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Yes, as @Schphol said, this is the mind-body problem, which is a ~2,000 year old issue that is still generating philosophy papers, books, talks, conferences, and entire professorial careers.

How is it possible?

There is no obvious or widely accepted answer for this within philosophy. About 25 years ago, I asked a philosophy of mind professor this same question. His response was, "No one knows." I think this is still a fair answer.

What are the various theories for the same?

  • Eliminativism. Denies there actually is subjective experience. Proponents: Paul and Patricia Churchland. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here) [Edit: Possibly Dennett, as quoted in linked Strawson piece.]. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here)

  • Mysterianism. Affirms there is subjective experience, but thinks it (probably) will always be a mystery. Proponent: David Chalmers.

  • Substance Dualism. Subjective experience is due to some non-physical "soul" or otherwise disembodied mind. Proponents: most religious people, Sir John Eccles, possibly Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (in their case, via quantum mechanical interaction with neurons' microtubules).

  • "Wait and see". Those who affirm there is subjective experience, but we just don't have the neuroscientific understanding yet to understand how this works. Proponents: Daniel Dennett (possibly; may be eliminativist, see above), John Searle, many others.

  • Panpsychism. Believes that all matter has some degree of subjective experience, however slight, and when you put it together in a nervous system, this somehow amplifies it such that we can have rich inner lives. Proponent: Galen Strawson.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it touches on some of the major ideas.

    -

Yes, as @Schphol said, this is the mind-body problem, which is a ~2,000 year old issue that is still generating philosophy papers, books, talks, conferences, and entire professorial careers.

How is it possible?

There is no obvious or widely accepted answer for this within philosophy. About 25 years ago, I asked a philosophy of mind professor this same question. His response was, "No one knows." I think this is still a fair answer.

What are the various theories for the same?

  • Eliminativism. Denies there actually is subjective experience. Proponents: Paul and Patricia Churchland. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here) [Edit: Possibly Dennett, as quoted in linked Strawson piece.]

  • Mysterianism. Affirms there is subjective experience, but thinks it (probably) will always be a mystery. Proponent: David Chalmers.

  • Substance Dualism. Subjective experience is due to some non-physical "soul" or otherwise disembodied mind. Proponents: most religious people, Sir John Eccles, possibly Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (in their case, via quantum mechanical interaction with neurons' microtubules).

  • "Wait and see". Those who affirm there is subjective experience, but we just don't have the neuroscientific understanding yet to understand how this works. Proponents: Daniel Dennett, John Searle, many others.

  • Panpsychism. Believes that all matter has some degree of subjective experience, however slight, and when you put it together in a nervous system, this somehow amplifies it such that we can have rich inner lives. Proponent: Galen Strawson.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it touches on some of the major ideas.

    -

Yes, as @Schphol said, this is the mind-body problem, which is a ~2,000 year old issue that is still generating philosophy papers, books, talks, conferences, and entire professorial careers.

How is it possible?

There is no obvious or widely accepted answer for this within philosophy. About 25 years ago, I asked a philosophy of mind professor this same question. His response was, "No one knows." I think this is still a fair answer.

What are the various theories for the same?

  • Eliminativism. Denies there actually is subjective experience. Proponents: Paul and Patricia Churchland [Edit: Possibly Dennett, as quoted in linked Strawson piece.]. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here)

  • Mysterianism. Affirms there is subjective experience, but thinks it (probably) will always be a mystery. Proponent: David Chalmers.

  • Substance Dualism. Subjective experience is due to some non-physical "soul" or otherwise disembodied mind. Proponents: most religious people, Sir John Eccles, possibly Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (in their case, via quantum mechanical interaction with neurons' microtubules).

  • "Wait and see". Those who affirm there is subjective experience, but we just don't have the neuroscientific understanding yet to understand how this works. Proponents: Daniel Dennett (possibly; may be eliminativist, see above), John Searle, many others.

  • Panpsychism. Believes that all matter has some degree of subjective experience, however slight, and when you put it together in a nervous system, this somehow amplifies it such that we can have rich inner lives. Proponent: Galen Strawson.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it touches on some of the major ideas.

    -
3 added 66 characters in body
source | link

Yes, as @Schphol said, this is the mind-body problem, which is a ~2,000 year old issue that is still generating philosophy papers, books, talks, conferences, and entire professorial careers.

How is it possible?

There is no obvious or widely accepted answer for this within philosophy. About 25 years ago, I asked a philosophy of mind professor this same question. His response was, "No one knows." I think this is still a fair answer.

What are the various theories for the same?

  • Eliminativism. Denies there actually is subjective experience. Proponents: Paul and Patricia Churchland. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here) [Edit: Possibly Dennett, as quoted in linked Strawson piece.]

  • Mysterianism. Affirms there is subjective experience, but thinks it (probably) will always be a mystery. Proponent: David Chalmers.

  • Substance Dualism. Subjective experience is due to some non-physical "soul" or otherwise disembodied mind. Proponents: most religious people, Sir John Eccles, possibly Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (in their case, via quantum mechanical interaction with neurons' microtubules).

  • "Wait and see". Those who affirm there is subjective experience, but we just don't have the neuroscientific understanding yet to understand how this works. Proponents: Daniel Dennett, John Searle, many others.

  • Panpsychism. Believes that all matter has some degree of subjective experience, however slight, and when you put it together in a nervous system, this somehow amplifies it such that we can have rich inner lives. Proponent: Galen Strawson.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it touches on some of the major ideas.

    -

Yes, as @Schphol said, this is the mind-body problem, which is a ~2,000 year old issue that is still generating philosophy papers, books, talks, conferences, and entire professorial careers.

How is it possible?

There is no obvious or widely accepted answer for this within philosophy. About 25 years ago, I asked a philosophy of mind professor this same question. His response was, "No one knows." I think this is still a fair answer.

What are the various theories for the same?

  • Eliminativism. Denies there actually is subjective experience. Proponents: Paul and Patricia Churchland. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here)

  • Mysterianism. Affirms there is subjective experience, but thinks it (probably) will always be a mystery. Proponent: David Chalmers.

  • Substance Dualism. Subjective experience is due to some non-physical "soul" or otherwise disembodied mind. Proponents: most religious people, Sir John Eccles, possibly Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (in their case, via quantum mechanical interaction with neurons' microtubules).

  • "Wait and see". Those who affirm there is subjective experience, but we just don't have the neuroscientific understanding yet to understand how this works. Proponents: Daniel Dennett, John Searle, many others.

  • Panpsychism. Believes that all matter has some degree of subjective experience, however slight, and when you put it together in a nervous system, this somehow amplifies it such that we can have rich inner lives. Proponent: Galen Strawson.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it touches on some of the major ideas.

    -

Yes, as @Schphol said, this is the mind-body problem, which is a ~2,000 year old issue that is still generating philosophy papers, books, talks, conferences, and entire professorial careers.

How is it possible?

There is no obvious or widely accepted answer for this within philosophy. About 25 years ago, I asked a philosophy of mind professor this same question. His response was, "No one knows." I think this is still a fair answer.

What are the various theories for the same?

  • Eliminativism. Denies there actually is subjective experience. Proponents: Paul and Patricia Churchland. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here) [Edit: Possibly Dennett, as quoted in linked Strawson piece.]

  • Mysterianism. Affirms there is subjective experience, but thinks it (probably) will always be a mystery. Proponent: David Chalmers.

  • Substance Dualism. Subjective experience is due to some non-physical "soul" or otherwise disembodied mind. Proponents: most religious people, Sir John Eccles, possibly Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (in their case, via quantum mechanical interaction with neurons' microtubules).

  • "Wait and see". Those who affirm there is subjective experience, but we just don't have the neuroscientific understanding yet to understand how this works. Proponents: Daniel Dennett, John Searle, many others.

  • Panpsychism. Believes that all matter has some degree of subjective experience, however slight, and when you put it together in a nervous system, this somehow amplifies it such that we can have rich inner lives. Proponent: Galen Strawson.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it touches on some of the major ideas.

    -
2 deleted 18 characters in body
source | link

Yes, as @Schphol said, this is the mind-body problem, which is a ~2,000 year old issue that is still generating philosophy papers, books, talks, journal articles, conferences, and entire professorial careers.

How is it possible?

There is no obvious or widely accepted answer for this within philosophy. About 25 years ago, I asked a philosophy of mind professor this same question. His response was, "No one knows." I think this is still a fair answer.

What are the various theories for the same?

  • Eliminativism. Denies there actually is subjective experience. Proponents: Paul and Patricia Churchland. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here)

  • Mysterianism. Affirms there is subjective experience, but thinks it (probably) will always be a mystery. Proponent: David Chalmers.

  • Substance Dualism. Subjective experience is due to some non-physical "soul" or otherwise disembodied mind. Proponents: most religious people, Sir John Eccles, possibly Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (in their case, via quantum mechanical interaction with neurons' microtubules).

  • "Wait and see". Those who affirm there is subjective experience, but we just don't have the neuroscientific understanding yet to understand how this works. Proponents: Daniel Dennett, John Searle, many others.

  • Panpsychism. Believes that all matter has some degree of subjective experience, however slight, and when you put it together in a nervous system, this somehow amplifies it such that we can have rich inner lives. Proponent: Galen Strawson.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it touches on some of the major ideas.

    -

Yes, as @Schphol said, this is the mind-body problem, which is a ~2,000 year old issue that is still generating philosophy papers, books, talks, journal articles, conferences, and entire professorial careers.

How is it possible?

There is no obvious or widely accepted answer for this within philosophy. About 25 years ago, I asked a philosophy of mind professor this same question. His response was, "No one knows." I think this is still a fair answer.

What are the various theories for the same?

  • Eliminativism. Denies there actually is subjective experience. Proponents: Paul and Patricia Churchland. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here)

  • Mysterianism. Affirms there is subjective experience, but thinks it (probably) will always be a mystery. Proponent: David Chalmers.

  • Substance Dualism. Subjective experience is due to some non-physical "soul" or otherwise disembodied mind. Proponents: most religious people, Sir John Eccles, possibly Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (in their case, via quantum mechanical interaction with neurons' microtubules).

  • "Wait and see". Those who affirm there is subjective experience, but we just don't have the neuroscientific understanding yet to understand how this works. Proponents: Daniel Dennett, John Searle, many others.

  • Panpsychism. Believes that all matter has some degree of subjective experience, however slight, and when you put it together in a nervous system, this somehow amplifies it such that we can have rich inner lives. Proponent: Galen Strawson.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it touches on some of the major ideas.

    -

Yes, as @Schphol said, this is the mind-body problem, which is a ~2,000 year old issue that is still generating philosophy papers, books, talks, conferences, and entire professorial careers.

How is it possible?

There is no obvious or widely accepted answer for this within philosophy. About 25 years ago, I asked a philosophy of mind professor this same question. His response was, "No one knows." I think this is still a fair answer.

What are the various theories for the same?

  • Eliminativism. Denies there actually is subjective experience. Proponents: Paul and Patricia Churchland. Recent noted opponent: Galen Strawson (see here)

  • Mysterianism. Affirms there is subjective experience, but thinks it (probably) will always be a mystery. Proponent: David Chalmers.

  • Substance Dualism. Subjective experience is due to some non-physical "soul" or otherwise disembodied mind. Proponents: most religious people, Sir John Eccles, possibly Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (in their case, via quantum mechanical interaction with neurons' microtubules).

  • "Wait and see". Those who affirm there is subjective experience, but we just don't have the neuroscientific understanding yet to understand how this works. Proponents: Daniel Dennett, John Searle, many others.

  • Panpsychism. Believes that all matter has some degree of subjective experience, however slight, and when you put it together in a nervous system, this somehow amplifies it such that we can have rich inner lives. Proponent: Galen Strawson.

This is not an exhaustive list, but it touches on some of the major ideas.

    -
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