Skip to main content
Philosophy

Return to Answer

added 282 characters in body
Source Link
CriglCragl
CriglCragl
  • 23.8k
  • 4
  • 28
  • 76

You have to understand, the language-game 'Philosophical Zombies' is above all a thought experiment. Whether we personally are not zombies, or whether zombies are possible, are not subject to assumption or observation - but, definition in this context. The thought experiment begins there, with looking to consequences if the definition is allowed to stand. So really, Dennett conducts a sleight-of-hand, which personally I don't think stands scrutiny, he just satssays what we call inner experience isn't really that, when clearly definitionally it is - a la cogitocogito.

P-Zombies is the parallel of the Turing Test, where gherethere is the recognition 'all we have' for other humans seems to be that we pass such a test of acting conscious, and so allows us to focus on the gap between our experience of ourselves and how we experience others, and examine our intuitions about ourselves and others.

This quote though points us at intersubjectivity. We do generally, if we are not solipsists, begin with the assumption other humans are like ourselves, and, that is functional and useful, in constructing our world and reality - like so: Indra's Net. That is, whether or not we consider other humans to 'really' be like ourselves, if we at least 'act' like they are, then we can engage in this peer-to-peer reality where our experiences are named and organised through engaging in language games, and we greatly extend our experiences and understanding by acting like other people are like ourselves - and, beliefs to the contrary aren't really functional. Through language tools like 'chunking' and assembling 'salience landscapes', and forming 'explanatory layers' that use those, we focus on the bits of the world where we can have influence, enabling our mental model of reality to give us 'cognitive grip' on our experiences. See detailed discussion here: According to the major theories of concepts, where do meanings come from?

I would explain the deep roots of this gap, between the idea of the Turing Test and the practice, by looking to how we expect a deeper mirroring by other humans: for them to deduce things about our experience by queues like wincing, and that the assumptions involved in that pre-exist our capacities to make sense of our experiences by naming them, involved in language. We just can't begin to sift noise for signal, and begin to form tractable models of the world, without accepting it. Babies isolated from interaction die, babies deprived of verbal language develop their own (babbling, hand gestures, etc), and risk never becoming fully cognitively developed if the don't get human interaction (see children raised by wolves, or severely neglected). Human brains fully developing, and language, arise together. An AGI could potentially arise out of language itself, in the way AlphaZero generated a chess player, this is likeI think comparable to how some twins sponteneously generate their own language from the evolutionary trigger of babbling (assiciatedassociated with FoxP2 genes, plus honed by mirror neurons).

I feel that the distinction in science between phenomena and theory, is a useful model for understanding the relation between personal experience (not private, but intersubjectively-informed) and language. Discussed here: Is scientific knowledge personal or general? We use tools like consilience and examining our cognitive biasees, to filter what about our experiences is intersubjective, and would be experienced by others in a similar way if they were in our situation. 

We are enculturated into a peer-to-peer reality, but there is the capacity for a 'hard fork' or paradigm shift, if a new framing can take enough people into it's language game. This can help us understand the problems of interspecies communication.

You have to understand, the language-game 'Philosophical Zombies' is above all a thought experiment. Whether we personally are not zombies, or whether zombies are possible, are not subject to assumption or observation - but, definition in this context. The thought experiment begins there, with looking to consequences if the definition is allowed to stand. So really, Dennett conducts a sleight-of-hand, which personally I don't think stands scrutiny, he just sats what we call inner experience isn't really that, when clearly definitionally it is - a la cogito.

P-Zombies is the parallel of the Turing Test, where ghere is the recognition 'all we have' for other humans seems to be that we pass such a test of acting conscious, and so allows us to focus on the gap between our experience of ourselves and how we experience others, and examine our intuitions about ourselves and others.

This quote though points us at intersubjectivity. We do generally, if we are not solipsists, begin with the assumption other humans are like ourselves, and, that is functional and useful, in constructing our world and reality - like so: Indra's Net. That is, whether or not we consider other humans to 'really' be like ourselves, if we at least 'act' like they are, then we can engage in this peer-to-peer reality where our experiences are named and organised through engaging in language games, and we greatly extend our experiences and understanding by acting like other people are like ourselves. Through language tools like 'chunking' and assembling 'salience landscapes' and forming 'explanatory layers' that use those, we focus on the bits of the world where we can have influence, enabling our mental model of reality to give us 'cognitive grip' on our experiences. See detailed discussion here: According to the major theories of concepts, where do meanings come from?

I would explain this gap, between the idea of the Turing Test and the practice, by looking to how we expect a deeper mirroring by other humans: for them to deduce things about our experience by queues like wincing, and that the assumptions involved in that pre-exist our capacities to make sense of our experiences by naming them, involved in language. We just can't begin to sift noise for signal, and begin to form tractable models of the world, without accepting it. Babies isolated from interaction die, babies deprived of verbal language develop their own, and risk never becoming fully cognitively developed if the don't get human interaction. Human brains fully developing and language, arise together. An AGI could potentially arise out of language itself, in the way AlphaZero generated a chess player, this is like how some twins sponteneously generate their own language from the evolutionary trigger of babbling (assiciated with FoxP2 genes, plus mirror neurons).

I feel that the distinction in science between phenomena and theory, is a useful model for understanding the relation between personal experience (not private, but intersubjectively-informed) and language: Is scientific knowledge personal or general? We use tools like consilience and examining our cognitive biasees, to filter what about our experiences is intersubjective, and would be experienced by others in a similar way if they were in our situation. We are enculturated into a peer-to-peer reality, but there is the capacity for a 'hard fork' or paradigm shift, if a new framing can take enough people into it's language game.

You have to understand, the language-game 'Philosophical Zombies' is above all a thought experiment. Whether we personally are not zombies, or whether zombies are possible, are not subject to assumption or observation - but, definition in this context. The thought experiment begins there, with looking to consequences if the definition is allowed to stand. So really, Dennett conducts a sleight-of-hand, which personally I don't think stands scrutiny, he just says what we call inner experience isn't really that, when clearly definitionally it is - a la cogito.

P-Zombies is the parallel of the Turing Test, where there is the recognition 'all we have' for other humans seems to be that we pass such a test of acting conscious, and so allows us to focus on the gap between our experience of ourselves and how we experience others, and examine our intuitions about ourselves and others.

This quote though points us at intersubjectivity. We do generally, if we are not solipsists, begin with the assumption other humans are like ourselves, and, that is functional and useful, in constructing our world and reality - like so: Indra's Net. That is, whether or not we consider other humans to 'really' be like ourselves, if we at least 'act' like they are, then we can engage in this peer-to-peer reality where our experiences are named and organised through engaging in language games, and we greatly extend our experiences and understanding by acting like other people are like ourselves - and, beliefs to the contrary aren't really functional. Through language tools like 'chunking' and assembling 'salience landscapes', and forming 'explanatory layers' that use those, we focus on the bits of the world where we can have influence, enabling our mental model of reality to give us 'cognitive grip' on our experiences. See detailed discussion here: According to the major theories of concepts, where do meanings come from?

I would explain the deep roots of this gap, between the idea of the Turing Test and the practice, by looking to how we expect a deeper mirroring by other humans: for them to deduce things about our experience by queues like wincing, and that the assumptions involved in that pre-exist our capacities to make sense of our experiences by naming them, involved in language. We just can't begin to sift noise for signal, and begin to form tractable models of the world, without accepting it. Babies isolated from interaction die, babies deprived of verbal language develop their own (babbling, hand gestures, etc), and risk never becoming fully cognitively developed if the don't get human interaction (see children raised by wolves, or severely neglected). Human brains fully developing, and language, arise together. An AGI could potentially arise out of language itself, in the way AlphaZero generated a chess player, this is I think comparable to how some twins sponteneously generate their own language from the evolutionary trigger of babbling (associated with FoxP2 genes, plus honed by mirror neurons).

I feel that the distinction in science between phenomena and theory, is a useful model for understanding the relation between personal experience (not private, but intersubjectively-informed) and language. Discussed here: Is scientific knowledge personal or general? We use tools like consilience and examining our cognitive biasees, to filter what about our experiences is intersubjective, and would be experienced by others in a similar way if they were in our situation. 

We are enculturated into a peer-to-peer reality, but there is the capacity for a 'hard fork' or paradigm shift, if a new framing can take enough people into it's language game. This can help us understand the problems of interspecies communication.

Source Link
CriglCragl
CriglCragl
  • 23.8k
  • 4
  • 28
  • 76

"Why aren't we zombies?" There's the assumption that we aren't, but it's not acknowledged.

You have to understand, the language-game 'Philosophical Zombies' is above all a thought experiment. Whether we personally are not zombies, or whether zombies are possible, are not subject to assumption or observation - but, definition in this context. The thought experiment begins there, with looking to consequences if the definition is allowed to stand. So really, Dennett conducts a sleight-of-hand, which personally I don't think stands scrutiny, he just sats what we call inner experience isn't really that, when clearly definitionally it is - a la cogito.

P-Zombies is the parallel of the Turing Test, where ghere is the recognition 'all we have' for other humans seems to be that we pass such a test of acting conscious, and so allows us to focus on the gap between our experience of ourselves and how we experience others, and examine our intuitions about ourselves and others.

To me the critical piece for this topic, which I find all too frequently bizarrely and to my mind inexplicably neglected, is The Private Language Argument. Take Wittgenstein's points about pain, a topic you raise:

"What would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth ache'." Well, let's assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation! But then, of course, he couldn't make himself understood when he used the word. So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone? But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'? How has he done this naming of pain?! -PI 257

He has a lot more to say on this, and the full Private Language Argument was not strictly developed by Wittgenstein but from his work.

This quote though points us at intersubjectivity. We do generally, if we are not solipsists, begin with the assumption other humans are like ourselves, and, that is functional and useful, in constructing our world and reality - like so: Indra's Net. That is, whether or not we consider other humans to 'really' be like ourselves, if we at least 'act' like they are, then we can engage in this peer-to-peer reality where our experiences are named and organised through engaging in language games, and we greatly extend our experiences and understanding by acting like other people are like ourselves. Through language tools like 'chunking' and assembling 'salience landscapes' and forming 'explanatory layers' that use those, we focus on the bits of the world where we can have influence, enabling our mental model of reality to give us 'cognitive grip' on our experiences. See detailed discussion here: According to the major theories of concepts, where do meanings come from?

The Turing Test in practice is subject to endless iterations and reforming, because despite superficial plausability in practice we just don't feel that engaging in text-based chat does indicate the presence of inner experience, though it can apparently fool some people some of the time (I'd suggest this was actually done in bad faith for attention, which it got, given the substantial editing of the chats involved). But, the idea of the Turing Test points towards the shift from thinking about what subjectivity 'is' to what it does for us. What we really look for in a Turing Test is evidence of subjective experience like our own, manifested by mirroring, empathy, and sponteneous responses to internal experiences like our own. When we think more deeply, these may not be good criteria at all, and while we can point at structural/functional attributes like manifesting a strange-loop, there is a real risk of suffering occuring that we are blind to by only recognising human-like sentience, as discussed under Bostrom's 'mind crime'.

I would explain this gap, between the idea of the Turing Test and the practice, by looking to how we expect a deeper mirroring by other humans: for them to deduce things about our experience by queues like wincing, and that the assumptions involved in that pre-exist our capacities to make sense of our experiences by naming them, involved in language. We just can't begin to sift noise for signal, and begin to form tractable models of the world, without accepting it. Babies isolated from interaction die, babies deprived of verbal language develop their own, and risk never becoming fully cognitively developed if the don't get human interaction. Human brains fully developing and language, arise together. An AGI could potentially arise out of language itself, in the way AlphaZero generated a chess player, this is like how some twins sponteneously generate their own language from the evolutionary trigger of babbling (assiciated with FoxP2 genes, plus mirror neurons).

We can observe degrees of intersubjectivity with animals: How to define intelligence amongst animals

We can I think have experiences without language, new-born babies do, although they quickly learn to cry when hungry, reach when they want to be picked up, focus their eyes and make eye contact to show interest or ask for attention, mimicry, and so on - which in this context are language. With distinct developments in children's quality of intersubjectivity, like the ability to decieve others that usually develops around age three. Our observations themselves, rapidly become theory-laden, through the application of language. And a huge amount of human cognition and communication is about picking up implicit and contextual queues, which is highlighted by trying to communicate with computers, and we can relate evolutionarily to the neocortex (Dunbar Number) and the Default Mode Network. Simply participating in interactions with other agents, can begin to develop language.

I feel that the distinction in science between phenomena and theory, is a useful model for understanding the relation between personal experience (not private, but intersubjectively-informed) and language: Is scientific knowledge personal or general? We use tools like consilience and examining our cognitive biasees, to filter what about our experiences is intersubjective, and would be experienced by others in a similar way if they were in our situation. We are enculturated into a peer-to-peer reality, but there is the capacity for a 'hard fork' or paradigm shift, if a new framing can take enough people into it's language game.