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Do all serious disagreements in philosophy come down to these [axiomatic] differences in intuition?

Intuitions are not axiomatic and logic tells us nothing about the way things are. Differences and disagreements in philosophy usually have nothing to do with logic. Usually, at least in modern philosophy in the west, disagreements stem from presumably ineluctable foundationism"foundationism" and its problems, left over from Descartes and Kant. Meaning, as Sellers rejects, that there is a "given" in philosophy that entails our task as "What is mind?" and "How do we get thoughts to represent accurately?" Classic disagreements then would be, for instance, Clifford and James over the ethics of belief, Kant, Quine, Sellers and foundationalism and synthetic/analytic distiction, Putnam and Rorty and the success [or failure] of epistemology and truth.

It bears repeating logic is only a formal description of how folks think, aiding us in clear thinking, it doesn't entail truth, and it tells us nothing at all about reality.

I will say that you're absolutely right, however, in noting that logic itself isn't compelling; one must be moved to agree with it and this is entirely apart from merely applying formal logic to any given proposition. For instance, if we suppose there can be no evidence for transcendent realities and we argue over the existence of said realities, then we use logic alone to do so. In that case, if both sides present sound arguments for and against, the fact that each has a necessary conclusion demonstrates this point as soon as a person finds one or the other to be more likely the case. It wouldn't be logic that's compelling but one's total impressions of the world helping us into a disposition about the proposition's conclusion (an idea expressed in Seller's Coherence Theory Of Truth).

“Of these two conditions, the logician as such is concerned only with the first [validity]; the second, the determination of the truth or falsity of the premises, is the task of some special discipline or of common observation appropriate to the subject matter of the argument.”

https://www.britannica.com/topic/formal-logic

“When the conclusion of an argument is correctly deducible from its premises, the inference from the premises to the conclusion is said to be (deductively) valid, irrespective of whether the premises are true or false."

Ibid

“The bottom line is that logic alone can tell us nothing new about the real world.”

https://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/philosop/logic.htm

“Traditionally logic was considered a normative description of the workings of an ideal mind.”

http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/~morado/RLH.htm

“[The principles of logic] are non-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on any particular accidental features of the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the world actually is.”

http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/logic/whatislogic.php

“The principles of logic … are derived using reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features of the world.”

Ibid

“… the proof of the validity of these inferences depends upon the assumption of the truth of certain general statements concerning relatives.”

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html

Do all serious disagreements in philosophy come down to these [axiomatic] differences in intuition?

Intuitions are not axiomatic and logic tells us nothing about the way things are. Differences and disagreements in philosophy usually have nothing to do with logic. Usually, at least in modern philosophy in the west, disagreements stem from presumably ineluctable foundationism left over from Descartes and Kant. Meaning, as Sellers rejects, that there is a "given" in philosophy that entails our task as "What is mind?" and "How do we get thoughts to represent accurately?" Classic disagreements then would be, for instance, Clifford and James over the ethics of belief, Kant, Quine, Sellers and foundationalism and synthetic/analytic distiction, Putnam and Rorty and the success [or failure] of epistemology and truth.

It bears repeating logic is only a formal description of how folks think, aiding us in clear thinking, it doesn't entail truth, and it tells us nothing at all about reality.

I will say that you're absolutely right, however, in noting that logic itself isn't compelling; one must be moved to agree with it and this is entirely apart from merely applying formal logic to any given proposition. For instance, if we suppose there can be no evidence for transcendent realities and we argue over the existence of said realities, then we use logic alone to do so. In that case, if both sides present sound arguments for and against, the fact that each has a necessary conclusion demonstrates this point as soon as a person finds one or the other to be more likely the case. It wouldn't be logic that's compelling but one's total impressions of the world helping us into a disposition about the proposition's conclusion (an idea expressed in Seller's Coherence Theory Of Truth).

“Of these two conditions, the logician as such is concerned only with the first [validity]; the second, the determination of the truth or falsity of the premises, is the task of some special discipline or of common observation appropriate to the subject matter of the argument.”

https://www.britannica.com/topic/formal-logic

“When the conclusion of an argument is correctly deducible from its premises, the inference from the premises to the conclusion is said to be (deductively) valid, irrespective of whether the premises are true or false."

Ibid

“The bottom line is that logic alone can tell us nothing new about the real world.”

https://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/philosop/logic.htm

“Traditionally logic was considered a normative description of the workings of an ideal mind.”

http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/~morado/RLH.htm

“[The principles of logic] are non-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on any particular accidental features of the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the world actually is.”

http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/logic/whatislogic.php

“The principles of logic … are derived using reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features of the world.”

Ibid

“… the proof of the validity of these inferences depends upon the assumption of the truth of certain general statements concerning relatives.”

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html

Do all serious disagreements in philosophy come down to these [axiomatic] differences in intuition?

Intuitions are not axiomatic and logic tells us nothing about the way things are. Differences and disagreements in philosophy usually have nothing to do with logic. Usually, at least in modern philosophy in the west, disagreements stem from presumably ineluctable "foundationism" and its problems, left over from Descartes and Kant. Meaning, as Sellers rejects, that there is a "given" in philosophy that entails our task as "What is mind?" and "How do we get thoughts to represent accurately?" Classic disagreements then would be, for instance, Clifford and James over the ethics of belief, Kant, Quine, Sellers and foundationalism and synthetic/analytic distiction, Putnam and Rorty and the success [or failure] of epistemology and truth.

It bears repeating logic is only a formal description of how folks think, aiding us in clear thinking, it doesn't entail truth, and it tells us nothing at all about reality.

I will say that you're absolutely right, however, in noting that logic itself isn't compelling; one must be moved to agree with it and this is entirely apart from merely applying formal logic to any given proposition. For instance, if we suppose there can be no evidence for transcendent realities and we argue over the existence of said realities, then we use logic alone to do so. In that case, if both sides present sound arguments for and against, the fact that each has a necessary conclusion demonstrates this point as soon as a person finds one or the other to be more likely the case. It wouldn't be logic that's compelling but one's total impressions of the world helping us into a disposition about the proposition's conclusion (an idea expressed in Seller's Coherence Theory Of Truth).

“Of these two conditions, the logician as such is concerned only with the first [validity]; the second, the determination of the truth or falsity of the premises, is the task of some special discipline or of common observation appropriate to the subject matter of the argument.”

https://www.britannica.com/topic/formal-logic

“When the conclusion of an argument is correctly deducible from its premises, the inference from the premises to the conclusion is said to be (deductively) valid, irrespective of whether the premises are true or false."

Ibid

“The bottom line is that logic alone can tell us nothing new about the real world.”

https://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/philosop/logic.htm

“Traditionally logic was considered a normative description of the workings of an ideal mind.”

http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/~morado/RLH.htm

“[The principles of logic] are non-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on any particular accidental features of the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the world actually is.”

http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/logic/whatislogic.php

“The principles of logic … are derived using reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features of the world.”

Ibid

“… the proof of the validity of these inferences depends upon the assumption of the truth of certain general statements concerning relatives.”

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html

2 typ
source | link

Do all serious disagreements in philosophy come down to these [axiomatic] differences in intuition?

Intuitions are not axiomatic and logic tells us nothing about the way things are. Differences and disagreements in philosophy usually have nothing to do with logic. Usually, at least in modern philosophy in the west, disagreements stem from presumably ineluctable foundationism left over from Descartes and Kant. Meaning, as Sellers rejects, that there is a "given" in philosophy that entails our task as "What is mind?" and "How do we get thoughts to represent accurately?" Classic disagreements then would be, for instance, Clifford and James over the ethics of belief, Kant, Quine, Sellers and foundationalism and synthetic/analytic distiction, Putnam and Rorty and the success [or failure] of epistemology and truth.

It bears repeating logic is only a formal description of how folks think, aiding us in clear thinking, it doesn't entail truth, and it tells us nothing at all about reality.

I will say that you're absolutely right, however, in noting that logic itself isn't compelling; one must be moved to agree with it and this is entirely apart from merely applying formal logic to any given proposition. For instance, if we suppose there can be no evidence for transcendent realities and we argue over the existence of said realities, then we use logic alone to do so. In that case, if both sides present sound arguments for and against, the fact that each has a necessary conclusion demonstrates this point as soon as a person finds one or the other to be more likely the case. It wouldn't be logic that's compelling but one's total impressions of the world helping us into a disposition about the proposition's conclusion (an idea expressed in Seller's Coherence Theory Of Truth).

“Of these two conditions, the logician as such is concerned only with the first [validity]; the second, the determination of the truth or falsity of the premises, is the task of some special discipline or of common observation appropriate to the subject matter of the argument.”

https://www.britannica.com/topic/formal-logic

“When the conclusion of an argument is correctly deducible from its premises, the inference from the premises to the conclusion is said to be (deductively) valid, irrespective of whether the premises are true or false."

Ibid

“The bottom line is that logic alone can tell us nothing new about the real world.”

https://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/philosop/logic.htm

“Traditionally logic was considered a normative description of the workings of an ideal mind.”

http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/~morado/RLH.htm

“[The principles of logic] are non-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on any particular accidental features of the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the world actually is.”

http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/logic/whatislogic.php

“The principles of logic … are derived using reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features of the world.”

Ibid

“… the proof of the validity of these inferences depends upon the assumption of the truth of certain general statements concerning relatives.”

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html

Do all serious disagreements in philosophy come down to these [axiomatic] differences in intuition?

Intuitions are not axiomatic and logic tells us nothing about the way things are. Differences and disagreements in philosophy usually have nothing to do with logic. Usually, at least in modern philosophy in the west, disagreements stem from presumably ineluctable foundationism left over from Descartes and Kant. Meaning, as Sellers rejects, that there is a "given" in philosophy that entails our task as "What is mind?" and "How do we get thoughts to represent?" Classic disagreements then would be, for instance, Clifford and James over the ethics of belief, Kant, Quine, Sellers and foundationalism and synthetic/analytic distiction, Putnam and Rorty and the success of epistemology and truth.

It bears repeating logic is only a formal description of how folks think, aiding us in clear thinking, it doesn't entail truth, and it tells us nothing at all about reality.

“Of these two conditions, the logician as such is concerned only with the first [validity]; the second, the determination of the truth or falsity of the premises, is the task of some special discipline or of common observation appropriate to the subject matter of the argument.”

https://www.britannica.com/topic/formal-logic

“When the conclusion of an argument is correctly deducible from its premises, the inference from the premises to the conclusion is said to be (deductively) valid, irrespective of whether the premises are true or false."

Ibid

“The bottom line is that logic alone can tell us nothing new about the real world.”

https://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/philosop/logic.htm

“Traditionally logic was considered a normative description of the workings of an ideal mind.”

http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/~morado/RLH.htm

“[The principles of logic] are non-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on any particular accidental features of the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the world actually is.”

http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/logic/whatislogic.php

“The principles of logic … are derived using reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features of the world.”

Ibid

“… the proof of the validity of these inferences depends upon the assumption of the truth of certain general statements concerning relatives.”

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html

Do all serious disagreements in philosophy come down to these [axiomatic] differences in intuition?

Intuitions are not axiomatic and logic tells us nothing about the way things are. Differences and disagreements in philosophy usually have nothing to do with logic. Usually, at least in modern philosophy in the west, disagreements stem from presumably ineluctable foundationism left over from Descartes and Kant. Meaning, as Sellers rejects, that there is a "given" in philosophy that entails our task as "What is mind?" and "How do we get thoughts to represent accurately?" Classic disagreements then would be, for instance, Clifford and James over the ethics of belief, Kant, Quine, Sellers and foundationalism and synthetic/analytic distiction, Putnam and Rorty and the success [or failure] of epistemology and truth.

It bears repeating logic is only a formal description of how folks think, aiding us in clear thinking, it doesn't entail truth, and it tells us nothing at all about reality.

I will say that you're absolutely right, however, in noting that logic itself isn't compelling; one must be moved to agree with it and this is entirely apart from merely applying formal logic to any given proposition. For instance, if we suppose there can be no evidence for transcendent realities and we argue over the existence of said realities, then we use logic alone to do so. In that case, if both sides present sound arguments for and against, the fact that each has a necessary conclusion demonstrates this point as soon as a person finds one or the other to be more likely the case. It wouldn't be logic that's compelling but one's total impressions of the world helping us into a disposition about the proposition's conclusion (an idea expressed in Seller's Coherence Theory Of Truth).

“Of these two conditions, the logician as such is concerned only with the first [validity]; the second, the determination of the truth or falsity of the premises, is the task of some special discipline or of common observation appropriate to the subject matter of the argument.”

https://www.britannica.com/topic/formal-logic

“When the conclusion of an argument is correctly deducible from its premises, the inference from the premises to the conclusion is said to be (deductively) valid, irrespective of whether the premises are true or false."

Ibid

“The bottom line is that logic alone can tell us nothing new about the real world.”

https://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/philosop/logic.htm

“Traditionally logic was considered a normative description of the workings of an ideal mind.”

http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/~morado/RLH.htm

“[The principles of logic] are non-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on any particular accidental features of the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the world actually is.”

http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/logic/whatislogic.php

“The principles of logic … are derived using reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features of the world.”

Ibid

“… the proof of the validity of these inferences depends upon the assumption of the truth of certain general statements concerning relatives.”

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html

1
source | link

Do all serious disagreements in philosophy come down to these [axiomatic] differences in intuition?

Intuitions are not axiomatic and logic tells us nothing about the way things are. Differences and disagreements in philosophy usually have nothing to do with logic. Usually, at least in modern philosophy in the west, disagreements stem from presumably ineluctable foundationism left over from Descartes and Kant. Meaning, as Sellers rejects, that there is a "given" in philosophy that entails our task as "What is mind?" and "How do we get thoughts to represent?" Classic disagreements then would be, for instance, Clifford and James over the ethics of belief, Kant, Quine, Sellers and foundationalism and synthetic/analytic distiction, Putnam and Rorty and the success of epistemology and truth.

It bears repeating logic is only a formal description of how folks think, aiding us in clear thinking, it doesn't entail truth, and it tells us nothing at all about reality.

“Of these two conditions, the logician as such is concerned only with the first [validity]; the second, the determination of the truth or falsity of the premises, is the task of some special discipline or of common observation appropriate to the subject matter of the argument.”

https://www.britannica.com/topic/formal-logic

“When the conclusion of an argument is correctly deducible from its premises, the inference from the premises to the conclusion is said to be (deductively) valid, irrespective of whether the premises are true or false."

Ibid

“The bottom line is that logic alone can tell us nothing new about the real world.”

https://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/philosop/logic.htm

“Traditionally logic was considered a normative description of the workings of an ideal mind.”

http://www.filosoficas.unam.mx/~morado/RLH.htm

“[The principles of logic] are non-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on any particular accidental features of the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the world actually is.”

http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/logic/whatislogic.php

“The principles of logic … are derived using reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features of the world.”

Ibid

“… the proof of the validity of these inferences depends upon the assumption of the truth of certain general statements concerning relatives.”

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html