Can our universe be a simulation without simulator?

Question

I have a deviating understanding of the simulation hypothesis. If I look at our universe as simulation, then it seems to me irrelevant whether this simulation is actually executed or not. In my understanding of simulation hypothesis, we exist because we can be simulated; not because we are simulated.
My argumentation:

Say our universe can be described by a finite set of rules and initial states. Then every possible future sequence of states of the universe can in principle be calculated. Even if some rules are stochastic, something can in theory run a simulation long enough to cause any possible sequence of states.

Then what makes our universe real? Is it real because it is executed on some mysterious "real" computing device? If we run our universe on more real computers, will it be more real? But from the viewpoint of the universe, it makes no difference if it is executed on 1, 2, 3, ..., N computing devices. No sequence of states of the universe depends on this information of how many computing devices it runs on.

Then what if N=0? If the universe is not executed on a single computing device, then does it not exist?
Executing the universe is something that makes the universe observable by someone running the simulation. But is an execution needed for the sole purpose of the universe to exist?
Is it possible that every possible universe must exist simply because it theoretically can exist?
Can the simulation of our universe exist without a simulator?

Am I right to assume that if we accept the simulation hypothesis we must accept this 'simulation without simulator hypothesis'?

Answer 1

If you are going to weave together simulations with nihilism and zero, expect to have to define very strict meanings for several terms:

• Simulation
• Simulator
• Execute
• Zero
• One
• Finite
• Real
• Exists

Your theory does balloon quickly into "every possible universe exists, because none of them exist," which isn't inherently wrong, per se, but it does limit its usefulness as a descriptive theory unless those strict definitions produce some very interesting side effects.

As a starting point, consider that "the natural numbers" starts from 1, not 0. That doesn't mean it can't start from 0, but it does mean there is some qualitative difference between the starting points that have meaning to human philosophers.

Answer 2

This idea of 'simulation' without simulator is worth exploring. Thinking along the lines proposed, one is quickly confronted with the notion of 'real' and what supports (if anything) what is 'real'? I suspect it is the notion of 'real' that is causing us difficulty.

I think the notion of 'simulation' without simulator has some merit and it's easy to think of an example.

1) Imagine -- for instance -- an infinite (or large 'enough') GAME OF LIFE GRID that has been initilized with a set of 'ON' cells that corresponds to a 'computer' (we know these can be built on the LIFE GRID) that 'simulates' the mechanics and all components of a 'universe'. We can make the LIFE GRID as large as we like so that memory is inexhaustible. Last step: WE NEED NOT ACTUALL BUILD SUCH A GRID INITIALIZED AS DESCRIBED -- we need only acknowledge that such a grid-initialization exists (Platonic). To wit: somewhere in the GAME OF LIFE UNIVERSE there IS a grid that corresponds to a computing device that simulates a universe -- and perhaps one complete with thinking creatures. There is no simulator -- there is simply a Platonic Form (so to speak) that corresponds to something we identify with a universe with various features. No creator. No simulation. Just the logical unpacking of rigid logic on the LIFE grid.

2) Same as (1) but said LIFE computer is a simulation of a single MIND and is fed a tape that gives 'it' (the sentience simulated) the experience of being a 'person' (See S Lem's short story addressing this scenario in fiction).

3) Forget the LIFE grid for a moment -- imagine a cellular automata (N dimensional, infinite or very very large) of sufficient complexity that when randomly initialized (or very specifically initialized perhaps) YIELDS complex, sustained objects (atoms, chemistry, stars, etc -- emergent structures). This happens naturally on the LIFE grid, it's easy to imagine (not so easy to create from scratch) automata with rules that yield sufficient macroscale (big chunks of the grid, perhaps the grid cells are Planck Scale) structure to support molecular formation, evolution, etc. All of this from an automata that DOESN'T EXIST IN SOMEONE'S COMPUTER -- ie, an automata from the set of ALL automata -- a Platonic item. This (as with (1) and (2)) eliminates a creator/simulator and any need for an external computing device. This hypothesis is appealing as it immediately manages some inscrutables: apparent need for a creator, paradox of 'real', an unreasonably 'large'/infinite universe.

Answer 3

Suppose you have genuine random elements in the simulation. Then every instantation will realise a different history which cannot be predicted beforehand. So unless you regard the entire ensemble of possible unfoldings of history as your universe you really have to run the simulation to see what you get.

Running the simulation on multiple devices will give different universes, though with common features implicit in the models.

Answer 4

Not only can you not have a simulation without a simulator, but also without something to simulate.

Take for example a painter who makes a painting of a tree. When you look at his canvas you see a picture of a tree, a simulation of tree.

But how could he paint a tree if there was no actually existing tree to paint?

The point I’m making is that the notion of simulation is conceptually incoherent and more likely signifies a kind of philosophical fantasia that says more about the people promulgating such an idea and the times that we live in than it actually says anything about the world.