Sellars's argument against "the myth of the given" is a powerful argument defeating fundamentalism in epistemology. Edmund Husserl considered "the given" to be "unconditionally/absolutely(?) given", and we construct (in one of my understandings of Husserl) objects from given phenomena, so it looks like a kind of fundamentalism. At the same time, Husserl opposes fundamentalism, but I do not know how he does it. So did Sellars defeat Husserl's phenomenology?

Sellars's critique of "the myth of the given" is a potent argument that weakens fundamentalism in epistemology. Edmund Husserl regarded "the given" as being "unconditionally/absolutely given," and it can be interpreted that we construct objects from given phenomena, which may be of a form of fundamentalism. However, Husserl also opposes fundamentalism, although the manner in which he does so is not entirely clear. Consequently, the question arises: Did Sellars effectively undermine Husserl's phenomenology?