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Mozibur Ullah
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Isn't that what quantum computing practitioners or string theorists doing already? Or should be doing - or do they need more help? Aronson himself makes the point that funding in philosophy is in a parlous state on both sides of the Atlantic, and one could assume this was due simply to its obscure subject-matter, a possible penchant for political subversiveness, and a decidedly hermeneutic tradition - or one could point out that one lives in a technological age where funding is slanted quite heavily towards science because of its perceived technological benefits.

Isn't that what quantum computing practitioners or string theorists doing already? Or should be doing - or do they need more help?

Isn't that what quantum computing practitioners or string theorists doing already? Or should be doing - or do they need more help? Aronson himself makes the point that funding in philosophy is in a parlous state on both sides of the Atlantic, and one could assume this was due simply to its obscure subject-matter, a possible penchant for political subversiveness, and a decidedly hermeneutic tradition - or one could point out that one lives in a technological age where funding is slanted quite heavily towards science because of its perceived technological benefits.

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Mozibur Ullah
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Interestingly enough, Aaronson, himself, in the interview (not in the extract) shows that he has missed the full import of Humes attack on induction, which was one of the problems that Kant set out to solve. One might say that its only by reading Kant that one understands Humes question. Or one could just dismiss this as hermeneutics.

He also mentions one of his most popular paper, Who can name the largest number, which, pace Cantorian Set Theory, remains only in the world of finite (but very large) numbers. When one understands Cantor work on the Transinfinite one can progress into a world of much much larger numbers. And in fact this has become something of a cottage industry in Modern Set Theory where new axioms are appended which allows one to ascend even higher up the the transfinite heirarchy. Certain enthusiasts say that Set Theorists have tamed the ininite and made it comprehensible; but this is again to miss the full import of the infinite, even only in its mathematical guise - Aristotle judged correctly when he said Man could only ever conceptualise infinity, the apeiron, the potential infinity and never grasp it.

Interestingly enough, Aaronson, himself, in the interview (not in the extract) shows that he has missed the full import of Humes attack on induction, which was one of the problems that Kant set out to solve. One might say that its only by reading Kant that one understands Humes question. Or one could just dismiss this as hermeneutics.

He also mentions one of his most popular paper, Who can name the largest number, which, pace Cantorian Set Theory, remains only in the world of finite (but very large) numbers. When one understands Cantor work on the Transinfinite one can progress into a world of much much larger numbers. And in fact this has become something of a cottage industry in Modern Set Theory where new axioms are appended which allows one to ascend even higher up the the transfinite heirarchy. Certain enthusiasts say that Set Theorists have tamed the ininite and made it comprehensible; but this is again to miss the full import of the infinite, even only in its mathematical guise - Aristotle judged correctly when he said Man could only ever conceptualise infinity, the apeiron, the potential infinity and never grasp it.

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Mozibur Ullah
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Its untrue that philosophical debates about abstruse matters do not affect other fields.

To take one example, the debate about the reality of universals, which dates from antiquity, informed Bouwers intuitionism/constructivism which is one species of nominalism. This led something of an undercover existence apart from the mainstream as Cantorian Set Theory was adopted by the mainstream mathematical community under the aegis of Hilbert. Its only recently that its made its presence more visible with Topos Theory.

Nagarjuna & Hegel were taking quite seriously the idea that there can be true contradictions. Again very recently one has idea that paraconsistent logics can be taken seriosly by removing 'explosion' from classical logic.

As for quanta, the originary story in the history of science, was the discovery of the solution by Plank of black-body radiation by allowing energy to be quantised, that is to come in discrete sizes. The change of language in particular hides what actually has been done, which is to think of energy atomically, in the sense of Democritus.

Of course the work of Democritus was also significant in Newton theory of light, where he introduced the idea of corpuscular light which fixed an inconsistenct in Democritus theory of light - as he didn't consider them atomically.

The Universal Theory of Gravitation that Newton discovered had a huge philosophic hole which is how was force transmitted. It was this reason, amongst others that one can see that the idea of aether that was postulated by Aristotle was pressed into service as the medium that carried this force. As mechanics was the supreme science then, it was given certain mechanical properties. It was only when Einstein discovered that it was the very fabric of space-time that transmitted the force of gravity that one can see that this idea of the aether was seen to be wrong. Except of course that this is not quite right - Aristotle was quite right in postulating the existence of the aether as an element distinct in nature from the other four classsical elements, but he hadn't understood its true nature, and the later physicists post-Newton following Aristotle were also correct in doing so. It was Einstein that identified space-time itself as the aether that physicists had postulated all along. Space-time itself was a substance, a kind of element.

why not help clarify some modern scientific debates—-say, about quantum computing, or string theory, or the black-hole firewall problem, ones where we don’t already know how everything turns out?

Isn't that what quantum computing practitioners or string theorists doing already? Or should be doing - or do they need more help?

Every discipline has its own character, its own subject-matter, and its own tradition. It seems to me that one general distiction between philosophy and the sciences, and this probably goes for most of the humanities, is that the original text matters much more in the humanties. One does not go back and read the Principia Mathematica, whereas one is expected to read King Lear in the rginal Shakespearian Language, or Beowulf in Old English, or Platos dialogues. One might say Science progresses by papers. And humanities by books.