3 edited tags
| link
2 edited tags
| link
    Tweeted twitter.com/StackPhilosophy/status/786706645908873216
source | link

Does Brandom remain faithful to a Kantian autonomous intellect when he invokes Hegel?

There is a paradox about self-legislating norms that if the norms are self-legislated, they are not binding. In order to avoid this paradox, Brandom turns to Hegel's point that "normative statuses such as authority and responsibility are at base social statuses" (Reason in Philosophy, 66).

However, by including as a necessary condition to the binding of norms a social status, does Brandom really remain faithful to the Kantian idea that norms are self-legislated?

Furthermore, does Brandom remain faithful to his own idea that norms are legislated solely by objectless activities? If what is required in any legislation is an act of reciprocity and recognition, what is involved in any such recognition is a recognition of an object, namely the person or the group. Such an activity's end is not implicit but explicit, finding its terminus in a thing. This seems to go against Brandom's thesis that norms are determined by implicit know-how rather than explicit know-that.