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See Gottlob Frege's Sense and reference :

It is clear from the context that by sign and name I have here understood any designation figuring as a proper name, which thus has as its meaning a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs [see example : "the point of intersection of a and b"]. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name.

In footnote, Frege refers to :

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' ...

In some texts "actual" proper names has been called "genuine" proper names. See e.g.

Frege’s footnote makes clear that this is not how things are in natural language for genuine proper names: "In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ ..."


See also A.N. Whitehead & B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (1910), Introduction, page 64 :

We may, in fact, distinguish names of different orders as follows: (a) Elementary names will be such as are true "proper names," i.e. conventional appellations not involving any description. (b) First-order names will be such as involve a description by means of a first-order function; [...]


See also : Saul Kripke, Reference and Existence : The John Locke Lectures 1973, Oxford UP (2013), page 13 :

Russell would hold that such a name [an "empty" name] does have a sense given by a descriptive phrase. But then, he holds that the things that we ordinarily call ‘names’ aren’t really names, and that we have to leave it to analysis to discover what the genuine [emphasis mine] names really are. One of the criteria that are demanded by this argument to apply to names — genuine names of genuine objects — is that they have to name objects such that we can’t even meaningfully raise the question about whether they exist.

See Gottlob Frege's Sense and reference :

It is clear from the context that by sign and name I have here understood any designation figuring as a proper name, which thus has as its meaning a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs [see example : "the point of intersection of a and b"]. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name.

In footnote, Frege refers to :

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' ...

In some texts "actual" proper names has been called "genuine" proper names. See e.g.

Frege’s footnote makes clear that this is not how things are in natural language for genuine proper names: "In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ ..."


See also A.N. Whitehead & B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (1910), Introduction, page 64 :

We may, in fact, distinguish names of different orders as follows: (a) Elementary names will be such as are true "proper names," i.e. conventional appellations not involving any description. (b) First-order names will be such as involve a description by means of a first-order function; [...]

See Gottlob Frege's Sense and reference :

It is clear from the context that by sign and name I have here understood any designation figuring as a proper name, which thus has as its meaning a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs [see example : "the point of intersection of a and b"]. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name.

In footnote, Frege refers to :

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' ...

In some texts "actual" proper names has been called "genuine" proper names. See e.g.

Frege’s footnote makes clear that this is not how things are in natural language for genuine proper names: "In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ ..."


See also A.N. Whitehead & B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (1910), Introduction, page 64 :

We may, in fact, distinguish names of different orders as follows: (a) Elementary names will be such as are true "proper names," i.e. conventional appellations not involving any description. (b) First-order names will be such as involve a description by means of a first-order function; [...]


See also : Saul Kripke, Reference and Existence : The John Locke Lectures 1973, Oxford UP (2013), page 13 :

Russell would hold that such a name [an "empty" name] does have a sense given by a descriptive phrase. But then, he holds that the things that we ordinarily call ‘names’ aren’t really names, and that we have to leave it to analysis to discover what the genuine [emphasis mine] names really are. One of the criteria that are demanded by this argument to apply to names — genuine names of genuine objects — is that they have to name objects such that we can’t even meaningfully raise the question about whether they exist.

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See Gottlob Frege's Sense and reference :

It is clear from the context that by sign and name I have here understood any designation figuring as a proper name, which thus has as its meaning a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs [see example : "the point of intersection of a and b"]. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name.

In footnote, Frege refers to :

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' ...

In some texts "actual" proper names has been called "genuine" proper names. See e.g.

Frege’s footnote makes clear that this is not how things are in natural language for genuine proper names: "In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ ..."


See also A.N. Whitehead & B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (1910), Introduction, page 64 :

We may, in fact, distinguish names of different orders as follows: (a) Elementary names will be such as are true "proper names," i.e. conventional appellations not involving any description. (b) First-order names will be such as involve a description by means of a first-order function; [...]

See Gottlob Frege's Sense and reference :

It is clear from the context that by sign and name I have here understood any designation figuring as a proper name, which thus has as its meaning a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs [see example : "the point of intersection of a and b"]. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name.

In footnote, Frege refers to :

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' ...

In some texts "actual" proper names has been called "genuine" proper names. See e.g.

Frege’s footnote makes clear that this is not how things are in natural language for genuine proper names: "In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ ..."

See Gottlob Frege's Sense and reference :

It is clear from the context that by sign and name I have here understood any designation figuring as a proper name, which thus has as its meaning a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs [see example : "the point of intersection of a and b"]. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name.

In footnote, Frege refers to :

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' ...

In some texts "actual" proper names has been called "genuine" proper names. See e.g.

Frege’s footnote makes clear that this is not how things are in natural language for genuine proper names: "In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ ..."


See also A.N. Whitehead & B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (1910), Introduction, page 64 :

We may, in fact, distinguish names of different orders as follows: (a) Elementary names will be such as are true "proper names," i.e. conventional appellations not involving any description. (b) First-order names will be such as involve a description by means of a first-order function; [...]

    Post Undeleted by Mauro ALLEGRANZA
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See Saul Kripke's discussion of genuine proper names, into e.g.Gottlob Frege's Reference and Existence : The John Locke Lectures 1973 (Oxford UP, 2013).

The issue is with Kripke's refutation ofSense and reference Frege-Russell's theory of names as "description in disguise":

according to FregeIt is clear from the context that by sign and Russellname I have here understood any designation figuring as a proper name, [.which thus has as its meaning a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs [see example : "the point of intersection of a and b"].] with each For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name one associates some predicate that is supposed to be uniquely instantiated. 

For Saul KripkeIn footnote, insteadFrege refers to :

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' ...

In some texts "actual" proper names has been called "genuine" proper names. See e.g.

in determining reference in the actual world we do not generally use properties that we believe to be satisfied by the objects to pick them out. Rather, some picture likeFrege’s footnote makes clear that this is to be heldnot how things are in natural language for genuine proper names: someone initially ‘baptizes’ the object, picking out"In the object perhaps by pointing to it, or perhaps by its properties, or perhaps by some other devicecase of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ ..."

See Saul Kripke's discussion of genuine proper names, into e.g. Reference and Existence : The John Locke Lectures 1973 (Oxford UP, 2013).

The issue is with Kripke's refutation of Frege-Russell's theory of names as "description in disguise":

according to Frege and Russell, [...] with each proper name one associates some predicate that is supposed to be uniquely instantiated.

For Saul Kripke, instead :

in determining reference in the actual world we do not generally use properties that we believe to be satisfied by the objects to pick them out. Rather, some picture like this is to be held: someone initially ‘baptizes’ the object, picking out the object perhaps by pointing to it, or perhaps by its properties, or perhaps by some other device.

See Gottlob Frege's Sense and reference :

It is clear from the context that by sign and name I have here understood any designation figuring as a proper name, which thus has as its meaning a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs [see example : "the point of intersection of a and b"]. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name. 

In footnote, Frege refers to :

In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' ...

In some texts "actual" proper names has been called "genuine" proper names. See e.g.

Frege’s footnote makes clear that this is not how things are in natural language for genuine proper names: "In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ ..."

    Post Deleted by Mauro ALLEGRANZA
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