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We know that infants perceptually differentiate self-starting from starting with contact at least by 6 months of age (Leslie, 1982)... Pace Hume’s belief that we cannot see causality, there is evidence that we can, or at least we see one of the major components of a commonly experienced causal relation, namely, the transfer of motion from one moving object to another. White (1988) proposed that the powerful sense of causality perceived when, say, a billiard ball strikes another, comes from the short duration of iconic storage (about 250 msec). The

The iconic store is a large-capacity sensory store that holds visual information prior to attentive processing; it is continuously refreshed, enabling the temporal integration, which makes us see motion as continuous... We see a causal relation when a conflict exists between two types of continuity cues. Spatial discontinuity between two objects says there are two objects, whereas continuous motion suggests there is only one. The conflict is resolved by perceiving the causal sequence as the transfer of motion from one object to the other.

We know that infants perceptually differentiate self-starting from starting with contact at least by 6 months of age (Leslie, 1982)... Pace Hume’s belief that we cannot see causality, there is evidence that we can, or at least we see one of the major components of a commonly experienced causal relation, namely, the transfer of motion from one moving object to another. White (1988) proposed that the powerful sense of causality perceived when, say, a billiard ball strikes another, comes from the short duration of iconic storage (about 250 msec). The iconic store is a large-capacity sensory store that holds visual information prior to attentive processing; it is continuously refreshed, enabling the temporal integration, which makes us see motion as continuous... We see a causal relation when a conflict exists between two types of continuity cues. Spatial discontinuity between two objects says there are two objects, whereas continuous motion suggests there is only one. The conflict is resolved by perceiving the causal sequence as the transfer of motion from one object to the other.

We know that infants perceptually differentiate self-starting from starting with contact at least by 6 months of age (Leslie, 1982)... Pace Hume’s belief that we cannot see causality, there is evidence that we can, or at least we see one of the major components of a commonly experienced causal relation, namely, the transfer of motion from one moving object to another. White (1988) proposed that the powerful sense of causality perceived when, say, a billiard ball strikes another, comes from the short duration of iconic storage (about 250 msec).

The iconic store is a large-capacity sensory store that holds visual information prior to attentive processing; it is continuously refreshed, enabling the temporal integration, which makes us see motion as continuous... We see a causal relation when a conflict exists between two types of continuity cues. Spatial discontinuity between two objects says there are two objects, whereas continuous motion suggests there is only one. The conflict is resolved by perceiving the causal sequence as the transfer of motion from one object to the other.

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However, the transfer of motion example rather confirms Hume's view that what we directly observe is not "causality"the "causing", but one type of event following another with regularity. Thus, causation plays a role similar to theoretical entities, that of unifying experiences, except it was formed even before scientific practice made introduction of such entities systematic and deliberate. Hume thought that it is formed through a subconscious psychological mechanism, "the law of association". Once this "theoretization" is accomplished the presence or absence of causation is determined based on holistic considerations of forming a coherent picture of environment rather than just induction on individual observations. Some previously admitted regularities, such as thunder following lightning, are reclassified as having common cause rather than directly causalcausative, others are dismissed as coincidences or superstitions. At this stage proximity still remains a requirement for proximate causes.

In science, however, the notion of causation is further subsumed under instantiation of a general predictive law, or a combination thereof, classically expressed by various differential equations. For example, we can say that one ball causes another one to move upon contact because that is what the laws of mechanics predict. At this point it becomes logically possible to have proximate causes without spatio-temporal contact, and indeed Newton introduced gravitational action at a distance that ostensibly did not require it. This was however in sharp conflict with the pre-existent everyday notion of proximate cause, and the following passage from his letter to Bentley shows just how conflicted he was about it before acquiescing to "hypotheses non fingo" [I feign no hypotheses] stance:

However, the transfer of motion example rather confirms Hume's view that what we directly observe is not "causality", but one type of event following another with regularity. Thus, causation plays a role similar to theoretical entities, that of unifying experiences, except it was formed even before scientific practice made introduction of such entities systematic and deliberate. Hume thought that it is formed through a subconscious psychological mechanism, "the law of association". Once this "theoretization" is accomplished the presence or absence of causation is determined based on holistic considerations of forming a coherent picture of environment rather than just induction on individual observations. Some previously admitted regularities, such as thunder following lightning, are reclassified as having common cause rather than directly causal, others are dismissed as coincidences or superstitions. At this stage proximity still remains a requirement for proximate causes.

In science, however, the notion of causation is further subsumed under instantiation of a general predictive law, or a combination thereof, classically expressed by various differential equations. For example, we can say that one ball causes another one to move upon contact because that is what the laws of mechanics predict. At this point it becomes logically possible to have proximate causes without spatio-temporal contact, and indeed Newton introduced gravitational action at a distance that ostensibly did not require it. This was however in sharp conflict with the pre-existent everyday notion of proximate cause, and the following passage from his letter to Bentley shows just how conflicted he was about it before acquiescing to "hypotheses non fingo" [I feign no hypotheses]:

However, the transfer of motion example rather confirms Hume's view that what we directly observe is not the "causing", but one type of event following another with regularity. Thus, causation plays a role similar to theoretical entities, that of unifying experiences, except it formed even before scientific practice made introduction of such entities systematic and deliberate. Hume thought that it is formed through a subconscious psychological mechanism, "the law of association". Once this "theoretization" is accomplished the presence or absence of causation is determined based on holistic considerations of forming a coherent picture of environment rather than just induction on individual observations. Some previously admitted regularities, such as thunder following lightning, are reclassified as having common cause rather than directly causative, others are dismissed as coincidences or superstitions. At this stage proximity still remains a requirement for proximate causes.

In science, however, the notion of causation is further subsumed under instantiation of a general predictive law, or a combination thereof, classically expressed by various differential equations. For example, we can say that one ball causes another one to move upon contact because that is what the laws of mechanics predict. At this point it becomes logically possible to have proximate causes without spatio-temporal contact, and indeed Newton introduced gravitational action at a distance that ostensibly did not require it. This was however in sharp conflict with the pre-existent everyday notion of proximate cause, and the following passage from his letter to Bentley shows just how conflicted he was about it before acquiescing to "hypotheses non fingo" [I feign no hypotheses] stance:

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In science, however, the notion of causation is further subsumed under instantiation of a general predictive law, or a combination thereof, classically expressed by various differential equations, e.g. For example, we can say that one ball causes another one to move upon contact because that is what the laws of mechanics predict. At this point it becomes logically possible to have proximate causes without spatio-temporal contact, and indeed Newton introduced gravitational action at a distance that ostensibly did not require it. This was however in sharp conflict with the pre-existent everyday notion of proximate cause, and the following passage from his letter to Bentley shows just how conflicted he was about it before acquiescing to "hypotheses non fingo" [I feign no hypotheses]:

In science, however, the notion of causation is further subsumed under instantiation of a general predictive law, or a combination thereof, classically expressed by various differential equations, e.g. we can say that one ball causes another one to move upon contact because that is what the laws of mechanics predict. At this point it becomes logically possible to have proximate causes without spatio-temporal contact, and indeed Newton introduced gravitational action at a distance that ostensibly did not require it. This was however in sharp conflict with the pre-existent everyday notion of proximate cause, and the following passage from his letter to Bentley shows just how conflicted he was about it before acquiescing to "hypotheses non fingo" [I feign no hypotheses]:

In science, however, the notion of causation is further subsumed under instantiation of a general predictive law, or a combination thereof, classically expressed by various differential equations. For example, we can say that one ball causes another one to move upon contact because that is what the laws of mechanics predict. At this point it becomes logically possible to have proximate causes without spatio-temporal contact, and indeed Newton introduced gravitational action at a distance that ostensibly did not require it. This was however in sharp conflict with the pre-existent everyday notion of proximate cause, and the following passage from his letter to Bentley shows just how conflicted he was about it before acquiescing to "hypotheses non fingo" [I feign no hypotheses]:

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