#Yes, there are.

###Contemporary views

J.D. Velleman argues in his works that the (analytic) metaphysics of time, especially endurantism and presentism, are severely inconsistent. He explicitely introduces the Buddhist thought of no-self as an interesting concept that shows us how time could and should be understood, illustrating his own (again, analytic) theory of time. He even talks about not only self and time, but suffering as well, as examples of mere illusions.

He further points out that while the works of Derek Parfit mentioned by @Drux point in the correct direction (and indeed contain thoughts similar to Buddhist philosophy), he himself did not make this link and therefore missed some interesting features of his model of self regarding the theory of time as a whole.

These thoughts are summarised in the lecture 'So it goes' (2006), freely available as part of the Amherst Lectures (which are always worth a look by the way).

Quoting the abstract:

Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explaining the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another — namely, the illusion of the passage of time. Seeming to be an enduring self, even though one is not, is what makes time seem to pass, even though it does not. And the appearance that time passes, I argue, is the source of the suffering that is alleviated when both illusions are dispelled.

###Older examples (not mentioned by @Drux)

Friedrich Hölderlin in his short fragment Judgement and Being presents a view where there is original being that is separated by the original judgement that sperarates into object and subject (The German term for judgement - Urteil - may be interpreted as meaning 'the archetype of seperation' - Ur-Teilung, which is quite a nice word-play). That obviously relates to some Buddhist thoughts about the illusion of our privileging of the self. But, contrary to Buddhists, he rejects the possibility of accessing the original being (i.e. there is no Buddhist's Enlightenment possible in his view).

There may be readings of Heraclitus (I try to defend that position in an assignment) that are near to Buddhist philosophy as they emphasise the deceptive aspects of judgements in perception, resulting in paradoxical views on change and persistence as well as contradictory points of view in perception as well as logic.

Another example not mentioned by @Drux would clearly be the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher who learnt Sanscrit (autodidactically!) in order to read the Vedas in original. He developed a philosophy very similar to Buddhist thoughts in The World as Will and Representation (1819)

Yes, there are.

Contemporary views

J.D. Velleman argues in his works that the (analytic) metaphysics of time, especially endurantism and presentism, are severely inconsistent. He explicitely introduces the Buddhist thought of no-self as an interesting concept that shows us how time could and should be understood, illustrating his own (again, analytic) theory of time. He even talks about not only self and time, but suffering as well, as examples of mere illusions.

He further points out that while the works of Derek Parfit mentioned by @Drux point in the correct direction (and indeed contain thoughts similar to Buddhist philosophy), he himself did not make this link and therefore missed some interesting features of his model of self regarding the theory of time as a whole.

These thoughts are summarised in the lecture 'So it goes' (2006), freely available as part of the Amherst Lectures (which are always worth a look by the way).

Quoting the abstract:

Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explaining the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another — namely, the illusion of the passage of time. Seeming to be an enduring self, even though one is not, is what makes time seem to pass, even though it does not. And the appearance that time passes, I argue, is the source of the suffering that is alleviated when both illusions are dispelled.

Older examples (not mentioned by @Drux)

Friedrich Hölderlin in his short fragment Judgement and Being presents a view where there is original being that is separated by the original judgement that sperarates into object and subject (The German term for judgement - Urteil - may be interpreted as meaning 'the archetype of seperation' - Ur-Teilung, which is quite a nice word-play). That obviously relates to some Buddhist thoughts about the illusion of our privileging of the self. But, contrary to Buddhists, he rejects the possibility of accessing the original being (i.e. there is no Buddhist's Enlightenment possible in his view).

There may be readings of Heraclitus (I try to defend that position in an assignment) that are near to Buddhist philosophy as they emphasise the deceptive aspects of judgements in perception, resulting in paradoxical views on change and persistence as well as contradictory points of view in perception as well as logic.

Another example not mentioned by @Drux would clearly be the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher who learnt Sanscrit (autodidactically!) in order to read the Vedas in original. He developed a philosophy very similar to Buddhist thoughts in The World as Will and Representation (1819)

#Yes, there are.

###Contemporary views

J.D. Velleman argues in his works that the (analytic) metaphysics of time, especially endurantism and presentism, are severely inconsistent. He explicitely introduces the Buddhist thought of no-self as an interesting concept that shows us how time could and should be understood, illustrating his own (again, analytic) theory of time. He even talks about not only self and time, but suffering as well, as examples of mere illusions.

He further points out that while the works of Derek Parfit mentioned by @Drux point in the correct direction (and indeed contain thoughts similar to Buddhist philosophy), he himself did not make this link and therefore missed some interesting features of his model of self regarding the theory of time as a whole.

These thoughts are summarised in the lecture 'So it goes' (2006), freely available as part of the Amherst Lectures (which are always worth a look by the way).

Quoting the abstract:

Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explaining the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another — namely, the illusion of the passage of time. Seeming to be an enduring self, even though one is not, is what makes time seem to pass, even though it does not. And the appearance that time passes, I argue, is the source of the suffering that is alleviated when both illusions are dispelled.

###Older examples (not mentioned by @Drux)

Friedrich Hölderlin in his short fragment Judgement and Being presents a view where there is original being that is separated by the original judgement that sperarates into object and subject (The German term for judgement - Urteil - may be interpreted as meaning 'the archetype of seperation' - Ur-Teilung, which is quite a nice word-play). That obviously relates to some Buddhist thoughts about the illusion of our privileging of the self. But, contrary to Buddhists, he rejects the possibility of accessing the original being (i.e. there is no Buddhist's Enlightenment).

There may be readings of Heraclitus (I try to defend that position in an assignment) that are near to Buddhist philosophy as they emphasise the deceptive aspects of judgements in perception, resulting in paradoxical views on change and persistence as well as contradictory points of view in perception as well as logic.

Another example not mentioned by @Drux would clearly be the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher who learnt Sanscrit (autodidactically!) in order to read the Vedas in original. He developed a philosophy very similar to Buddhist thoughts in The World as Will and Representation (1819)

#Yes, there are.

###Contemporary views

J.D. Velleman argues in his works that the (analytic) metaphysics of time, especially endurantism and presentism, are severely inconsistent. He explicitely introduces the Buddhist thought of no-self as an interesting concept that shows us how time could and should be understood, illustrating his own (again, analytic) theory of time. He even talks about not only self and time, but suffering as well, as examples of mere illusions.

He further points out that while the works of Derek Parfit mentioned by @Drux point in the correct direction (and indeed contain thoughts similar to Buddhist philosophy), he himself did not make this link and therefore missed some interesting features of his model of self regarding the theory of time as a whole.

These thoughts are summarised in the lecture 'So it goes' (2006), freely available as part of the Amherst Lectures (which are always worth a look by the way).

Quoting the abstract:

Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explaining the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another — namely, the illusion of the passage of time. Seeming to be an enduring self, even though one is not, is what makes time seem to pass, even though it does not. And the appearance that time passes, I argue, is the source of the suffering that is alleviated when both illusions are dispelled.

###Older examples (not mentioned by @Drux)

Friedrich Hölderlin in his short fragment Judgement and Being presents a view where there is original being that is separated by the original judgement that sperarates into object and subject (The German term for judgement - Urteil - may be interpreted as meaning 'the archetype of seperation' - Ur-Teilung, which is quite a nice word-play). That obviously relates to some Buddhist thoughts about the illusion of our privileging of the self. But, contrary to Buddhists, he rejects the possibility of accessing the original being (i.e. there is no Buddhist's Enlightenment possible in his view).

There may be readings of Heraclitus (I try to defend that position in an assignment) that are near to Buddhist philosophy as they emphasise the deceptive aspects of judgements in perception, resulting in paradoxical views on change and persistence as well as contradictory points of view in perception as well as logic.

Another example not mentioned by @Drux would clearly be the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher who learnt Sanscrit (autodidactically!) in order to read the Vedas in original. He developed a philosophy very similar to Buddhist thoughts in The World as Will and Representation (1819)

##Yes, there are.

J.D. Velleman argues in his works that the (analytic) metaphysics of time, especially endurantism and presentism, are severely inconsistent. He explicitely introduces the Buddhist thought of no-self as an interesting concept that shows us how time could and should be understood, illustrating his own (again, analytic) theory of time. He even talks about not only self and time, but suffering as well, as examples of mere illusions.

He further points out that while the works of Derek Parfit mentioned by @Drux point in the correct direction (and indeed contain thoughts similar to Buddhist philosophy), he himself did not make this link and therefore missed some interesting features of his model of self regarding the theory of time as a whole.

These thoughts are summarised in the lecture 'So it goes' (2006), freely available as part of the Amherst Lectures (which are always worth a look by the way).

Quoting the abstract:

Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explaining the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another — namely, the illusion of the passage of time. Seeming to be an enduring self, even though one is not, is what makes time seem to pass, even though it does not. And the appearance that time passes, I argue, is the source of the suffering that is alleviated when both illusions are dispelled.

Another example not mentioned by @Drux would clearly be the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher who learnt Sanscrit (autodidactically!) in order to read the Vedas in original. He developed a philosophy very similar to Buddhist thoughts in The World as Will and Representation (1819)

#Yes, there are.

###Contemporary views

J.D. Velleman argues in his works that the (analytic) metaphysics of time, especially endurantism and presentism, are severely inconsistent. He explicitely introduces the Buddhist thought of no-self as an interesting concept that shows us how time could and should be understood, illustrating his own (again, analytic) theory of time. He even talks about not only self and time, but suffering as well, as examples of mere illusions.

He further points out that while the works of Derek Parfit mentioned by @Drux point in the correct direction (and indeed contain thoughts similar to Buddhist philosophy), he himself did not make this link and therefore missed some interesting features of his model of self regarding the theory of time as a whole.

These thoughts are summarised in the lecture 'So it goes' (2006), freely available as part of the Amherst Lectures (which are always worth a look by the way).

Quoting the abstract:

Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explaining the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another — namely, the illusion of the passage of time. Seeming to be an enduring self, even though one is not, is what makes time seem to pass, even though it does not. And the appearance that time passes, I argue, is the source of the suffering that is alleviated when both illusions are dispelled.

###Older examples (not mentioned by @Drux)

Friedrich Hölderlin in his short fragment Judgement and Being presents a view where there is original being that is separated by the original judgement that sperarates into object and subject (The German term for judgement - Urteil - may be interpreted as meaning 'the archetype of seperation' - Ur-Teilung, which is quite a nice word-play). That obviously relates to some Buddhist thoughts about the illusion of our privileging of the self. But, contrary to Buddhists, he rejects the possibility of accessing the original being (i.e. there is no Buddhist's Enlightenment).

There may be readings of Heraclitus (I try to defend that position in an assignment) that are near to Buddhist philosophy as they emphasise the deceptive aspects of judgements in perception, resulting in paradoxical views on change and persistence as well as contradictory points of view in perception as well as logic.

Another example not mentioned by @Drux would clearly be the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher who learnt Sanscrit (autodidactically!) in order to read the Vedas in original. He developed a philosophy very similar to Buddhist thoughts in The World as Will and Representation (1819)