I'll suggest the Euthyphro Dilemma by Plato as an example of this issue. In my thinking, Plato used the Euthyphro Dilemma to bring to light a problem with believing that gods are actually just human expressions rather than true-in-fact supernatural authorities.

The dilemma (as reworked by Leibniz) goes:

Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?

Neither choice seems OK, but especially not if you don't accept claims by Abrahamic believers in "The I Am" about the nature of God as the originator of both physical and moral reality.

If gods really are just human contraptions, then this dilemma feels like a paradox and thus anticipates the naturalistic fallacy without expressing it as such.

I'll suggest the Euthyphro Dilemma by Plato as an example of this issue. In my thinking, Plato used the Euthyphro Dilemma to bring to light a problem with believing that gods are actually just human expressions rather than true-in-fact supernatural authorities.

The dilemma (as reworked by Leibniz) goes:

Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?

Neither choice seems OK, but especially not if you don't accept claims by Abrahamic believers in "The I Am" about the nature of God as the sole originator of both physical and moral reality.

If gods really are just human contraptions, then this dilemma feels like a paradox and thus anticipates the naturalistic fallacy without expressing it as such.