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It is not just that empiricism works, and in 300 years has brought us from semaphore lines to global high speed interconnects, or that non-empiricism is a fervent breeding ground for falsehoods and mysticism; those are true and more than justify aversion to the magical, but they don't explain why that should be the case.

Rather, it is that in the modern day we come further and further to irrefutable evidence that people are empirical. I will not go into detail on the evidence, but it suffices to say that if you agree to this much you also understand that there is nothing that you can do, even in theory, that a machine cannot. There is no mental magic that lets you probe beyond the veil. There is no mystical wand to wave that lets your knowledge constitute more than a map to the territory. Even if there was such a contortion of reason it would be nothing that could not in principle be done by another appropriate arrangement of gears and lasers.

There is no higher level of knowledge than empirical knowledge because that is all that can be known. No matter how smart you are, Solomonoff induction is smarter. No matter how wise you are, your mind can only be causally related to causal objects.

A devotion to a "higher level of truth" leads to epistemic voids like zombies or the ontological argument, arguments that seem appealing on the outset but do nought but waste time. In contrast empirical work is why we can now talk about the consciousness of brains under fully homomorphic encryption, or the measurement problem, real problems that represent huge leaps in the boundaries of philosophical discussion. Even when talking about the mind, or issues like free will, actual progress is made through empirical study.

If you want to say that empirical arguments do not stand at the same height as the rest of philosophy, I would not disagree, but it is certainly not because it is lower. Until brute philosophy can make a single step forward toin its own field the way Copernicus, or Turing, or Darwin, or Everett, did upon it, I hardly see much competition.

It is not just that empiricism works, and in 300 years has brought us from semaphore lines to global high speed interconnects, or that non-empiricism is a fervent breeding ground for falsehoods and mysticism; those are true and more than justify aversion to the magical, but they don't explain why that should be the case.

Rather, it is that in the modern day we come further and further to irrefutable evidence that people are empirical. I will not go into detail on the evidence, but it suffices to say that if you agree to this much you also understand that there is nothing that you can do, even in theory, that a machine cannot. There is no mental magic that lets you probe beyond the veil. There is no mystical wand to wave that lets your knowledge constitute more than a map to the territory. Even if there was such a contortion of reason it would be nothing that could not in principle be done by another appropriate arrangement of gears and lasers.

There is no higher level of knowledge than empirical knowledge because that is all that can be known. No matter how smart you are, Solomonoff induction is smarter. No matter how wise you are, your mind can only be causally related to causal objects.

A devotion to a "higher level of truth" leads to epistemic voids like zombies or the ontological argument, arguments that seem appealing on the outset but do nought but waste time. In contrast empirical work is why we can now talk about the consciousness of brains under fully homomorphic encryption, or the measurement problem, real problems that represent huge leaps in the boundaries of philosophical discussion. Even when talking about the mind, or issues like free will, actual progress is made through empirical study.

If you want to say that empirical arguments do not stand at the same height as the rest of philosophy, I would not disagree, but it is certainly not because it is lower. Until brute philosophy can make a single step forward to its own field the way Copernicus, or Turing, or Darwin, or Everett, did upon it, I hardly see much competition.

It is not just that empiricism works, and in 300 years has brought us from semaphore lines to global high speed interconnects, or that non-empiricism is a fervent breeding ground for falsehoods and mysticism; those are true and more than justify aversion to the magical, but they don't explain why that should be the case.

Rather, it is that in the modern day we come further and further to irrefutable evidence that people are empirical. I will not go into detail on the evidence, but it suffices to say that if you agree to this much you also understand that there is nothing that you can do, even in theory, that a machine cannot. There is no mental magic that lets you probe beyond the veil. There is no mystical wand to wave that lets your knowledge constitute more than a map to the territory. Even if there was such a contortion of reason it would be nothing that could not in principle be done by another appropriate arrangement of gears and lasers.

There is no higher level of knowledge than empirical knowledge because that is all that can be known. No matter how smart you are, Solomonoff induction is smarter. No matter how wise you are, your mind can only be causally related to causal objects.

A devotion to a "higher level of truth" leads to epistemic voids like zombies or the ontological argument, arguments that seem appealing on the outset but do nought but waste time. In contrast empirical work is why we can now talk about the consciousness of brains under fully homomorphic encryption, or the measurement problem, real problems that represent huge leaps in the boundaries of philosophical discussion. Even when talking about the mind, or issues like free will, actual progress is made through empirical study.

If you want to say that empirical arguments do not stand at the same height as the rest of philosophy, I would not disagree, but it is certainly not because it is lower. Until brute philosophy can make a single step forward in its own field the way Copernicus, or Turing, or Darwin, or Everett, did upon it, I hardly see much competition.

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It is not just that empiricism works, and in 300 years has brought us from semaphore lines to global high speed interconnects, or that non-empiricism is a fervent breeding ground for falsehoods and mysticism; those are true and more than justify aversion to the magical, but they don't explain why that should be the case.

Rather, it is that in the modern day we come further and further to irrefutable evidence that people are empirical. I will not go into detail on the evidence, but it suffices to say that if you agree to this much you also understand that there is nothing that you can do, even in theory, that a machine cannot. There is no mental magic that lets you probe beyond the veil. There is no mystical wand to wave that lets your knowledge constitute more than a map to the territory. Even if there was such a contortion of reason it would be nothing that could not in principle be done by another appropriate arrangement of gears and lasers.

There is no higher level of knowledge than empirical knowledge because that is all that can be known. No matter how smart you are, Solomonoff induction is smarter. No matter how wise you are, your mind can only be causally related to causal objects.

A devotion to a "higher level of truth" leads to epistemic voids like zombies or the ontological argument, arguments that seem appealing on the outset but do nought but waste time. In contrast empirical work is why we can now talk about the consciousness of brains under fully homomorphic encryption, or the measurement problem, real problems that represent huge leaps in the boundaries of philosophical discussion. Even when talking about the mind, or issues like free will, actual progress is made through empirical study.

If you want to say that empirical arguments do not stand at the same height as the rest of philosophy, I would not disagree, but it is certainly not because it is lower. Until brute philosophy can make a single step forward to its own field the way Copernicus, or Turing, or Darwin, or Everett, did upon it, I hardly see much competition.