This thought has been on my mind for a long time. It was reinvigorated by this question.
The most cliche presentation we hear about what “science” is in everyday discourse is something like:
- a flowchart-type diagram involving “making observations”, “formulating hypotheses”, “making experiments”
- Some very common re-hashing of Karl Popper that it “has to be falsifiable”
- Or, probably some focus on “testability”, or “empirical evidence” or “experimental evidence”
Now, on the one hand, if the key distinguishing feature of “science” is empirical knowledge, as opposed to, I don’t know, Descartes-type a priori rational knowledge, then I think this idea of “science” would encompass more than is commonly considered “science” (like, everyday first-person experiences are “empirical knowledge”, like going to an ice cream shop), and it would fail to address what is probably a key aspect of “science”, which is the rational component (ie, how much of “science” actually is about non-empirical analytical reasoning; building theories, mental models, etc.)
The question is of importance to me, since I have often felt that “science” has become a very effective rhetorical instrument in this period of history. I have often felt one of the best ways to immediately persuade someone of anything is to tell them that it’s “science”. It’s sort of a Trojan horse in which because they believe “science” is the antidote to all forms of dubious and irrational thinking, as long as they can become convinced something is “science”, they will believe almost anything, even if it is actually something lacking in epistemic soundness. (I don’t just mean cliche ideas of “pseudo-science” like New Age medicine, but rather, how cultural dynamics reinforce what ideas count as “science” vs “pseudo-science”, and those words alone are enough to steer people’s epistemic allegiances).
What is strange is that the word “science” comes from a Latin word meaning “to know”; “philosophy” comes from a Greek word meaning “wisdom”; “mathematics” comes from a Greek word meaning “to learn”; and I think “ethics” comes from the Greek “ethos”, which meant “character, disposition or personality” but originally came from “accustomed place” (like the habitat of say, horses), and “morality” also has a strikingly parallel etymology in Latin, coming from “mores” (i.e. customs, habits) (I think, anyway). The point being, a lot of terminology with a lot of concentrated meaning, if you try to peel back the layers and get down to some semantic primitives giving them strong definition and demarcation, are kind of empty. “Science” means (literally) nothing but “knowledge”. Are we conditioned through experience to associate “science” with particular techniques we happen to see in our society around us, like laboratories, microscopes, “double-blind placebo controlled studies”, “Ph.D.’s”, etc.? Does “science” reduce to nothing but epistemology, the analysis of the nature and conditions of “knowing” something?
The SEP features this paragraph which I like:
Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories. How these are carried out in detail can vary greatly, but characteristics like these have been looked to as a way of demarcating scientific activity from non-science, where only enterprises which employ some canonical form of scientific method or methods should be considered science (see also the entry on science and pseudo-science). Others have questioned whether there is anything like a fixed toolkit of methods which is common across science and only science. Some reject privileging one view of method as part of rejecting broader views about the nature of science, such as naturalism (Dupré 2004); some reject any restriction in principle (pluralism).
I’m gonna read through that article, but would definitely like some supportive discussion here to think things through and analyze different dimensions of the question in detail.