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As a cell divides how can we affect the attribute of having a closed, independent circulatory system to the end product when it is not in the origin and was not introduced from outside at any given point? This is the fallacy of division, the idea that parts must share the attributes of the whole for no other reason than that of being its parts. ItIn the form you are using it, it is related to the sorites paradox and to various kinds of equivocation.

Sometimes when you partition an object a given property of that object belongs to only onesome and not others of the parts, sometimes it disappears entirely, almost never is absolutely every property of the whole preserved in one or the other of the parts. At the very least, the attribute of being wholebeing whole is lost, as are attributes dependent upon the homeostasis of the whole, such as sustainable life, or meeting various definitions based on holistic structural characteristics like "having a single head and two feet". (There is a joke about Quine requesting the collected totality attained by the parts of a chicken. The problem being that noneno pike of the parts has 'collected totality' and the whole chicken does not actually have any given set of parts until we decide where to cut it.)

There is an equivocation on 'having' treating the meaning 'fitting the parameters' with a more literal meaning that identifies a real 'object' that is had. One does not have a property the way one has a hat. We imagine some materiality of a property because of a habit language.

So obviously conversely as a thing comes into being, the end whole can have attributes that no previous stage or part has. The succession of processes do not have to have all the properties of the entire process in the same way the segmented chicken will no doubt lack the property of being able to continue living for very much longer.

But the composing direction is trickier than the segmenting direction because things like the independent circulatory system or functioning brain of a fetus clearly exist at later points, while it is impossible to identify at exactly what stage they were absent and came into being. So this introduces another dimension to the fallacy of division related to the sorites paradox where one cannot identify the exact grain of wheat that turned the collection of grains into a pile of grain. Properties of the whole can come into existence without being present at earlier stages.

As a cell divides how can we affect the attribute of having a circulatory system to the end product when it is not in the origin and was not introduced from outside at any given point? This is the fallacy of division, the idea that parts must share the attributes of the whole for no other reason than that of being its parts. It is related to the sorites paradox and to various kinds of equivocation.

Sometimes when you partition an object a given property of that object belongs to only one of the parts, sometimes it disappears entirely, almost never is absolutely every property of the whole preserved in one or the other of the parts. At the very least, the attribute of being whole is lost, as are attributes dependent upon the homeostasis of the whole, such as life, or meeting various definitions based on holistic structural characteristics like "having a single head and two feet". (There is a joke about Quine requesting the collected totality attained by the parts of a chicken. The problem being that none of the parts has 'collected totality' and the whole chicken does not actually have any given set of parts until we decide where to cut it.)

So obviously conversely as a thing comes into being, the end whole can have attributes that no previous stage or part has. The succession of processes do not have to have all the properties of the entire process in the same way the segmented chicken will no doubt lack the property of being able to continue living for very much longer.

But the composing direction is trickier than the segmenting direction because things like the independent circulatory system or functioning brain of a fetus clearly exist at later points, while it is impossible to identify at exactly what stage they were absent and came into being. So this introduces another dimension to the fallacy of division related to the sorites paradox where one cannot identify the exact grain of wheat that turned the collection of grains into a pile of grain. Properties of the whole can come into existence without being present at earlier stages.

As a cell divides how can we affect the attribute of having a closed, independent circulatory system to the end product when it is not in the origin and was not introduced from outside at any given point? This is the fallacy of division, the idea that parts must share the attributes of the whole for no other reason than that of being its parts. In the form you are using it, it is related to the sorites paradox and to various kinds of equivocation.

Sometimes when you partition an object a given property of that object belongs to some and not others of the parts, sometimes it disappears entirely, almost never is absolutely every property of the whole preserved in one or the other of the parts. At the very least, the attribute of being whole is lost, as are attributes dependent upon the homeostasis of the whole, such as sustainable life, or meeting various definitions based on holistic structural characteristics like "having a single head and two feet". (There is a joke about Quine requesting the collected totality attained by the parts of a chicken. The problem being that no pike of parts has 'collected totality' and the whole chicken does not actually have any given set of parts until we decide where to cut it.)

There is an equivocation on 'having' treating the meaning 'fitting the parameters' with a more literal meaning that identifies a real 'object' that is had. One does not have a property the way one has a hat. We imagine some materiality of a property because of a habit language.

So obviously conversely as a thing comes into being, the end whole can have attributes that no previous stage or part has. The succession of processes do not have to have all the properties of the entire process in the same way the segmented chicken will no doubt lack the property of being able to continue living for very much longer.

But the composing direction is trickier than the segmenting direction because things like the independent circulatory system or functioning brain of a fetus clearly exist at later points, while it is impossible to identify at exactly what stage they were absent and came into being. So this introduces another dimension to the fallacy of division related to the sorites paradox where one cannot identify the exact grain of wheat that turned the collection of grains into a pile of grain. Properties of the whole can come into existence without being present at earlier stages.

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As a cell divides how can we affect the attribute of having a circulatory system to the end product when it is not in the origin and was not introduced from outside at any given point? This is the fallacy of division, the idea that parts must share the attributes of the whole for no other reason than that of being its parts. It is related to the sorites paradox and to various kinds of equivocation.

Sometimes when you partition an object a given property of that object belongs to only one of the parts, sometimes it disappears entirely, almost never is absolutely every property of the whole preserved in one or the other of the parts. At the very least, the attribute of being whole is lost, as are attributes dependent upon the homeostasis of the whole, such as life, or meeting various definitions based on holistic structural characteristics like "having a single head and two feet". (There is a joke about Quine requesting the collected totality attained by the parts of a chicken. The problem being that none of the parts has 'collected totality' and the whole chicken does not actually have any given set of parts until we decide where to cut it.)

So obviously conversely as a thing comes into being, the end whole can have attributes that no previous stage or part has. The succession of processes do not have to have all the properties of the entire process in the same way the segmented chicken will no doubt lack the property of being able to continue living for very much longer.

But the composing direction is trickier than the segmenting direction because things like the independent circulatory system or functioning brain of a fetus clearly exist at later points, while it is impossible to identify at exactly what stage they were absent and came into being. So this introduces another dimension to the fallacy of division related to the sorites paradox where one cannot identify the exact grain of wheat that turned the collection of grains into a pile of grain. Properties of the whole can come into existence without being present at earlier stages.