Debunking Anselm's Ontological Argument

Question

In a nutshell, Anselm's Ontological Argument states that given a God defined as "a being than which none greater can be imagined" it follows that this God must exist.

It seems to me that this argument can easily fall apart with the following reasoning:

Irrespective of the exact meaning of the adjective “greater”, there will be many properties contributing to being greater and other properties that are not related. For instance, being beautiful, being strong and having the power to blow up planets could be all properties contributing to being greater, therefore God would be the most beautiful, the strongest and would have the power to destroy planets. On the opposite side, being funny or being black haired are not properties that make any difference for being greater (this depends on the definition of greater of course, but given a definition there will always be properties that are not related).

Now, “existing in reality” is a property that an entity can have or not have. There are two possibilities, either “existing in reality” is a property contributing to being greater or it’s not.

If not, then there is no implication greater —> “existing in reality”.

If yes, then the argument is circular, since we postulated what we wanted to prove.

Are there any flaws in this reasoning?

Answer 1

To be fair, the notion is really 'more perfect', 'more free of defect' or 'closer to ideal', rather than 'greater'.

Anselm would consider not existing in reality to be a defect, so whatever does not exist in reality could be better if it were to exist in reality. So if you decided God were not real, you did not actually correctly identify the thing most free of defects as God. So there is a real implication there. You have taken a candidate for perfection and improved it by removing a flaw. That is not circular or degenerate.

But that candidate would have to exist. The first part of the deduction does have the weakness you indicate. The notion that the lattice of perfect or defect-free things has a single maximal value is kind of bizarre, given that we know that, for instance, the lattice of integers doesn't. We can create one, slap it on there, and name it 'infinity' but it does not actually exist, and proposing it creates all kinds of confusion and numerous contradictions to be evaded. It can only exist outside the integers...

There is also a basic problem with the idea that 'existing in reality' is a property things can have or not have. Where do we keep the things that do not exist in reality -- do we have another place to put them, other than reality? In fact things might exist 'modally', as fictional ideas, as potential creations, as inchoate wishes, etc... but the idea of 'reality' is a red herring, since any given notion of reality will include some of these and exclude others, kind of according to taste.

Answer 2

Anselm's alleged definition is:

"God is a being than which none greater can be imagined"

That's the same thing as saying:

"Nothing greater can be imagined than the being than which none greater can be imagined"

So my question is:

"What being are you talking about imagining"?

If your answer to that is Anselm's alleged definition, i.e.,

"a being than which none greater can be imagined"

Then you are saying

"Nothing greater can be imagined than a being than which none greater can be imagined"

Then I say:

All the beings I am able to imagine are finite sized material beings, such as human beings. Are you saying "God is a finite-sized material being?".

So I am unable to imagine anything that these words could be talking about, and if I can't imagine anything that has been talked about, then I have only heard some sounds spoken, read some ink squiggles or some lit pixels on a computer screen.

So Anselm's alleged definition is not a definition at all because it doesn't tell me any being to think of, and if you can't think of anything for some words to refer to, then all you have are some words.

Answer 3

You say if yes, then the argument is circular, because we've assumed what we wanted to prove. Just to clarify, Anselm is trying to prove that God exists, not that existence is a greater quality, just making sure we're on the same page.

It does not follow directly that because existence is a greater property that the greatest being must exist. In fact, (though I am no expert) I think the key here is something which was pointed out by Kant and echoed by many others, not to exhaust their entire point, but just to borrow, that existence is a unique property (or not a property at all if they have their way). In my opinion, apart from being contradictory, if a property at all, existence is the one thing we cannot give to the definition of a being (or anything else for that matter). I can define a purple, skinny jaberwocky with 5 toes and an affinity for blue cheese, but I cannot define him to exist in reality. It seems Anselm shared my sentiments as this is not what he has done. He set out to prove it, by saying that if the being does not exist, then an existent version can be imagined, and the imagined version would be greater, creating a contradiction, and if the proposition that God does not exist leads to a contradiction, it must be false and God exists.