8 added a source for the quote

The following quotes are from Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: “There are natural laws”...

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent

Assuming that we can see the world rightly before falling silent, that 6.54 isn't made incoherent by 7, then Wittgenstein seems to be saying that the law of causality should be surmounted, and thrown away.

How can we think about effects without a law of causality? If not, then surely treating the latter as a ladder would mean there are no effects.

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: “There are natural laws”...

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent

Assuming that we can see the world rightly before falling silent, that 6.54 isn't made incoherent by 7, then Wittgenstein seems to be saying that the law of causality should be surmounted, and thrown away.

How can we think about effects without a law of causality? If not, then surely treating the latter as a ladder would mean there are no effects.

The following quotes are from Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: “There are natural laws”...

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent

Assuming that we can see the world rightly before falling silent, that 6.54 isn't made incoherent by 7, then Wittgenstein seems to be saying that the law of causality should be surmounted, and thrown away.

How can we think about effects without a law of causality? If not, then surely treating the latter as a ladder would mean there are no effects.

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# Tractatus Proposition 6.36 and 6.54 How can effects be thinkable without a law of causality?

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: “There are natural laws”...

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent

Assuming that we can see the world rightly before falling silent, that 6.54 isn't made incoherent by 7, then Wittgenstein seems to be saying that the law of causality should be surmounted, and thrown away.

CanHow can we think about effects without a law of causality? If not, then surely treating the latter as a ladder would mean there are no effects.

# Tractatus Proposition 6.36 and 6.54

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: “There are natural laws”...

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent

Assuming that we can see the world rightly before falling silent, that 6.54 isn't made incoherent by 7, then Wittgenstein seems to be saying that the law of causality should be surmounted, and thrown away.

Can we think about effects without a law of causality? If not, then surely treating the latter as a ladder would mean there are no effects.

# How can effects be thinkable without a law of causality?

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: “There are natural laws”...

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent

Assuming that we can see the world rightly before falling silent, that 6.54 isn't made incoherent by 7, then Wittgenstein seems to be saying that the law of causality should be surmounted, and thrown away.

How can we think about effects without a law of causality? If not, then surely treating the latter as a ladder would mean there are no effects.

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