Timeline for How can a soul have parts if it's the unifying principle of the person? (Aquinas)
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
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Jun 2, 2020 at 23:00 | history | bumped | CommunityBot | This question has answers that may be good or bad; the system has marked it active so that they can be reviewed. | |
May 4, 2020 at 14:59 | comment | added | user20253 | Schroedinger finds even the idea of a multiplicity of souls absurd, uniting them in the world-soul in line with the early Classical Christian and Upanishadic teachings. So for him it is not the individual soul that needs to be unified but (our idea of) the multiplicity of part-less souls. . | |
May 3, 2020 at 22:13 | answer | added | viuser | timeline score: 2 | |
May 3, 2020 at 14:45 | answer | added | user37859 | timeline score: 0 | |
May 3, 2020 at 6:07 | comment | added | curiousdannii | If there are parts, why wouldn't it be the soul itself which unites its parts, just as the body unites its parts? | |
May 3, 2020 at 4:10 | comment | added | Cal | Thank you both—yes, Geremia, I think I was thinking of powers of the soul, and Conifold, your references have given me confidence. | |
May 3, 2020 at 3:48 | comment | added | Geremia | By "parts" do you really mean "powers of the soul"? | |
May 3, 2020 at 3:30 | comment | added | Conifold | It can not, the soul has no parts to unite, it is "simple". Blackerby helpfully collected relevant passages at the end of his thesis, p.237ff:"The Philosopher says in De Anima II, the soul is the form of the body. He also says there that the form is neither matter nor a composite. Therefore, the soul is not a composite", In Sent. 1 d. | |
May 3, 2020 at 3:02 | history | asked | Cal | CC BY-SA 4.0 |