no definition, no theory of induction, and no philosophy of knowledge at all. We get along well enough without them in daily life and in scientific research." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

Of course, Goodman didn't give up at that point. He went on to try to clarify the problem to provide a firmer foundation for the confirmation of hypotheses. He maintained hope that seeking solutions to the problem is a worthwhile endeavor. However, he never lost sight of the inescapable fact that we live by faith in certain assumptions:

"We have no guarantees. The criterion for the legitimacy of projections cannot be truth that is as yet undetermined." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

We may continue with our science and our philosophy, but it's best to understandremember that we operate within the constraints of a presuppositionsome presuppositions we can never empirically justify.

Nelson Goodman is well known for what he calls the "The New Riddle of Induction." I believe the following does a good job of summarizing his conclusion:

"We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

I believe his conclusion is correct because in the final analysis it merely exemplifies the fact that we assume that things will behave in a regular manner. That assumption usually serves us very well, but it is still only an assumption for which there is no means to prove.

Your question seems to suggest and all-or-nothing attitude toward epistemology, i.e. if we can't have certainty, we are doomed to scepticism. However, in practice, such an extreme position is unnecessary as Goodman points out:

"If our definition works for such hypotheses as are normally employed, isn't that all we need? In a sense, yes; but only in the sense that we need no definition, no theory of induction, and no philosophy of knowledge at all. We get along well enough without them in daily life and in scientific research." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

Of course, Goodman didn't give up at that point. He went on to try to clarify the problem to provide a firmer foundation for the confirmation of hypotheses. He maintained hope that seeking solutions to the problem is a worthwhile endeavor. However, he never lost sight of the inescapable fact that we live by faith in certain assumptions:

"We have no guarantees. The criterion for the legitimacy of projections cannot be truth that is as yet undetermined." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

We may continue with our science and our philosophy, but it's best to understand that we operate within the constraints of a presupposition we can never empirically justify.

Nelson Goodman is well known for what he calls the "The New Riddle of Induction." I believe the following does a good job of summarizing his conclusion:

"We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

I believe his conclusion is correct because in the final analysis it merely exemplifies the fact that we assume that things will behave in a regular manner. That assumption usually serves us very well, but it is still only an assumption for which there is no means to prove.

Your question seems to suggest and all-or-nothing attitude toward epistemology, i.e. if we can't have certainty, we are doomed to scepticism. However, in practice, such an extreme position is unnecessary as Goodman points out:

"If our definition works for such hypotheses as are normally employed, isn't that all we need? In a sense, yes; but only in the sense that we need no definition, no theory of induction, and no philosophy of knowledge at all. We get along well enough without them in daily life and in scientific research." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

Of course, Goodman didn't give up at that point. He went on to try to clarify the problem to provide a firmer foundation for the confirmation of hypotheses. He maintained hope that seeking solutions to the problem is a worthwhile endeavor. However, he never lost sight of the inescapable fact that we live by faith in certain assumptions:

"We have no guarantees. The criterion for the legitimacy of projections cannot be truth that is as yet undetermined." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

We may continue with our science and our philosophy, but it's best to remember that we operate within the constraints of some presuppositions we can never empirically justify.

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source | link

Nelson Goodman is well known for what he calls the "The New Riddle of Induction." I believe the following does a good job of summarizing his conclusion:

"We have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable ones; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the stature of a major obstacle to the development of a satisfactory theory." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

I believe his conclusion is correct because in the final analysis it merely exemplifies the fact that we assume that things will behave in a regular manner. That assumption usually serves us very well, but it is still only an assumption for which there is no means to prove.

Your question seems to suggest and all-or-nothing attitude toward epistemology, i.e. if we can't have certainty, we are doomed to scepticism. However, in practice, such an extreme position is unnecessary as Goodman points out:

"If our definition works for such hypotheses as are normally employed, isn't that all we need? In a sense, yes; but only in the sense that we need no definition, no theory of induction, and no philosophy of knowledge at all. We get along well enough without them in daily life and in scientific research." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

Of course, Goodman didn't give up at that point. He went on to try to clarify the problem to provide a firmer foundation for the confirmation of hypotheses. He maintained hope that seeking solutions to the problem is a worthwhile endeavor. However, he never lost sight of the inescapable fact that we live by faith in certain assumptions:

"We have no guarantees. The criterion for the legitimacy of projections cannot be truth that is as yet undetermined." (Nelson Goodman, "Fact, Fiction and Forecast")

We may continue with our science and our philosophy, but it's best to understand that we operate within the constraints of a presupposition we can never empirically justify.