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Geremia
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The philosophical axiom that

something cannot give what it does not have
nemo dat quod non habet
(cf. I q. 2 a. 3)

applies here.

If the First Mover were movable (i.e., not pure actuality, actus purus), it would lack something (for example:* the ability to move other things), and it could not give what it lacks to others (in the example: it could not change others). This is a contradiction (in the example: because we do observe that things change). Thus, the First Mover must be immovable.

*Any (absolute, not relative) perfection could be given as an example of what the First Mover could lack, and the argument would remain. Other examples: immateriality, omniscience, justice, omnipresence, etc.:

  • If the First Mover lacked immateriality, it could not give immateriality to creatures; but, we know that there are immaterial creatures; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover lacked all knowledge, it could not give knowledge to creatures; but, we know that there are creatures with knowledge; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover lacked justice, it could not give justice to creatures; but, we know that there are creatures with the virtue of justice; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover were localized to one place, it could not make creatures localized to no place; but, we know that there are creatures not localized to one place (e.g., purely intellectual beings, the angels); ergo….

  • Etc.

The philosophical axiom that

something cannot give what it does not have
nemo dat quod non habet
(cf. I q. 2 a. 3)

applies here.

If the First Mover were movable (i.e., not pure actuality, actus purus), it would lack something (for example:* the ability to move other things), and it could not give what it lacks to others (in the example: it could not change others). This is a contradiction (in the example: because we do observe that things change). Thus, the First Mover must be immovable.

*Any perfection could be given as an example of what the First Mover could lack, and the argument would remain. Other examples: immateriality, omniscience, justice, omnipresence, etc.:

  • If the First Mover lacked immateriality, it could not give immateriality to creatures; but, we know that there are immaterial creatures; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover lacked all knowledge, it could not give knowledge to creatures; but, we know that there are creatures with knowledge; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover lacked justice, it could not give justice to creatures; but, we know that there are creatures with the virtue of justice; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover were localized to one place, it could not make creatures localized to no place; but, we know that there are creatures not localized to one place (e.g., purely intellectual beings, the angels); ergo….

  • Etc.

The philosophical axiom that

something cannot give what it does not have
nemo dat quod non habet
(cf. I q. 2 a. 3)

applies here.

If the First Mover were movable (i.e., not pure actuality, actus purus), it would lack something (for example:* the ability to move other things), and it could not give what it lacks to others (in the example: it could not change others). This is a contradiction (in the example: because we do observe that things change). Thus, the First Mover must be immovable.

*Any (absolute, not relative) perfection could be given as an example of what the First Mover could lack, and the argument would remain. Other examples: immateriality, omniscience, justice, omnipresence, etc.:

  • If the First Mover lacked immateriality, it could not give immateriality to creatures; but, we know that there are immaterial creatures; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover lacked all knowledge, it could not give knowledge to creatures; but, we know that there are creatures with knowledge; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover lacked justice, it could not give justice to creatures; but, we know that there are creatures with the virtue of justice; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover were localized to one place, it could not make creatures localized to no place; but, we know that there are creatures not localized to one place (e.g., purely intellectual beings, the angels); ergo….

  • Etc.

Source Link
Geremia
Geremia
  • 8.6k
  • 4
  • 29
  • 61

The philosophical axiom that

something cannot give what it does not have
nemo dat quod non habet
(cf. I q. 2 a. 3)

applies here.

If the First Mover were movable (i.e., not pure actuality, actus purus), it would lack something (for example:* the ability to move other things), and it could not give what it lacks to others (in the example: it could not change others). This is a contradiction (in the example: because we do observe that things change). Thus, the First Mover must be immovable.

*Any perfection could be given as an example of what the First Mover could lack, and the argument would remain. Other examples: immateriality, omniscience, justice, omnipresence, etc.:

  • If the First Mover lacked immateriality, it could not give immateriality to creatures; but, we know that there are immaterial creatures; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover lacked all knowledge, it could not give knowledge to creatures; but, we know that there are creatures with knowledge; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover lacked justice, it could not give justice to creatures; but, we know that there are creatures with the virtue of justice; ergo….

  • Or: If the First Mover were localized to one place, it could not make creatures localized to no place; but, we know that there are creatures not localized to one place (e.g., purely intellectual beings, the angels); ergo….

  • Etc.