Let's say Kant was right about Transcendental Idealism, what further conclusions would you come to about reality and our existence?

Question

So here are some quotes from Schopenhauer about Kant's views:

"Transcendental is the philosophy that makes us aware of the fact that the first and essential laws of this world that are presented to us are rooted in our brain and are therefore known a priori. It is called transcendental because it goes beyond the whole given phantasmagoria to the origin thereof."

"Before Kant, it may be said, we were in time; now time is in us. In the first case, time is real and, like everything lying in time, we are consumed by it. In the second case, time is ideal; it lies within us."

"With Kant the critical philosophy appeared as the opponent of this entire method [of dogmatic philosophy]. It makes its problem just those eternal truths (principle of contradiction, principle of sufficient reason) that serve as the foundation of every such dogmatic structure, investigates their origin, and then finds this to be in man's head."

So my question is....if time/space are within us, and the forms of our intuition (the grounds of the possibility of intuiting objects), then what exactly are we?

Let's just assume it's all true, for fun. Then, are each of us gods of some kind? Divine beings?

Maybe I am reading too much into his views, but it seems like if we take it all as true, you could come to some crazy ideas about what we are really are.

Where did we come from? How do we attain the power to create time and space to order reality?

I actually like Kant's views (and Schopenhauer). I think they are geniuses, even if I don't necessarily buy everything that they say.

I think about this all the time. If it's all true (in Kant's view), then what would you say about us as beings? Are there other philosophers who have explored further into this question about our essence? Where and why we attained these powers?

Answer 1

Kant does, in a way appropriate to his time, state that we are built to gain, process, and represent input in a particular way that is broadly identical between humans. And he wrote about necessary structural elements of that. The question why or how this happens is nonsensical, it just is what it is.

Following the Hegelian impact of becoming as a central element, Dilthey, Husserl, Gadamer, Foucault and others later stated that these structural elements are not eternal but can, gradually and within limits, change over time depending on cultural developments.

As of time, space etc. the interpretations differ but I would like to stress that Kant does never write that we make time and space out of thin air or that there is no "real" time or space. Just that the time and space we know is "only in oir heads" and only part of the objects aas they appear to us. It just makes no sense to think or discuss about time and space beyond that because we cannot possibly know about that. What we think to know due to the ones who followed Kant is that these things are necessary structures for shared experiences and undergoes cultural and historical plasticity to a degree.

In a way, it would be a misreading of Kant (which Schopenhauer certainly would endorse as insight beyond Kant) to say that our intellect is somehow building (part of) the universe. There is a spontaneous element, yes, and our understanding "adds" something to the sensuous input. That itself cannot be random, though, or we could not understand each other. Spontaneity means only breaking the direct chain of causality here. According to later and modern interpretation, this process itself is governed by language, culture, and biology, though. In other words: we are children of the interactions with our environment, just like any other animal is.

Answer 2

You ask:

Let's say Kant was right about Transcendental Idealism, what further conclusions would you come to about reality and our existence?

Philip Klöcking says:

Kant does, in a way appropriate to his time, state that we are built to gain, process, and represent input in a particular way that is broadly identical between humans. And he wrote about necessary structural elements of that. The question why or how this happens is nonsensical, it just is what it is... others later stated that these structural elements are not eternal but can, gradually and within limits, change over time depending on cultural developments.

This is largely accurate with the objection that might be lodged that the question of why or how this universality of human thought and phenomenal experience be universal nonsensical and just is. As Literallywho has noted, human cognition and the phenomenal experience under a naturalized epistemology are products of the forces of evolution. Therefore, there is a question of the unity of science (SEP) since Kant and TI provides a sound metaphysical argument that psychology and minds is partially reducible to biology.

Thus, any philosopher who has an interest in how science and philosophy interoperate to provide us a metaphysical grounding (SEP) for our thinking consistent with scientific knowledge should look to Kant and his theories on pain of reinventing the wheel when coping with the struggles reconciling empirical and rational methods. In fact, two important and more contemporary philosophers who do so are Wilfred Sellars and John McDowell. The former discusses manifest image and scientific image, and the latter discusses bald naturalism and rejects non-conceptual data both of which have the power to shape our conclusions about reality and our existence.

This should come as no surprise, of course, as both thinkers are considered neo-Kantians. Both thinkers offer additional steps forward in shaping our philosophical views of the world, and both views can be considered in terms of their consistency with the findings cognitive science. As for the implications for TI in modern philosophy, as Philip Klöcking has noted in the comments:

I'd just like to add that there is no philosophical system after 1928 (Plessner) I am aware of that integrates the human as a biological, physical being with its sentient and sapient Being. Also, Sellars has a lot more to offer than manifest vs. scientific image since he has systematic Kantian accounts of language learning and concept building that are largely in line with modern cognitive sciences (holistic learning and representation).

Thus, contemporary philosophers still very much are in disagreement about our physical and mental lives.

Answer 3

1. What does Kant mean by Transcendental Idealism? He says:

   I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances [Erscheinungen] the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves [nicht als Dinge an sich selbst ansehen], and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves [als Dinge an sich selbst]. (Critique of Pure Reason A369)

   Kant’s emphasizes the difference between “representation (Vorstellung) – thing in itself (Ding an sich selbst)” and on the character of “space and time” as the forms of our intuition (Anschauung).

2. For an introduction into these basic ideas of Kant’s transcendental idealism see SEP Appearances and Things in Themselves.

   Kant focuses with his epistemology on the tools, which human mind and human reason use to produce experience. In modern language: On the cognitive capabilities and tools used by human data processing.

3. The general conclusion of Kant’s transcendental idealism is to see human experience as a mental construction, not as a reproduction like an image.

   Kant considered his philosophy as an answer to the big question “What is the human being?”, which he specified by the three questions (Critique of Pure Reason B833)

   • What can I know?
   • What ought I do?
   • What can I hope for?

   Kant elaborated his answer to these three questions mainly in his volumes "Critique of Pure Reason" and "Critique of Practical Reason".

Answer 4

I see no reason why not to read Kant in naturalistic terms: the pure intuitions of space and time, for example, depend on some neural correlates and can be seen as conferring a evolutionary advantage by allowing us to apprehend empirical objects (appearances), since these intuitions makes possible for us to "integrate" the manifold of heterogeneous sensations.

Regarding who we are, for Kant, the subject can be understood in a twofold way: the empirical subject and the transcendental subject.

The empirical subject/soul/self is cognized as an object like any other (trees, stones, galaxies), subject in every way to the laws of nature and so physically explainable. Moreover, insofar as for Kant a purely temporal persistent is impossible (a Cartesian soul, for example), the empirical subject can only be cognized as the accident of a permanent spatial substance (i.e. the body) and not as a substance in its own right. Therefore, I see no reason why not to view Kant as endorsing a sort of physicalism.

When we shift our view to the transcendental subject that precedes and explains experience, all that it is, is another transcendental object = X (noumenon) about which nothing can be known or affirmed, except its existence as indicated by the fact of affection which might be understood as a sensational self-awareness.

For more information on Kant and his philosophy of mind, see the IEP's article on the topic.