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Darjes is an 18th century author who published Introductio in Artem Inveniendi, seu Logicam theoretico-practicam, qua Analytica atque Dialectica... (1732). He assigned todefined the analytic as the "science of rules for discovering truths with certainty" and dialectic as the "science of discovering plausible truths". The "discovering" part separates him from contemporary Wolffians, who saw logic only as ars demonstrandi, and anticipates the understanding of Logic (and dialectic in particular) in later German idealism.

To the analytic Darjes assigned "concepts and definitions and their origin either a priori or a posteriori, judgments and sentences, intuitive judgments and the generality a posteriori, discursive judgments..." and to the dialectic "probability in general and and as a way to dialectically find the truth, a way to find apparent terms or definitions, theoretical sentences a priori and a posteriori, philosophical hypotheses, hermeneutic probability, probable criticism, assessment of the likelihood of other people's opinions".

Kant has two types of analytic and dialectic, formal and transcendental. In both cases the division is between correct and incorrect employment of understanding and reason in their formal (general, syntactic) and transcendental (synthetic, semantic) functions. On Kant's "transcendental dialectic" there is more or less an agreement, see e.g. IEP, Kant’s Dialectic, Loparic, Kant's Dialectic, Guyer, The Unity of Reason and Rotenstreich, Kant's Dialectic. 

It is the antithetical "logic of illusion" ("a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of the truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness", A61), but of a special kind. It has to do with the tendency of pure reason to employ concepts of the understanding to unify knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience, and thereby fall into antinomies and "transcendental illusion". The reason preoccupies itself with directing understanding "towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions", which can never be guaranteed to terminate, but then transgresses into positing such absolute totalities as transcendent objects, as if this synthesis of appearances has already terminated. That's the transcendental dialectic. Here is Loparic:

Darjes is an 18th century author who published Introductio in Artem Inveniendi, seu Logicam theoretico-practicam, qua Analytica atque Dialectica... (1732). He assigned to analytic "concepts and definitions and their origin either a priori or a posteriori, judgments and sentences, intuitive judgments and the generality a posteriori, discursive judgments..." and to dialectic "probability in general and as a way to dialectically find the truth, a way to find apparent terms or definitions, theoretical sentences a priori and a posteriori, philosophical hypotheses, hermeneutic probability, probable criticism, assessment of the likelihood of other people's opinions".

Kant has two types of analytic and dialectic, formal and transcendental. In both cases the division is between correct and incorrect employment of understanding and reason in their formal (general, syntactic) and transcendental (synthetic, semantic) functions. On Kant's "transcendental dialectic" there is more or less an agreement, see e.g. IEP, Kant’s Dialectic, Loparic, Kant's Dialectic, Guyer, The Unity of Reason and Rotenstreich, Kant's Dialectic. It is the antithetical "logic of illusion" ("a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of the truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness", A61), but of a special kind. It has to do with the tendency of pure reason to employ concepts of the understanding to unify knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience, and thereby fall into antinomies and "transcendental illusion". The reason preoccupies itself with directing understanding "towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions", which can never be guaranteed to terminate, but then transgresses into positing such absolute totalities as transcendent objects, as if this synthesis of appearances has already terminated. That's the transcendental dialectic. Here is Loparic:

Darjes is an 18th century author who published Introductio in Artem Inveniendi, seu Logicam theoretico-practicam, qua Analytica atque Dialectica... (1732). He defined the analytic as the "science of rules for discovering truths with certainty" and dialectic as the "science of discovering plausible truths". The "discovering" part separates him from contemporary Wolffians, who saw logic only as ars demonstrandi, and anticipates the understanding of Logic (and dialectic in particular) in later German idealism.

To the analytic Darjes assigned "concepts and definitions and their origin either a priori or a posteriori, judgments and sentences, intuitive judgments and the generality a posteriori, discursive judgments..." and to the dialectic "probability in general and as a way to dialectically find the truth, a way to find apparent terms or definitions, theoretical sentences a priori and a posteriori, philosophical hypotheses, hermeneutic probability, probable criticism, assessment of the likelihood of other people's opinions".

Kant has two types of analytic and dialectic, formal and transcendental. In both cases the division is between correct and incorrect employment of understanding and reason in their formal (general, syntactic) and transcendental (synthetic, semantic) functions. On Kant's "transcendental dialectic" there is more or less an agreement, see e.g. IEP, Kant’s Dialectic, Loparic, Kant's Dialectic, Guyer, The Unity of Reason and Rotenstreich, Kant's Dialectic. 

It is the antithetical "logic of illusion" ("a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of the truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness", A61), but of a special kind. It has to do with the tendency of pure reason to employ concepts of the understanding to unify knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience, and thereby fall into antinomies and "transcendental illusion". The reason preoccupies itself with directing understanding "towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions", which can never be guaranteed to terminate, but then transgresses into positing such absolute totalities as transcendent objects, as if this synthesis of appearances has already terminated. That's the transcendental dialectic. Here is Loparic:

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The genesis of the terms "analytic" and "dialectic" in Kant's time is discussed in Tonelli's Der historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini „Analytik“ und „Dialektik“, who concludes (my translation):

"The division of the Critique of Pure Reason into Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic is undoubtedly after the process made by Darjes. Kant knew the Darjesian philosophy very well, he had dealt with it several times and stood in some details under the influence of Darjes and his school. The content of the Kantian transcendental analytics and dialectics is clearly quite different from that of the eponymous parts of the Aristotelian manuals; but the hypothetical and antithetical character the transcendental dialectic probably corresponds to the concept of logica probabilium or disputatrix. This analogy may have moved Kant to to adopt the Aristotelian term."

Darjes is an 18th century author who published Introductio in Artem Inveniendi, seu Logicam theoretico-practicam, qua Analytica atque Dialectica... (1732), who. He assigned to analytic "concepts and definitions and their origin either a priori or a posteriori, judgments and sentences, intuitive judgments and the generality a posteriori, discursive judgments..." and to dialectic "probability in general and as a way to dialectically find the truth, a way to find apparent terms or definitions, theoretical sentences a priori and a posteriori, philosophical hypotheses, hermeneutic probability, probable criticism, assessment of the likelihood likelihood of other people's opinions".

Kant has two types of analytic and dialectic, formal and transcendental. In both cases the division is between correct and incorrect employment of understanding and reason in their formal (general, syntactic) and transcendental (synthetic, semantic) functions. On Kant's "transcendental dialectic" there is more or less an agreement, see e.g. IEP, Kant’s Dialectic, Loparic, Kant's Dialectic, Guyer, The Unity of Reason and Rotenstreich, Kant's Dialectic. It is the antithetical "logic of illusion" ("a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of the truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness", A61), but of a special kind. It has to do with the tendency of pure reason to employ concepts of the understanding to unify knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience, and thereby fall into antinomies and "transcendental illusion". The reason preoccupies itself with directing understanding "towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions", which can never be guaranteed to terminate, but then transgresses into positing such absolute totalities as transcendent objects, as if this synthesis of appearances has already terminated. That's the transcendental dialectic. Here is Loparic:

"Yet, if we employ the principles of the understanding not as a canon for evaluating the empirical truth of synthetic propositions but as an organon, and consequently "venture, with the pure understanding alone, to judge synthetically, to affirm, and to decide regarding objects in general", our employment of the pure understanding becomes dialectical (B 88). It cannot be otherwise, because, as we have just seen, the a priori principles of the understanding provide universal conditions of synthesis of sensible objects and as such cannot offer the necessary basis for "passing judgments upon objects without distinction - upon objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot in any way be given" (B 88). An analogous dialectical illusion is generated through attempts to decide synthetical propositions regarding objects in general by employing solely formal logic and the transcendental principles of pure speculative reason (B 353)".

The genesis of the terms "analytic" and "dialectic" in Kant's time is discussed in Tonelli's Der historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini „Analytik“ und „Dialektik“, who concludes (my translation):

"The division of the Critique of Pure Reason into Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic is undoubtedly after the process made by Darjes. Kant knew the Darjesian philosophy very well, he had dealt with it several times and stood in some details under the influence of Darjes and his school. The content of the Kantian transcendental analytics and dialectics is clearly quite different from that of the eponymous parts of the Aristotelian manuals; but the hypothetical and antithetical character the transcendental dialectic probably corresponds to the concept of logica probabilium or disputatrix. This analogy may have moved Kant to to adopt the Aristotelian term."

Darjes is an 18th century author who published Introductio in Artem Inveniendi, seu Logicam theoretico-practicam, qua Analytica atque Dialectica... (1732), who assigned to analytic "concepts and definitions and their origin either a priori or a posteriori, judgments and sentences, intuitive judgments and the generality a posteriori, discursive judgments..." and to dialectic "probability in general and as a way to dialectically find the truth, a way to find apparent terms or definitions, theoretical sentences a priori and a posteriori, philosophical hypotheses, hermeneutic probability, probable criticism, assessment of the likelihood of other people's opinions".

Kant has two types of analytic and dialectic, formal and transcendental. In both cases the division is between correct and incorrect employment of understanding and reason in their formal (general, syntactic) and transcendental (synthetic, semantic) functions. On Kant's "transcendental dialectic" there is more or less an agreement, see e.g. IEP, Kant’s Dialectic, Loparic, Kant's Dialectic, Guyer, The Unity of Reason and Rotenstreich, Kant's Dialectic. It is the antithetical "logic of illusion" ("a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of the truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness", A61), but of a special kind. It has to do with the tendency of pure reason to employ concepts of the understanding to unify knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience, and thereby fall into antinomies and "transcendental illusion". The reason preoccupies itself with directing understanding "towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions", which can never be guaranteed to terminate, but then transgresses into positing such absolute totalities as transcendent objects, as if this synthesis of appearances has already terminated. That's the transcendental dialectic. Here is Loparic:

"Yet, if we employ the principles of the understanding not as a canon for evaluating the empirical truth of synthetic propositions but as an organon, and consequently "venture, with the pure understanding alone, to judge synthetically, to affirm, and to decide regarding objects in general", our employment of the pure understanding becomes dialectical (B 88). It cannot be otherwise, because, as we have just seen, the a priori principles of the understanding provide universal conditions of synthesis of sensible objects and as such cannot offer the necessary basis for "passing judgments upon objects without distinction - upon objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot in any way be given" (B 88). An analogous dialectical illusion is generated through attempts to decide synthetical propositions regarding objects in general by employing solely formal logic and the transcendental principles of pure speculative reason (B 353)".

The genesis of the terms "analytic" and "dialectic" in Kant's time is discussed in Tonelli's Der historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini „Analytik“ und „Dialektik“, who concludes (my translation):

"The division of the Critique of Pure Reason into Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic is undoubtedly after the process made by Darjes. Kant knew the Darjesian philosophy very well, he had dealt with it several times and stood in some details under the influence of Darjes and his school. The content of the Kantian transcendental analytics and dialectics is clearly quite different from that of the eponymous parts of the Aristotelian manuals; but the hypothetical and antithetical character the transcendental dialectic probably corresponds to the concept of logica probabilium or disputatrix. This analogy may have moved Kant to adopt the Aristotelian term."

Darjes is an 18th century author who published Introductio in Artem Inveniendi, seu Logicam theoretico-practicam, qua Analytica atque Dialectica... (1732). He assigned to analytic "concepts and definitions and their origin either a priori or a posteriori, judgments and sentences, intuitive judgments and the generality a posteriori, discursive judgments..." and to dialectic "probability in general and as a way to dialectically find the truth, a way to find apparent terms or definitions, theoretical sentences a priori and a posteriori, philosophical hypotheses, hermeneutic probability, probable criticism, assessment of the likelihood of other people's opinions".

Kant has two types of analytic and dialectic, formal and transcendental. In both cases the division is between correct and incorrect employment of understanding and reason in their formal (general, syntactic) and transcendental (synthetic, semantic) functions. On Kant's "transcendental dialectic" there is more or less an agreement, see e.g. IEP, Kant’s Dialectic, Loparic, Kant's Dialectic, Guyer, The Unity of Reason and Rotenstreich, Kant's Dialectic. It is the antithetical "logic of illusion" ("a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of the truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness", A61), but of a special kind. It has to do with the tendency of pure reason to employ concepts of the understanding to unify knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience, and thereby fall into antinomies and "transcendental illusion". The reason preoccupies itself with directing understanding "towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions", which can never be guaranteed to terminate, but then transgresses into positing such absolute totalities as transcendent objects, as if this synthesis of appearances has already terminated. That's the transcendental dialectic. Here is Loparic:

"Yet, if we employ the principles of the understanding not as a canon for evaluating the empirical truth of synthetic propositions but as an organon, and consequently "venture, with the pure understanding alone, to judge synthetically, to affirm, and to decide regarding objects in general", our employment of the pure understanding becomes dialectical (B 88). It cannot be otherwise, because, as we have just seen, the a priori principles of the understanding provide universal conditions of synthesis of sensible objects and as such cannot offer the necessary basis for "passing judgments upon objects without distinction - upon objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot in any way be given" (B 88). An analogous dialectical illusion is generated through attempts to decide synthetical propositions regarding objects in general by employing solely formal logic and the transcendental principles of pure speculative reason (B 353)".

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The genesis of the terms "analytic" and "dialectic" in Kant's time is discussed in Tonelli's Der historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini „Analytik“ und „Dialektik“, who concludes (my translation):

"The division of the Critique of Pure Reason into Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic is undoubtedly after the process made by Darjes. Kant knew the Darjesian philosophy very well, he had dealt with it several times and stood in some details under the influence of Darjes and his school. The content of the Kantian transcendental analytics and dialectics is clearly quite different from that of the eponymous parts of the Aristotelian manuals; but the hypothetical and antithetical character the transcendental dialectic probably corresponds to the concept of logica probabilium or disputatrix. This analogy may have moved Kant to to adopt the Aristotelian term."

Darjes is an 18th century author who published Introductio in Artem Inveniendi, seu Logicam theoretico-practicam, qua Analytica atque Dialectica... (1732), who assigned to analytic "concepts and definitions and their origin either a priori or a posteriori, judgments and sentences, intuitive judgments and the generality a posteriori, discursive judgments..." and to dialectic "probability in general and as a way to dialectically find the truth, a way to find apparent terms or definitions, theoretical sentences a priori and a posteriori, philosophical hypotheses, hermeneutic probability, probable criticism, assessment of the likelihood of other people's opinions".

On Kant's ownKant has two types of analytic and dialectic, formal and transcendental. In both cases the division is between correct and incorrect employment of understanding and reason in their formal (general, syntactic) and transcendental (synthetic, semantic) functions. On Kant's "transcendental dialectic" there is more or less an agreement, see e.g. IEP, Kant’s Dialectic, Loparic, Kant's Dialectic, Guyer, The Unity of Reason and Rotenstreich, Kant's Dialectic. It is the antithetical "logic of illusion" ("a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of the truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness", A61), but of a special kind that. It has to do with the tendency of pure reason to employ concepts of the understanding to unify knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience, and thereby fall into antinomies and "transcendental illusion". The reason preoccupies itself with directing understanding "towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions", which can never be guaranteed to terminate, andbut then transgresses into positing such absolute totalities as transcendent objects, as if this synthesis of appearances has already terminated. That's the transcendental dialectic. Here is Loparic:

"Yet, if we employ the principles of the understanding not as a canon for evaluating the empirical truth of synthetic propositions but as an organon, and consequently "venture, with the pure understanding alone, to judge synthetically, to affirm, and to decide regarding objects in general", our employment of the pure understanding becomes dialectical (B 88). It cannot be otherwise, because, as we have just seen, the a priori principles of the understanding provide universal conditions of synthesis of sensible objects and as such cannot offer the necessary basis for "passing judgments upon objects without distinction - upon objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot in any way be given" (B 88). An analogous dialectical illusion is generated through attempts to decide synthetical propositions regarding objects in general by employing solely formal logic and the transcendental principles of pure speculative reason (B 353)".

The genesis of the terms "analytic" and "dialectic" in Kant's time is discussed in Tonelli's Der historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini „Analytik“ und „Dialektik“, who concludes (my translation):

"The division of the Critique of Pure Reason into Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic is undoubtedly after the process made by Darjes. Kant knew the Darjesian philosophy very well, he had dealt with it several times and stood in some details under the influence of Darjes and his school. The content of the Kantian transcendental analytics and dialectics is clearly quite different from that of the eponymous parts of the Aristotelian manuals; but the hypothetical and antithetical character the transcendental dialectic probably corresponds to the concept of logica probabilium or disputatrix. This analogy may have moved Kant to to adopt the Aristotelian term."

Darjes is an 18th century author who published Introductio in Artem Inveniendi, seu Logicam theoretico-practicam, qua Analytica atque Dialectica... (1732), who assigned to analytic "concepts and definitions and their origin either a priori or a posteriori, judgments and sentences, intuitive judgments and the generality a posteriori, discursive judgments..." and to dialectic "probability in general and as a way to dialectically find the truth, a way to find apparent terms or definitions, theoretical sentences a priori and a posteriori, philosophical hypotheses, hermeneutic probability, probable criticism, assessment of the likelihood of other people's opinions".

On Kant's own employment of "transcendental dialectic" there is more or less an agreement, see e.g. IEP, Kant’s Dialectic, Loparic, Kant's Dialectic, Guyer, The Unity of Reason and Rotenstreich, Kant's Dialectic. It is the antithetical "logic of illusion" ("a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of the truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness", A61), but of a special kind that has to do with the tendency of pure reason to employ concepts of the understanding to unify knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience, and thereby fall into antinomies and "transcendental illusion". The reason preoccupies itself with directing understanding "towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions", which can never terminate, and then transgresses into positing such absolute totalities as transcendent objects, as if this synthesis of appearances has already terminated. That's the transcendental dialectic. Here is Loparic:

"Yet, if we employ the principles of the understanding not as a canon for evaluating the empirical truth of synthetic propositions but as an organon, and consequently "venture, with the pure understanding alone, to judge synthetically, to affirm, and to decide regarding objects in general", our employment of the pure understanding becomes dialectical (B 88). It cannot be otherwise, because, as we have just seen, the a priori principles of the understanding provide universal conditions of synthesis of sensible objects and as such cannot offer the necessary basis for "passing judgments upon objects without distinction - upon objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot in any way be given" (B 88). An analogous dialectical illusion is generated through attempts to decide synthetical propositions regarding objects in general by employing solely formal logic and the transcendental principles of pure speculative reason (B 353)".

The genesis of the terms "analytic" and "dialectic" in Kant's time is discussed in Tonelli's Der historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini „Analytik“ und „Dialektik“, who concludes (my translation):

"The division of the Critique of Pure Reason into Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic is undoubtedly after the process made by Darjes. Kant knew the Darjesian philosophy very well, he had dealt with it several times and stood in some details under the influence of Darjes and his school. The content of the Kantian transcendental analytics and dialectics is clearly quite different from that of the eponymous parts of the Aristotelian manuals; but the hypothetical and antithetical character the transcendental dialectic probably corresponds to the concept of logica probabilium or disputatrix. This analogy may have moved Kant to to adopt the Aristotelian term."

Darjes is an 18th century author who published Introductio in Artem Inveniendi, seu Logicam theoretico-practicam, qua Analytica atque Dialectica... (1732), who assigned to analytic "concepts and definitions and their origin either a priori or a posteriori, judgments and sentences, intuitive judgments and the generality a posteriori, discursive judgments..." and to dialectic "probability in general and as a way to dialectically find the truth, a way to find apparent terms or definitions, theoretical sentences a priori and a posteriori, philosophical hypotheses, hermeneutic probability, probable criticism, assessment of the likelihood of other people's opinions".

Kant has two types of analytic and dialectic, formal and transcendental. In both cases the division is between correct and incorrect employment of understanding and reason in their formal (general, syntactic) and transcendental (synthetic, semantic) functions. On Kant's "transcendental dialectic" there is more or less an agreement, see e.g. IEP, Kant’s Dialectic, Loparic, Kant's Dialectic, Guyer, The Unity of Reason and Rotenstreich, Kant's Dialectic. It is the antithetical "logic of illusion" ("a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of the truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness", A61), but of a special kind. It has to do with the tendency of pure reason to employ concepts of the understanding to unify knowledge beyond the boundaries of experience, and thereby fall into antinomies and "transcendental illusion". The reason preoccupies itself with directing understanding "towards absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions", which can never be guaranteed to terminate, but then transgresses into positing such absolute totalities as transcendent objects, as if this synthesis of appearances has already terminated. That's the transcendental dialectic. Here is Loparic:

"Yet, if we employ the principles of the understanding not as a canon for evaluating the empirical truth of synthetic propositions but as an organon, and consequently "venture, with the pure understanding alone, to judge synthetically, to affirm, and to decide regarding objects in general", our employment of the pure understanding becomes dialectical (B 88). It cannot be otherwise, because, as we have just seen, the a priori principles of the understanding provide universal conditions of synthesis of sensible objects and as such cannot offer the necessary basis for "passing judgments upon objects without distinction - upon objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot in any way be given" (B 88). An analogous dialectical illusion is generated through attempts to decide synthetical propositions regarding objects in general by employing solely formal logic and the transcendental principles of pure speculative reason (B 353)".

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