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Suppose I have a theory A that can predict all experimental outcomes, E, in a particular domain of interest almost exactly.

Now suppose later a second theory is developed B that cannot predict experimental outcomes precisely, but instead can make a prediction within a certain range of E.

Now let us suppose that no one can understand how theory A produces the right answer. Theory A just involves doing certain arithmetical sums and happens to work.

But let us suppose B is built up from more fundamental scientific ideas, and allows one to clearly conceptualise how the theory works (despite not being as accurate as A).

So my question is, does theory B have a place in science, given that A can already predict all experimental results in the domain of interest?

Put another way, is science done when it can predict the world, or is there still science in understanding it (even at the cost of accuracy)?

Suppose I have a theory A that can predict all experimental outcomes, E, in a particular domain of interest almost exactly.

Now suppose later a second theory is developed B that cannot predict experimental outcomes precisely, but instead can make a prediction within a certain range of E.

Now let us suppose that no one can understand how theory A produces the right answer. Theory A just involves doing certain arithmetical sums and happens to work.

But let us suppose B is built up from more fundamental scientific ideas, and allows one to clearly conceptualise how the theory works (despite not being as accurate as A).

So my question is, does theory B have a place in science, given that A can already predict all experimental results in the domain of interest?

Suppose I have a theory A that can predict all experimental outcomes, E, in a particular domain of interest almost exactly.

Now suppose later a second theory is developed B that cannot predict experimental outcomes precisely, but instead can make a prediction within a certain range of E.

Now let us suppose that no one can understand how theory A produces the right answer. Theory A just involves doing certain arithmetical sums and happens to work.

But let us suppose B is built up from more fundamental scientific ideas, and allows one to clearly conceptualise how the theory works (despite not being as accurate as A).

So my question is, does theory B have a place in science, given that A can already predict all experimental results in the domain of interest?

Put another way, is science done when it can predict the world, or is there still science in understanding it (even at the cost of accuracy)?

2 deleted 45 characters in body
source | link

Suppose I have a theory A that can predict all experimental outcomes, E, in a particular domain of interest almost exactly.

Now suppose later a second theory is developed B that cannot predict experimental outcomes precisely, but instead can make a prediction within a certain range of E.

Now let us suppose that no one can understand how theory A produces the right answer. Theory A just involves doing certain arithmetical sums and happens to work.

But let us suppose B is built up from more fundamental scientific ideas, and allows one to clearly conceptualise how the theory works (despite not being as accurate as A).

So my question is, does theory B have a place in science, given that A can already predict all experimental results in the domain of interest, and B is inferior to A at this task?

Suppose I have a theory A that can predict all experimental outcomes, E, in a particular domain of interest almost exactly.

Now suppose later a second theory is developed B that cannot predict experimental outcomes precisely, but instead can make a prediction within a certain range of E.

Now let us suppose that no one can understand how theory A produces the right answer. Theory A just involves doing certain arithmetical sums and happens to work.

But let us suppose B is built up from more fundamental scientific ideas, and allows one to clearly conceptualise how the theory works (despite not being as accurate as A).

So my question is, does theory B have a place in science, given that A can already predict all experimental results in the domain of interest, and B is inferior to A at this task?

Suppose I have a theory A that can predict all experimental outcomes, E, in a particular domain of interest almost exactly.

Now suppose later a second theory is developed B that cannot predict experimental outcomes precisely, but instead can make a prediction within a certain range of E.

Now let us suppose that no one can understand how theory A produces the right answer. Theory A just involves doing certain arithmetical sums and happens to work.

But let us suppose B is built up from more fundamental scientific ideas, and allows one to clearly conceptualise how the theory works (despite not being as accurate as A).

So my question is, does theory B have a place in science, given that A can already predict all experimental results in the domain of interest?

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Accuracy vs. Understanding In Science

Suppose I have a theory A that can predict all experimental outcomes, E, in a particular domain of interest almost exactly.

Now suppose later a second theory is developed B that cannot predict experimental outcomes precisely, but instead can make a prediction within a certain range of E.

Now let us suppose that no one can understand how theory A produces the right answer. Theory A just involves doing certain arithmetical sums and happens to work.

But let us suppose B is built up from more fundamental scientific ideas, and allows one to clearly conceptualise how the theory works (despite not being as accurate as A).

So my question is, does theory B have a place in science, given that A can already predict all experimental results in the domain of interest, and B is inferior to A at this task?