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It seems to me that you are making an uncalled for switch between things about which one cannot speak and things about which one cannot speak definitively, and these are distinct "things".

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

When I give the description “The ground was quite covered with plants”, do you want to say that I don’t know what I’m talking about until I can give a definition of a plant? (§70)

That is to say, not being able to define morality or love does exclude you from speaking about them.

On the other hand there is a "thing" about which one cannot speak. In fact, it appears that most people don't know what the hell the people who do speak of that "thing" about(about which one cannot speak,) speak about.

It is not an obscure or poorly defined concept at all. It is a "thing" about which one cannot speak because it transcends language, reason, and logic. It is not clear to what extent Wittgenstein was referring to that "thing" in his writings but he does provide many aphorisms that lend them selves to that "thing" perfectly:

It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. (PI §304)

In some traditions that "thing" is called Godliness or the true nature of consciousness. In the Tibetan Mahamudra tradition of Buddhism that "thing" is to be found within what they refer to as "meditation" or in fact what they refer to as non-meditation, which makes it interesting to compare Wittgenstein's quote with how Osho described "meditation" (which I put in quotes since he is not speaking of what is typically understood by the word meditation in the West, rather he is in fact speaking of the "thing"):

It is very difficult to verbalize it. To say something about meditation is a contradiction in terms. It is something which you can have, which you can be, but by its very nature you cannot say what it is.

It seems to me that you are making an uncalled for switch between things about which one cannot speak and things about which one cannot speak definitively, and these are distinct "things".

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

When I give the description “The ground was quite covered with plants”, do you want to say that I don’t know what I’m talking about until I can give a definition of a plant? (§70)

That is to say, not being able to define morality or love does exclude you from speaking about them.

On the other hand there is a "thing" about which one cannot speak. In fact, most people don't know what the hell the people who do speak of that "thing" about which one cannot speak, speak about.

It is not an obscure or poorly defined concept at all. It is a "thing" about which one cannot speak because it transcends language, reason, and logic. It is not clear to what extent Wittgenstein was referring to that "thing" in his writings but he does provide many aphorisms that lend them selves to that "thing" perfectly:

It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. (PI §304)

In some traditions that "thing" is called Godliness or the true nature of consciousness. In the Tibetan Mahamudra tradition of Buddhism that "thing" is to be found within what they refer to as "meditation" or in fact what they refer to as non-meditation, which makes it interesting to compare Wittgenstein's quote with how Osho described "meditation" (which I put in quotes since he is not speaking of what is typically understood by the word meditation in the West, rather he is in fact speaking of the "thing"):

It is very difficult to verbalize it. To say something about meditation is a contradiction in terms. It is something which you can have, which you can be, but by its very nature you cannot say what it is.

It seems to me that you are making an uncalled for switch between things about which one cannot speak and things about which one cannot speak definitively, and these are distinct "things".

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

When I give the description “The ground was quite covered with plants”, do you want to say that I don’t know what I’m talking about until I can give a definition of a plant? (§70)

That is to say, not being able to define morality or love does exclude you from speaking about them.

On the other hand there is a "thing" about which one cannot speak. In fact, it appears that most people don't know what the hell the people who do speak of that "thing" (about which one cannot speak) speak about.

It is not an obscure or poorly defined concept at all. It is a "thing" about which one cannot speak because it transcends language, reason, and logic. It is not clear to what extent Wittgenstein was referring to that "thing" in his writings but he does provide many aphorisms that lend them selves to that "thing" perfectly:

It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. (PI §304)

In some traditions that "thing" is called Godliness or the true nature of consciousness. In the Tibetan Mahamudra tradition of Buddhism that "thing" is to be found within what they refer to as "meditation" or in fact what they refer to as non-meditation, which makes it interesting to compare Wittgenstein's quote with how Osho described "meditation" (which I put in quotes since he is not speaking of what is typically understood by the word meditation in the West, rather he is in fact speaking of the "thing"):

It is very difficult to verbalize it. To say something about meditation is a contradiction in terms. It is something which you can have, which you can be, but by its very nature you cannot say what it is.

2 added 116 characters in body
source | link

It seems to me that you are making an uncalled for switch between things about which one cannot speak and things about which one cannot speak definitively, and these are distinct "things".

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

When I give the description “The ground was quite covered with plants”, do you want to say that I don’t know what I’m talking about until I can give a definition of a plant? (§70)

That is to say, not being able to define morality or love does exclude you from speaking about them.

On the other hand there is a "thing" about which one cannot speak. In fact, most people don't know what the hell the people who do speak of that "thing" about which one cannot speak, speak about.

It is not an obscure or poorly defined concept at all. It is a "thing" about which one cannot speak, because it transcends language, reason, and logic. It is not clear to what extent Wittgenstein was referring to that "thing" in his writings but he does provide many aphorisms that lend them selves to that "thing" perfectly:

It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. (PI §304)

In some traditions that "thing" is called Godliness or the true nature of consciousness. In the Tibetan Mahamudra tradition of Buddhism that "thing" is to be found within what they refer to as "meditation" or in fact what they refer to as non-meditation, which makes it interesting to compare Wittgenstein's quote with how Osho described "meditation" (which I put in quotes since he is not speaking of what is typically understood by the word meditation in the West, rather he is in fact speaking of the "thing"):

It is very difficult to verbalize it. To say something about meditation is a contradiction in terms. It is something which you can have, which you can be, but by its very nature you cannot say what it is.

It seems to me that you are making an uncalled for switch between things about which one cannot speak and things about which one cannot speak definitively, and these are distinct "things".

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

When I give the description “The ground was quite covered with plants”, do you want to say that I don’t know what I’m talking about until I can give a definition of a plant? (§70)

That is to say, not being able to define morality or love does exclude you from speaking about them.

On the other hand there is a "thing" about which one cannot speak. In fact, most people don't know what the hell the people who do speak of that "thing" about which one cannot speak, speak about.

It is not an obscure or poorly defined concept at all. It is a "thing" about which one cannot speak, because it transcends reason and logic. It is not clear to what extent Wittgenstein was referring to that "thing" in his writings but he does provide many aphorisms that lend them selves to that "thing" perfectly:

It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. (PI §304)

In some traditions that "thing" is called Godliness or the true nature of consciousness. In the Tibetan Mahamudra tradition of Buddhism that "thing" is to be found within what they refer to as "meditation" or in fact what they refer to as non-meditation, which makes it interesting to compare Wittgenstein's quote with how Osho described "meditation":

It is very difficult to verbalize it. To say something about meditation is a contradiction in terms. It is something which you can have, which you can be, but by its very nature you cannot say what it is.

It seems to me that you are making an uncalled for switch between things about which one cannot speak and things about which one cannot speak definitively, and these are distinct "things".

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

When I give the description “The ground was quite covered with plants”, do you want to say that I don’t know what I’m talking about until I can give a definition of a plant? (§70)

That is to say, not being able to define morality or love does exclude you from speaking about them.

On the other hand there is a "thing" about which one cannot speak. In fact, most people don't know what the hell the people who do speak of that "thing" about which one cannot speak, speak about.

It is not an obscure or poorly defined concept at all. It is a "thing" about which one cannot speak because it transcends language, reason, and logic. It is not clear to what extent Wittgenstein was referring to that "thing" in his writings but he does provide many aphorisms that lend them selves to that "thing" perfectly:

It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. (PI §304)

In some traditions that "thing" is called Godliness or the true nature of consciousness. In the Tibetan Mahamudra tradition of Buddhism that "thing" is to be found within what they refer to as "meditation" or in fact what they refer to as non-meditation, which makes it interesting to compare Wittgenstein's quote with how Osho described "meditation" (which I put in quotes since he is not speaking of what is typically understood by the word meditation in the West, rather he is in fact speaking of the "thing"):

It is very difficult to verbalize it. To say something about meditation is a contradiction in terms. It is something which you can have, which you can be, but by its very nature you cannot say what it is.

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source | link

It seems to me that you are making an uncalled for switch between things about which one cannot speak and things about which one cannot speak definitively, and these are distinct "things".

In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

When I give the description “The ground was quite covered with plants”, do you want to say that I don’t know what I’m talking about until I can give a definition of a plant? (§70)

That is to say, not being able to define morality or love does exclude you from speaking about them.

On the other hand there is a "thing" about which one cannot speak. In fact, most people don't know what the hell the people who do speak of that "thing" about which one cannot speak, speak about.

It is not an obscure or poorly defined concept at all. It is a "thing" about which one cannot speak, because it transcends reason and logic. It is not clear to what extent Wittgenstein was referring to that "thing" in his writings but he does provide many aphorisms that lend them selves to that "thing" perfectly:

It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. (PI §304)

In some traditions that "thing" is called Godliness or the true nature of consciousness. In the Tibetan Mahamudra tradition of Buddhism that "thing" is to be found within what they refer to as "meditation" or in fact what they refer to as non-meditation, which makes it interesting to compare Wittgenstein's quote with how Osho described "meditation":

It is very difficult to verbalize it. To say something about meditation is a contradiction in terms. It is something which you can have, which you can be, but by its very nature you cannot say what it is.