Meta-ethics concerns whether at least some ethical judgments are what one might call facts. In particular, a cognitivist who subscribes to realism, rather than the error theory or something similar, holds that they express believed propositions which are sometimes true. As soon as they try to defend this view, they'll need to discuss the relationships between
- "things whose status as facts aren't in meta-ethical dispute because of logical or empirical bases for them" and
- "things whose potential status as further facts is part of what we're debating".
In short, the "is" & "ought" as Hume construed them.
What names can we give these two things that don't presuppose any specific view in meta-ethics? In particular, simply calling 1 "facts" seems inappropriate for this, as it implies 2 (whatever they be called), by contrast, don't comprise facts. I'm sure the need for terminology that doesn't have this problem has led someone to suggest something more workable, but I've not encountered it.
Popper certainly didn't. In Facts, Standards and Truth: A Further Criticism of Relativism, his 1961 addendum to The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper talks a lot about a dualism between facts and standards, which, on my best attempt to read it without finding him contradicting himself, would make these his terms for 1 and 2. Therefore, I suspect a "neutral" pair of terms postdates 1961.
A further clarifying edit, to address the close vote: I'm sorry if this question came across as opinion-based, but literally all I want to know is whether anyone's invented an alternate to "is statements and ought statements" that doesn't suggest anti-realism. That's a factual question about terminology in the literature. I'm assuming from people's responses that they haven't, or at least not very famously.