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In G. E. Anscombe's article "Modern Moral Philosophy", she thinks that it is meaningless to make moral judgements such as something is right, wrong, permissible and impermissible. Secondly, she thinks that her thick concept / Aristotelian virtue ethics vocabularies such as just, courage, tolerant, and wisdom etc. are better vocabularies. But both kinds are normative judgements except the latter (just, courage, tolerant, and wisdom) are some kind of thick concepts. 

But I still do not understand why she thinks her vocabularies are superior in making moral judgements.

In G. E. Anscombe's article "Modern Moral Philosophy", she thinks that it is meaningless to make moral judgements such as something is right, wrong, permissible and impermissible. Secondly, she thinks that her thick concept / Aristotelian virtue ethics vocabularies such as just, courage, tolerant, and wisdom etc. are better vocabularies. But both kinds are normative judgements except the latter (just, courage, tolerant, and wisdom) are some kind of thick concepts. But I still do not understand why she thinks her vocabularies are superior in making moral judgements.

In G. E. Anscombe's article "Modern Moral Philosophy", she thinks that it is meaningless to make moral judgements such as something is right, wrong, permissible and impermissible. Secondly, she thinks that her thick concept / Aristotelian virtue ethics vocabularies such as just, courage, tolerant, and wisdom etc. are better vocabularies. But both kinds are normative judgements except the latter (just, courage, tolerant, and wisdom) are some kind of thick concepts. 

But I still do not understand why she thinks her vocabularies are superior in making moral judgements.

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Thick Concepts versus Normative Concepts

In G. E. Anscombe's article "Modern Moral Philosophy", she thinks that it is meaningless to make moral judgements such as something is right, wrong, permissible and impermissible. Secondly, she thinks that her thick concept / Aristotelian virtue ethics vocabularies such as just, courage, tolerant, and wisdom etc. are better vocabularies. But both kinds are normative judgements except the latter (just, courage, tolerant, and wisdom) are some kind of thick concepts. But I still do not understand why she thinks her vocabularies are superior in making moral judgements.