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For emergentists, the problem with reductionism is not in theorizing the reduction, it is in imagining that you can understand the original by looking at the reduced form.

You can easily reduce all of life to chemistry, but you will fail to understand reproduction or other goal-driven behaviors. The concept of the will to survive probably has a hormonal analog, but by focussing on the chemistry you would forever fail to notice that it existed.

So by writing off the relevance of all the intermediate layers as places where we need conceptual anchors, and insisting that the most basic explanation is 'better' than others, reductivists lose sight of the real question: What is and is not an explanation? A theoretical reduction fails to be an explanation if it raises the complexity so fast that it does not make anything plainer.

By training I am partially a Jungian, so I fully acknowledge that God talk is probably reducible to a social convention (an Archetype of the Collective Unconscious) which is reducible to individual mental models, which are reducible to neurology, then to biology, to chemistry, to physics... But that does not mean that God is just physics and it is pointless to discuss the Godhead, unreduced, at the top level, unanalyzed. Our collective intuitions of perfection, transcendence and 'meaningfulness' get expressed in multiple ways on multiple levels. But reductivists want to discard the top level, or declare it pointless, simply because it has a lower-level causes.

The most compelling model of the world is not going to be the one that is expressed at the finest level of granularity, it is going to be the one that reduces complexity most efficiently at each level of reality without escaping or denying higher or lower ones.

For emergentists, the problem with reductionism is not in theorizing the reduction, it is in imagining that you can understand the original by looking at the reduced form.

You can easily reduce all of life to chemistry, but you will fail to understand reproduction or other goal-driven behaviors. The concept of the will to survive probably has a hormonal analog, but by focussing on the chemistry you would forever fail to notice that it existed.

So by writing off the relevance of all the intermediate layers as places where we need conceptual anchors, and insisting that the most basic explanation is 'better' than others, reductivists lose sight of the real question: What is and is not an explanation? A theoretical reduction fails to be an explanation if it raises the complexity so fast that it does not make anything plainer.

By training I am partially a Jungian, so I fully acknowledge that God talk is probably reducible to a social convention (an Archetype the Collective Unconscious) which is reducible to individual mental models, which are reducible to neurology, then to biology, to chemistry, to physics... But that does not mean that God is just physics and it is pointless to discuss the Godhead, unreduced, at the top level, unanalyzed. Our collective intuitions of perfection, transcendence and 'meaningfulness' get expressed in multiple ways on multiple levels. But reductivists want to discard the top level, or declare it pointless, simply because it has a lower-level causes.

The most compelling model of the world is not going to be the one that is expressed at the finest level of granularity, it is going to be the one that reduces complexity most efficiently at each level of reality without escaping or denying higher or lower ones.

For emergentists, the problem with reductionism is not in theorizing the reduction, it is in imagining that you can understand the original by looking at the reduced form.

You can easily reduce all of life to chemistry, but you will fail to understand reproduction or other goal-driven behaviors. The concept of the will to survive probably has a hormonal analog, but by focussing on the chemistry you would forever fail to notice that it existed.

So by writing off the relevance of all the intermediate layers as places where we need conceptual anchors, and insisting that the most basic explanation is 'better' than others, reductivists lose sight of the real question: What is and is not an explanation? A theoretical reduction fails to be an explanation if it raises the complexity so fast that it does not make anything plainer.

By training I am partially a Jungian, so I fully acknowledge that God talk is probably reducible to a social convention (an Archetype of the Collective Unconscious) which is reducible to individual mental models, which are reducible to neurology, then to biology, to chemistry, to physics... But that does not mean that God is just physics and it is pointless to discuss the Godhead, unreduced, at the top level, unanalyzed. Our collective intuitions of perfection, transcendence and 'meaningfulness' get expressed in multiple ways on multiple levels. But reductivists want to discard the top level, or declare it pointless, simply because it has a lower-level causes.

The most compelling model of the world is not going to be the one that is expressed at the finest level of granularity, it is going to be the one that reduces complexity most efficiently at each level of reality without escaping or denying higher or lower ones.

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For emergentists, the problem with reductionism is not in theorizing the reduction, it is in imagining that you can understand the original by looking at the reduced form.

You can easily reduce all of life to chemistry, but you will fail to understand reproduction or other goal-driven behaviors. The concept of the will to survive probably has a hormonal analog, but by focussing on the chemistry you would forever fail to notice that it existed.

So by writing off the relevance of all the intermediate layers as places where we need conceptual anchors, and insisting that the most basic explanation is 'better' than others, reductivists lose sight of the real question: What is and is not an explanation? A theoretical reduction fails to be an explanation if it raises the complexity so fast that it does not make anything plainer.

By training I am partially a Jungian, so I fully acknowledge that God talk is probably reducible to a social convention (an Archetype the Collective Unconscious) which is reducible to individual mental models, which are reducible to neurology, then to biology, to chemistry, to physics... But that does not mean that God is just physics and it is pointless to discuss the Godhead, unreduced, at the top level, unanalyzed. Our collective intuitions of perfection, transcendence and 'meaningfulness' get expressed in multiple ways on multiple levels. But reductivists want to discard the top level, or declare it pointless, simply because it has a lower-level causes.

The simplestmost compelling model of the world is not going to be the one that is expressed at the finest level of granularity, it is going to be the one that reduces complexity most efficiently at each level of reality without escaping or denying higher or lower ones.

For emergentists, the problem with reductionism is not in theorizing the reduction, it is in imagining that you can understand the original by looking at the reduced form.

You can easily reduce all of life to chemistry, but you will fail to understand reproduction or other goal-driven behaviors. The concept of the will to survive probably has a hormonal analog, but by focussing on the chemistry you would forever fail to notice that it existed.

So by writing off the relevance of all the intermediate layers as places where we need conceptual anchors, and insisting that the most basic explanation is 'better' than others, reductivists lose sight of the real question: What is and is not an explanation? A theoretical reduction fails to be an explanation if it raises the complexity so fast that it does not make anything plainer.

The simplest model of the world is not going to be the one that is at the finest level of granularity, it is going to be the one that reduces complexity most efficiently at each level of reality.

For emergentists, the problem with reductionism is not in theorizing the reduction, it is in imagining that you can understand the original by looking at the reduced form.

You can easily reduce all of life to chemistry, but you will fail to understand reproduction or other goal-driven behaviors. The concept of the will to survive probably has a hormonal analog, but by focussing on the chemistry you would forever fail to notice that it existed.

So by writing off the relevance of all the intermediate layers as places where we need conceptual anchors, and insisting that the most basic explanation is 'better' than others, reductivists lose sight of the real question: What is and is not an explanation? A theoretical reduction fails to be an explanation if it raises the complexity so fast that it does not make anything plainer.

By training I am partially a Jungian, so I fully acknowledge that God talk is probably reducible to a social convention (an Archetype the Collective Unconscious) which is reducible to individual mental models, which are reducible to neurology, then to biology, to chemistry, to physics... But that does not mean that God is just physics and it is pointless to discuss the Godhead, unreduced, at the top level, unanalyzed. Our collective intuitions of perfection, transcendence and 'meaningfulness' get expressed in multiple ways on multiple levels. But reductivists want to discard the top level, or declare it pointless, simply because it has a lower-level causes.

The most compelling model of the world is not going to be the one that is expressed at the finest level of granularity, it is going to be the one that reduces complexity most efficiently at each level of reality without escaping or denying higher or lower ones.

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For emergentists, the problem with reductionism is not in theorizing the reduction, it is in imagining that you can understand the original by looking at the reduced form.

You can easily reduce all of life to chemistry, but you will fail to understand reproduction or other goal-driven behaviors. The concept of the will to survive probably has a hormonal analog, but by focussing on the chemistry you would forever fail to notice that it existed.

So by writing off the relevance of all the intermediate layers as places where we need conceptual anchors, and insisting that the most basic explanation is 'better' than others, reductivists lose sight of the real question: What is and is not an explanation? A theoretical reduction fails to be an explanation if it raises the complexity so fast that it does not make anything plainer.

The simplest model of the world is not going to be the one that is at the finest level of granularity, it is going to be the one that reduces complexity most efficiently at each level of reality.