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(I deleted this answer because its basic interpretation of the quesion was wrong. But most of its content is still germane. So it is back.)

You still have the problem with positions like transcendental pantheism or Deism, who create a third (or even a fifth) substance. For them, the mental may currently supervene upon the material, but only because the material supervenes upon the 'spiritual' or some other determinant with an internal will.

Many of them suppose that while the latter state is permanent, the former may not be. That gives them a secularist eschatology and a notion of heaven, either as some adaptation of Nirvana or as union with an ultimate God. Or it provides them with a theoretical understanding of will that is non-determinist in a universe that is statistically determined. This is not too silly or arcane because folks just asked a question about it http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/36062/9166https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/36062/9166.

They derive support from the basic nondeterminism of matter, which suggests there is a lower-lying determining source. (At least in spirit, for their logic is often kind of nutty, even when they are brilliant, q.v. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind where the third substance is 'information'.)

So I still think you need to add the requirement of dualism to get your argument started.

And you still have the problem with alternative notions of causality.

One, coming from positions as wide apart as Hume and the religious notions of 'maya and lila', is that the regularity of physical causation is an epiphenomenon of perception -- not really present, but agreed upon by all those trapped in a shared illusion for their own peace of mind. (Like Folie-a-deux, but Folie à tous). Thus, you may reduce the mental to the physical, only to have the physical reduced back to the mental on a different scale.

Another is the return to the Medieval Christian notion that cause is really primarily teleological, flowing backward from the intended outcome, and only holding together in the forward direction as a side effect of its ultimate convergence.

So you would still need a stronger version of your last admitted thesis that not only establishes physical causation of the mental, but physical causation of the physical.

(I deleted this answer because its basic interpretation of the quesion was wrong. But most of its content is still germane. So it is back.)

You still have the problem with positions like transcendental pantheism or Deism, who create a third (or even a fifth) substance. For them, the mental may currently supervene upon the material, but only because the material supervenes upon the 'spiritual' or some other determinant with an internal will.

Many of them suppose that while the latter state is permanent, the former may not be. That gives them a secularist eschatology and a notion of heaven, either as some adaptation of Nirvana or as union with an ultimate God. Or it provides them with a theoretical understanding of will that is non-determinist in a universe that is statistically determined. This is not too silly or arcane because folks just asked a question about it http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/36062/9166.

They derive support from the basic nondeterminism of matter, which suggests there is a lower-lying determining source. (At least in spirit, for their logic is often kind of nutty, even when they are brilliant, q.v. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind where the third substance is 'information'.)

So I still think you need to add the requirement of dualism to get your argument started.

And you still have the problem with alternative notions of causality.

One, coming from positions as wide apart as Hume and the religious notions of 'maya and lila', is that the regularity of physical causation is an epiphenomenon of perception -- not really present, but agreed upon by all those trapped in a shared illusion for their own peace of mind. (Like Folie-a-deux, but Folie à tous). Thus, you may reduce the mental to the physical, only to have the physical reduced back to the mental on a different scale.

Another is the return to the Medieval Christian notion that cause is really primarily teleological, flowing backward from the intended outcome, and only holding together in the forward direction as a side effect of its ultimate convergence.

So you would still need a stronger version of your last admitted thesis that not only establishes physical causation of the mental, but physical causation of the physical.

(I deleted this answer because its basic interpretation of the quesion was wrong. But most of its content is still germane. So it is back.)

You still have the problem with positions like transcendental pantheism or Deism, who create a third (or even a fifth) substance. For them, the mental may currently supervene upon the material, but only because the material supervenes upon the 'spiritual' or some other determinant with an internal will.

Many of them suppose that while the latter state is permanent, the former may not be. That gives them a secularist eschatology and a notion of heaven, either as some adaptation of Nirvana or as union with an ultimate God. Or it provides them with a theoretical understanding of will that is non-determinist in a universe that is statistically determined. This is not too silly or arcane because folks just asked a question about it https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/36062/9166.

They derive support from the basic nondeterminism of matter, which suggests there is a lower-lying determining source. (At least in spirit, for their logic is often kind of nutty, even when they are brilliant, q.v. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind where the third substance is 'information'.)

So I still think you need to add the requirement of dualism to get your argument started.

And you still have the problem with alternative notions of causality.

One, coming from positions as wide apart as Hume and the religious notions of 'maya and lila', is that the regularity of physical causation is an epiphenomenon of perception -- not really present, but agreed upon by all those trapped in a shared illusion for their own peace of mind. (Like Folie-a-deux, but Folie à tous). Thus, you may reduce the mental to the physical, only to have the physical reduced back to the mental on a different scale.

Another is the return to the Medieval Christian notion that cause is really primarily teleological, flowing backward from the intended outcome, and only holding together in the forward direction as a side effect of its ultimate convergence.

So you would still need a stronger version of your last admitted thesis that not only establishes physical causation of the mental, but physical causation of the physical.

6 added 167 characters in body
source | link

(I deleted this answer because its basic interpretation of the quesion was wrong. But most of its content is still germane. So it is back.)

You still have the problem with positions like transcendental pantheism or Deism, who create a third (or even a fifth) substance. For them, the mental may currently supervene upon the material, but only because the material supervenes upon the 'spiritual' or some other determinant with an internal will.

Many of them suppose that while the latter state is permanent, the former may not be. That gives them a secularist eschatology and a notion of heaven, either as some adaptation of Nirvana or as union with an ultimate God. Or it provides them with a theoretical understanding of will that is non-determinist in a universe that is statistically determined. This is not too silly or arcane because folks just asked a question about it http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/36062/9166.

They derive support from the basic nondeterminism of matter, which suggests there is a lower-lying determining source. (At least in spirit, for their logic is often kind of nutty e, even when they are brilliant, q.gv. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind where the third substance is 'information'.)

So I still think you need to add the requirement of dualism to get your argument started.

And you still have the problem with alternative notions of causality.

One, coming from positions as wide apart as Hume and the religious notions of 'maya and lila', is that the regularity of physical causation is an epiphenomenon of perception -- not really present, but agreed upon by all those trapped in a shared illusion for their own peace of mind. (Like Folie-a-deux, but Folie à tous). Thus, you may reduce the mental to the physical, only to have the physical reduced back to the mental on a different scale.

Another is the return to the Medieval Christian notion that cause is really primarily teleological, flowing backward from the intended outcome, and only holding together in the forward direction as a side effect of its ultimate convergence.

So you would still need a stronger version of your last admitted thesis that not only establishes physical causation of the mental, but physical causation of the physical.

(I deleted this answer because its basic interpretation of the quesion was wrong. But most of its content is still germane. So it is back.)

You still have the problem with positions like transcendental pantheism or Deism, who create a third (or even a fifth) substance. For them, the mental may currently supervene upon the material, but only because the material supervenes upon the 'spiritual' or some other determinant with an internal will.

Many of them suppose that while the latter state is permanent, the former may not be. That gives them a secularist eschatology and a notion of heaven, either as some adaptation of Nirvana or as union with an ultimate God. Or it provides them with a theoretical understanding of will that is non-determinist in a universe that is statistically determined.

They derive support from the basic nondeterminism of matter, which suggests there is a lower-lying determining source. (At least in spirit, for their logic is kind of nutty e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind where the third substance is 'information'.)

So I still think you need to add the requirement of dualism to get your argument started.

And you still have the problem with alternative notions of causality.

One, coming from positions as wide apart as Hume and the religious notions of 'maya and lila', is that the regularity of physical causation is an epiphenomenon of perception -- not really present, but agreed upon by all those trapped in a shared illusion for their own peace of mind. (Like Folie-a-deux, but Folie à tous). Thus, you may reduce the mental to the physical, only to have the physical reduced back to the mental on a different scale.

Another is the return to the Medieval Christian notion that cause is really primarily teleological, flowing backward from the intended outcome, and only holding together in the forward direction as a side effect of its ultimate convergence.

So you would still need a stronger version of your last admitted thesis that not only establishes physical causation of the mental, but physical causation of the physical.

(I deleted this answer because its basic interpretation of the quesion was wrong. But most of its content is still germane. So it is back.)

You still have the problem with positions like transcendental pantheism or Deism, who create a third (or even a fifth) substance. For them, the mental may currently supervene upon the material, but only because the material supervenes upon the 'spiritual' or some other determinant with an internal will.

Many of them suppose that while the latter state is permanent, the former may not be. That gives them a secularist eschatology and a notion of heaven, either as some adaptation of Nirvana or as union with an ultimate God. Or it provides them with a theoretical understanding of will that is non-determinist in a universe that is statistically determined. This is not too silly or arcane because folks just asked a question about it http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/36062/9166.

They derive support from the basic nondeterminism of matter, which suggests there is a lower-lying determining source. (At least in spirit, for their logic is often kind of nutty, even when they are brilliant, q.v. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind where the third substance is 'information'.)

So I still think you need to add the requirement of dualism to get your argument started.

And you still have the problem with alternative notions of causality.

One, coming from positions as wide apart as Hume and the religious notions of 'maya and lila', is that the regularity of physical causation is an epiphenomenon of perception -- not really present, but agreed upon by all those trapped in a shared illusion for their own peace of mind. (Like Folie-a-deux, but Folie à tous). Thus, you may reduce the mental to the physical, only to have the physical reduced back to the mental on a different scale.

Another is the return to the Medieval Christian notion that cause is really primarily teleological, flowing backward from the intended outcome, and only holding together in the forward direction as a side effect of its ultimate convergence.

So you would still need a stronger version of your last admitted thesis that not only establishes physical causation of the mental, but physical causation of the physical.

5 added 458 characters in body
source | link

(I deleted this answer because its basic interpretation of the quesion was wrong. But most of its content is still germane. So it is back.)

You still have the problem with positions like transcendental pantheism or Deism, who create a third (or even a fifth) substance. For them, the mental may currently supervene upon the material, but only because the material supervenes upon the 'spiritual' or some other determinant with an internal will.

Many of them suppose that while the latter state is permanent, the former may not be. That gives them a secularist eschatology and a notion of heaven, either as some adaptation of Nirvana or as union with an ultimate God. Or it provides them with a theoretical understanding of will that is non-determinist in a universe that is statistically determined.

They derive support from the basic nondeterminism of matter, which suggests there is a lower-lying determining source. (At least in spirit, for their logic is kind of nutty e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind where the third substance is 'information'.)

So I still think you need to add the requirement of dualism to get your argument started.

And you still have the problem with alternative notions of causality.

One, coming from positions as wide apart as Hume and the religious notions of 'maya and lila', is that itthe regularity of physical causation is an epiphenomenon of perception -- not really present, but agreed upon by all those trapped in a shared illusion for their own peace of mind  . (FolieLike Folie-a-deux, but Folie à tous). Thus, you may reduce the mental to the physical, only to have the physical reduced back to the mental on a different scale.

Another is the return to the Medieval Christian notion that itcause is really primarily teleological, flowing backward from the intended outcome, and only holding together in the forward direction as a side effect of its ultimate convergence.

So you would still need a stronger version of your last admitted thesis that not only establishes physical causation of the mental, but physical causation of the physical.

(I deleted this answer because its basic interpretation of the quesion was wrong. But most of its content is still germane. So it is back.)

You still have the problem with positions like transcendental pantheism or Deism, who create a third (or even a fifth) substance. For them, the mental may currently supervene upon the material, but only because the material supervenes upon the 'spiritual' or some other determinant with an internal will.

Many of them suppose that while the latter state is permanent, the former may not be. That gives them a secularist eschatology and a notion of heaven, either as some adaptation of Nirvana or as union with an ultimate God. Or it provides them with a theoretical understanding of will that is non-determinist in a universe that is statistically determined.

They derive support from the basic nondeterminism of matter, which suggests there is a lower-lying determining source. (At least in spirit, for their logic is kind of nutty e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind where the third substance is 'information'.)

So I still think you need to add the requirement of dualism to get your argument started.

And you still have the problem with alternative notions of causality.

One, coming from positions as wide apart as Hume and the religious notions of 'maya and lila', is that it is an epiphenomenon of perception -- not really present, but agreed upon by all those trapped in a shared illusion for their own peace of mind  (Folie à tous).

Another is that it is really teleological, flowing backward from the intended outcome, and only holding together in the forward direction as a side effect of its ultimate convergence.

So you would need a stronger version of your last admitted thesis that not only establishes physical causation of the mental, but physical causation of the physical.

(I deleted this answer because its basic interpretation of the quesion was wrong. But most of its content is still germane. So it is back.)

You still have the problem with positions like transcendental pantheism or Deism, who create a third (or even a fifth) substance. For them, the mental may currently supervene upon the material, but only because the material supervenes upon the 'spiritual' or some other determinant with an internal will.

Many of them suppose that while the latter state is permanent, the former may not be. That gives them a secularist eschatology and a notion of heaven, either as some adaptation of Nirvana or as union with an ultimate God. Or it provides them with a theoretical understanding of will that is non-determinist in a universe that is statistically determined.

They derive support from the basic nondeterminism of matter, which suggests there is a lower-lying determining source. (At least in spirit, for their logic is kind of nutty e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor%27s_New_Mind where the third substance is 'information'.)

So I still think you need to add the requirement of dualism to get your argument started.

And you still have the problem with alternative notions of causality.

One, coming from positions as wide apart as Hume and the religious notions of 'maya and lila', is that the regularity of physical causation is an epiphenomenon of perception -- not really present, but agreed upon by all those trapped in a shared illusion for their own peace of mind. (Like Folie-a-deux, but Folie à tous). Thus, you may reduce the mental to the physical, only to have the physical reduced back to the mental on a different scale.

Another is the return to the Medieval Christian notion that cause is really primarily teleological, flowing backward from the intended outcome, and only holding together in the forward direction as a side effect of its ultimate convergence.

So you would still need a stronger version of your last admitted thesis that not only establishes physical causation of the mental, but physical causation of the physical.

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