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Jan 3, 2019 at 21:27 vote accept user27343
Jan 3, 2019 at 11:07 comment added user9166 Hume would concede nothing. But his thinking ultimately led to the notion that induction is a red herring. Consider Karl Popper (qv) and the notion that we should just go for systematically maximizing the probability of guessing right, instead of establishing facts at all.
Jan 3, 2019 at 10:57 answer added Frank Hubeny timeline score: 1
Jan 3, 2019 at 5:40 comment added user19423 Yeah, the standard terminology (along with a lengthy discussion) nowadays is en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlation_does_not_imply_causation (For the past thousand+ years, the monsoon season in India has occured several weeks after the flowers bloom in upstate NY. But that doesn't mean blooming flowers cause monsoons.)
Jan 3, 2019 at 1:58 comment added user27343 My question is simply whether or not saying certain events have a higher probability is compatible with the problem of induction. I can't say A causes B, but can I say the occurrence of A means there is a higher probability that B will follow? Based on the answer below, this is still consistent with Hume's argument.
Jan 3, 2019 at 1:54 vote accept user27343
Jan 3, 2019 at 21:27
Jan 3, 2019 at 0:00 history tweeted twitter.com/StackPhilosophy/status/1080614843906969601
Jan 2, 2019 at 23:41 comment added Conifold Why would Hume have to "concede" it? It is his point that we assign the label of causality to conjunctions of events that are particularly common, but that this label has no self-standing referent in reality. In contrast, the traditional belief is that causality (as in natural laws) is objectively grounded in some form.
Jan 2, 2019 at 9:20 answer added Mauro ALLEGRANZA timeline score: 2
Jan 2, 2019 at 0:58 comment added user35983 doesn't 'constant conjunction' make for belief some things are more likely but it can't be "justified" rather than habitually held to?
Jan 2, 2019 at 0:45 history asked user27343 CC BY-SA 4.0